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zusammenfassung
Aus Sicht von Unternehmen ist die Informationstechnologie (IT)
die Schlüsseltechnologie zur Erhaltung ihrer Wettbewerbsfähig-
keit. Zu diesem Zweck setzen Unternehmen IT ein, um ihre
Geschäftsprozesse zu optimieren. Dabei werden nicht nur in-
terne Geschäftsprozesse, welche innerhalb eines Unternehmens
ablaufen, betrachtet, sondern auch zwischenbetriebliche Geschäfts-
prozesse, an denen mehrere autonome Unternehmen mit Eigen-
interessen beteiligt sind, berücksichtigt. Jedoch bringt der IT-
Einsatz nicht nur Vorteile mit sich, sondern auch eine Reihe an
Schwachstellen und Risiken. Die Digitalisierung von Daten, zum
Beispiel Dokumenten, erleichtert deren Bearbeitung und Aus-
tausch. Zugleich vereinfacht die Digitalisierung unautorisierte Zu-
griffe auf sensible Daten. Hoch verfügbare Kommunikationsnetze
bieten effiziente Plattformen für Unternehmenskooperationen.
Mit diesem Potenzial gehen auch Missbrauchsmöglichkeiten ein-
her, die auf Grund des offenen und anonymen Charakters von
Kommunikationsnetzen entstehen. Zum diesen Missbrauchsmög-
lichkeiten zählt unter anderem Nichteinhaltung von Vereinba-
rungen, zum Beispiel in Bezug auf die Qualität der gelieferten
Güter oder auf Zahlungsmodalitäten.
Als Folge der skizzierten Schwachstellen leidet die Effizienz
(die Wertschaffung) eines Geschäftsprozesses oder die Unter-
nehmen verhalten sich zurückhaltend in Bezug auf den IT-Einsatz
zwecks Optimierung ihrer Geschäftsprozesse. Vor diesem Hin-
tergrund hat diese Arbeit die Entwicklung von Sicherheitsme-
chanismen für Geschäftsprozesse zum Ziel. Angesichts der oben
genannten Schwachstellen werden die Themen Vertrauensbil-
dung in Kommunikationsnetzen und Nutzungskontrolle für di-
gitale Daten, zum Beispiel elektronische Dokumente, adressiert.
Im Bereich Vertrauensbildung werden zwei neue Reputations-
systeme vorgestellt. Das erste Reputationssystem fördert die
Vertrauensbildung in einer Kooperationsplattform, welche die
Durchführung bilateraler und multiattributiver Verhandlungen
ermöglicht. Dabei berücksichtigt das Reputationssystem alle
Phasen einer Markttransaktion. Es ermöglicht die Findung eines
vertrauenswürdigen Geschäftspartners und bietet anschließend
eine Entscheidungsunterstützung während einer Verhandlung.
Das zweite Reputationssystem eignet sich zur Vertrauensbildung
im Rahmen von Geschäftsprozessen in dezentralen P2P-Netzen.
Das System besteht aus einer Reihe von Protokollen, welche
die Robustheit des Systems gegenüber Angriffen gegen das
Reputationssystem sicherstellen. Ein Schwerpunkt hierbei ist
die transitive Berechnung von Vertrauenswerten, welche gegen
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gängige Koalitionsangriffe gegen Reputationssysteme robust ist.
Diese Eigenschaft des Reputationssystems wird mittels Simula-
tion nachgewiesen.
Das Themenfeld Nutzungskontrolle umfasst zwei Aspekte. Ein-
erseits geht es um die Formulierung von Sicherheitsrichtlinien zur
Nutzungskontrolle. Andererseits sind Mechanismen zur Durch-
setzung der definierten Sicherheitsrichtlinien notwendig. Diese
Arbeit liefert Lösungen zur Formulierung und Durchsetzung von
Sicherheitsrichtlinien.
Im Themenfeld Formulierung von Sicherheitsrichtlinien wird
ein innovativer Ansatz für die Zugriffskontrolle für strukturierte
Dokumente vorgestellt. Das Besondere hierbei ist die Aufzeich-
nung von ausgeführten Operationen in einer Historie, welche
für die Definition von Zugriffsregeln verwendet wird. Das Ergeb-
nis ist ein feingranularer und zugleich flexibler Mechanismus
zur Formulierung von Regeln zur Zugriffskontrolle für elek-
tronische Dokumente, die im Rahmen von Geschäftsprozessen
ausgetauscht und bearbeitet werden.
Im Bereich Durchsetzung von Sicherheitsrichtlinien wird ein
System zur Umsetzung der Nutzungskontrolle für digitale Güter
vorgestellt. Es erlaubt die Umsetzung von Geschäftsprozessen im
Bereich des Vertriebs digitaler Güter. Das System bietet Anbietern
digitaler Güter ein hohes Sicherheitsniveau und ermöglicht gleich-
zeitig Nutzern flexible Nutzungsmöglichkeiten, zum Beispiel
den Transfer von digitalen Inhalten zu anderen Geräten oder
Nutzern. Ein wesentlicher Baustein des Systems ist ein robustes
Protokoll, welches die Überprüfung der Integrität einer entfern-
ten Plattform, die für die Durchsetzung von Sicherheitsrichtlinien
verantwortlich ist, ermöglicht.
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abstract
Information technology (IT) supports companies to streamline
their business processes. The main contributions of IT are the dig-
italization of data and efficient communication networks, which
allow companies to automatize their business processes and
thus increase their efficiency, i.e., their value creation. This ef-
fort started with the optimization of internal business processes
within a company. Nowadays, it also includes external business
processes, in which multiple enterprises and even customers are
involved.
However, using IT also causes undesirable side effects for com-
panies. They are exposed to a wide range of vulnerabilities and
threats. Digitalizing data, e.g., documents, spurs the access to that
data and the exchange of it. However, a disadvantageous result
of digitalizing data is the increased risk of unauthorized access
to that data. Communication networks provide an excellent foun-
dation for collaboration between companies. At the same time,
the open and anonymous character of communication networks
is a reason for distrust towards business partners offering their
goods and services over such networks. As a result of these un-
desirable side effects, the outcome of a certain business process
supported by IT may be suboptimal or companies may refrain
from using IT. Against this background, this thesis focuses on
securing electronic business processes with regard to two aspects,
i.e., building trust in open networks and controlling the usage of
digital objects.
Trust is the prerequisite for all kinds of commercial transactions.
Using reputation information is one possible way to build up
trust among business partners. In this thesis, we propose two new
reputation systems to establish trust for ad-hoc processes in open
markets. The first reputation system facilitates trust building in
the context of electronic negotiations which are performed with
the help of a centralized system. The reputation system enables
companies to find trustworthy business partners and provides
decision support during a negotiation. The second reputation
system supports trust building in decentralized Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
networks. A main feature of this system is its robustness against
coalition attacks, which is proven with the help of a simulation.
Controlling the usage of digital objects demands two function-
alities. First, we need methods for defining usage rules. Second,
mechanisms for enforcing the defined usage rules are required.
In this thesis, we address both aspects of usage control.
Digital documents play a central role in business processes,
since they are a means of integration and are handled among
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business partners. Some documents are sensitive and thus have
to be protected from being accessed by unauthorized parties.
For this purpose, we propose a flexible and expressive access
control model for electronic documents. Our model captures the
information about the operations performed on documents. This
history information can be used to define access control rules.
Customers are involved in the execution of special kinds of
business processes, such as selling and consuming digital goods.
In these cases, digital goods have to be protected from being used
in an unauthorized way, e.g., being shared in public networks.
Thus, the trustworthiness of customers’ platforms has to be ver-
ified before transferring digital goods. For this, we propose a
robust integrity reporting protocol which is necessary when a
remote platform has to perform security relevant operations, e.g.,
to enforce a security policy which controls the usage of digital
content. This integrity reporting protocol is a building block of a
new Digital Rights Management system which is also presented
in this thesis. This system provides a high protection level. At the
same time, it allows users to transfer their purchased content to
other devices or users.
vii
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 motivation
Computers and computer networks revolutionized many areas
of our personal and professional life. A wide range of data and
services can be accessed and used independently from location or
time. From companies’ points of view, these possibilities provide
an excellent basis for maintaining their competitiveness. In order
to exploit these opportunities, companies have started to opti-
mize their business processes with the help of the information
technology. This effort is known as Business Process Reengineer-
ing (BPR)[HC93]. BPR has many facets along the whole value
chain of a company. Electronic markets enable companies to find
appropriate business partners at low transaction costs. Supply
chain management systems help companies to streamline their
cross-organisational business processes and thereby to save their
resources. In addition, communication networks like the Internet
enable companies to set up a new range of business models,
e.g., offering digital content, and to interact directly with their
customers. As a result, customers are more and more involved in
a company’s business processes.
However, using information technology for BPR also causes
undesirable side effects for companies. They are exposed to a
wide range of vulnerabilities and threats, such as viruses, hacker
attacks or data theft. According to [Gar06], 40 percent of all
organizations will be targeted by financially motivated cyber-
crime by 2008. As stated by the computer crime and security
survey [Ins07], 194 US companies yielded losses of $66,930,950
caused by various types of computer security incidents in 2007.
The vulnerabilities and threats do not only pose major risks to
the reliable execution of business processes but may also have
negative effects on the reputation of a company and thus on
its value [ER02, CGLZ03]. In addition, the vulnerabilities and
threats lead to an issue regarding trust building. In contrast to
traditional “real-world” transactions, electronic transactions in
virtual communities lack the “direct interpersonal” aspects like
1
mimics, gestures or the personal impression, which have a signifi-
cant influence on the amount of trust shown towards the business
partner. According to [Mui02], challenges facing trust in virtual
communities ironically arise from what some proponents claim
to be the advantages for such communities: being vast, nearly
anonymous, simple to join and leave.
Securing business processes is a challenging task since it has
many facets. Information technology itself provides the necessary
primitives, e.g., cryptography, to secure business processes at
a low level. For example, we can transmit sensitive data over
encrypted channels. However, this is necessary but not sufficient,
since low level security mechanisms do not support companies
and their partners to tap the full potential offered by information
technology. In other words, security mechanisms have to be in-
tegrated into the business logic of a company. For this purpose,
more sophisticated security mechanisms, which ideally cover
business processes at application level, are required. Only then,
companies can fully optimize their business processes.
1.2 contributions
This thesis focuses on securing electronic business processes at ap-
plication level with regard to two aspects, i.e., trust building and
usage control. The contributions and corresponding publications
are sketched in the following:
Trust Building
Trust is the prerequisite for all kind of commercial transac-
tions. Using reputation information is one possible way to build
up trust between business partners. For this purpose, we pro-
pose two new reputation systems to establish trust for ad-hoc
processes in open markets. The first reputation system facil-
itates trust building in the context of electronic negotiations
which are performed with the help of a centralized system
[RT02, RTT03, TFR05, TMF+07, TMF+08]. The second reputa-
tion system supports trust building in decentralized Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) networks. A preliminary version of that system has been
presented in [Taf07].
Another approach to building trust is to make the actions of
a business partner transparent to the others. For this, we ana-
lyze a concrete business process called “Sale by Call for Tenders”
with respect to trust building. Then, we present a set of proto-
cols improving the fairness of the mentioned business process
[TSF+01].
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Usage Control
Controlling the usage of digital objects demands two function-
alities. First, we need methods for defining usage rules. Second,
mechanisms for enforcing the defined usage rules are required.
In this thesis, we address both aspects of usage control.
Digital objects play a key role in business processes. For ex-
ample, a digital document is of utmost importance to a business
process, since it is a means of integration and is handled among
business partners. Some documents are sensitive and thus have
to be protected from being accessed by unauthorized parties. For
this purpose, we propose a flexible access control model for elec-
tronic documents [RTME06, RTE07b, RTE07a, RTME07, RT08].
Digital objects can embody multimedia content. Since this kind
of content, e.g., digital music, can be efficiently reproduced and
delivered, a company can set up business models based on such
content. However, these technical benefits also enable customers
to use their content in an unauthorized way. For instance, they
can illegally duplicate and distribute their purchased content,
which in turn threatens the business models based on selling dig-
ital content. In this thesis, we analyze the requirement for systems
protecting digital content [STW04] and present a robust protocol
for controlling the usage of digital content [STRE06]. This pro-
tocol is a building block for a fair Digital Rights Management
system, which is also presented in thesis.
1.3 outline
This thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some
background information about business processes and argue
why it is crucial to secure them. In Section 3, we focus on trust
building in the context of business processes. We explain the
notions of trust and reputation. Afterwards, we present two new
reputation systems which support trust building in open envi-
ronments. Then, we show how a concrete business process, i.e.,
Sale by Call for Tenders, can be made robust against classical
security attacks, such as identity masquerading and repudiation
of messages. In addition, we explain how to overcome economic
design problems of the mentioned business process to lower the
inhibition threshold for the involved parties. Usage control is the
focus of Section 4. There, we first propose a model for controlling
access to XML documents, then we analyze the requirements
for business processes from the domain of content distribution
and usage. Afterwards, we propose a robust integrity reporting
protocol for secure content distribution. At the end of Section 4,
3
we present a fair Digital Rights Management system, which con-
siders the requirements of content providers as well as customers.
We conclude with a summary and an outlook into future work
in Section 5.
4
2
B A C K G R O U N D
In this section, we provide an introduction into business processes
and investigate security challenges which arise when we try
to automatize business processes with the help of information
technology. In the following section, we present two concrete
application scenarios, in which information technology supports
BPR. Afterwards, we use these scenarios to argue why securing
business processes is crucial.
2.1 business processes
According to [VW00], no generally accepted definition of the
term business process exists since business processes have been
approached by a number of different disciplines. [LDL03] claims
that most business process definitions are limited in depth and
the corresponding models are also constrained to a specific view-
point. According to [VTT08], the problem with business process
definitions in literature is twofold: either they are too simplistic
and basic, thus too generic to provide any tangible contribution or
they are confined to a very specific application area that prevents
them from wide acceptance and applicability.
In this thesis, we use one of the most cited definitions of a
business process which is given by Davenport: a business process
is “a structured, measured set of activities designed to produce a
specific output for a particular customer or market” [Dav92]. In
other words, a business process transforms some sort of input
by some sort of activities to some sort of output. The goal of this
transformation is value creation, i.e., the output of a process is
more valuable to an involved party than its input. Davenport’s
definition clearly shows that business processes embody the core
activities of a company which create value for customers and
thus ensure the existence of the company. As a result, companies
started to pay attention to their business processes in order to
increase their efficiency. This effort is referred to as Business Pro-
cess Reengineering (BPR). Hammer and Champy define BPR as
“... the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business
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processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical contempo-
rary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and
speed” [HC93]. In the last years BPR became a fixed part and
success factor of companies [GKS04].
[MS96] states that there are three factors influencing the re-
sult of a business process, namely process design, human actors
and information technology. Process design defines the way the
activities of a business process are actually preformed. For in-
stance, it determines the interdependencies between activities,
such as orders and preconditions. Human actors are responsi-
ble for performing tasks which cannot be automatized due to
their complexity. Thus, the skill and motivation of human actors
are decisive factors for the performance of a business process.
Information technology provides the means to BPR, since task
support and automation is a key approach for BPR. In the follow-
ing section, we investigate the impact of information technology
on BPR.
2.2 the role of information technology
At the beginning of BPR, the main focus was on internal business
processes within the borders of companies. The objective at that
time was to streamline tasks during a business process and to
try to automatize them with the help of information technology.
Enterprise application integration with the help of enterprise re-
source planning systems was the prevailing activity at that time.
Key technologies were efficient database management systems
and distributed client server applications. Later on, uses of infor-
mation technology extended computer use beyond transaction
processing into communication and coordination. As a conse-
quence, the focus of BRP shifted to external business processes.
These cover integration patterns across multiple enterprises and
interaction with customers. The driving force of this shift was
new communication possibilities offered by information technol-
ogy. Available communication networks, especially the Internet,
and open standards, such as the eXtensible Markup Language
(XML) have been facilitating collaborative business processes.
At the same time, the digitalization of data does not only allow
companies to streamline their business processes, but it also
fosters a new kind of business process built up on selling digital
media, e.g., digital music and electronic books.
In the following sections, we present two concrete application
scenarios, in which the information technology supports BPR.
First, we describe an electronic market which enables companies
to carry out bilateral and multi-attributive negotiations. In Section
6
3.3, we propose a reputation system supporting trust building
for electronic markets.
In Section 2.2.2, we explain a specific business process, i.e.,
Sale by Call for Tenders (CFT). A naive translation of the CFT
to open networks introduces new manipulation possibilities like
identity masquerading, repudiation of messages etc. In Section
3.5, we show how the basic CFT can be made robust against
these classical security attacks. However, this approach does not
eliminate fundamental economic design problems of the CFT
itself. To overcome these shortcomings, we show how the CFT
can be protected against manipulations that damage the fairness
and economic efficiency of a market by turning it into a secure
sealed-bid auction protocol.
2.2.1 A Business Web Forming an Electronic Market
Markets provide the basis for almost all types of businesses.
According to [Bak98], they have three main functions, i.e., match-
making between buyers and sellers, providing an institutional
infrastructure and the facilitation of transactions. A typical mar-
ket transaction consists of 5 phases [RL03], which are depicted in
Figure 2.1.
Information 
Phase
Service
Phase
Execution
Phase
Agreement
Phase
Intention
Phase
Partner & 
Product 
Search
Request for 
Price & Offer 
Submission
Negotiation 
& Contract 
Conclusion
Delivery, 
Invoice & 
Payment
Service & 
Support
Figure 2.1: Transaction Phases on a Market
In the information phase market participants gather relevant
information concerning products, market partners, etc. During
the intention phase market participants submit offers concerning
supply and demand. Then, the terms and conditions of the trans-
action are specified and the contract is closed in the agreement
phase. The agreed-upon contract is operationally executed in the
execution phase. During the service phase support, maintenance
and customer services are delivered.
A major activity during the agreement phase is the conduction
of negotiations for closing business transactions and concluding
valid contracts. A negotiation can be defined as a decentralized
decision-making process by at least two parties [Bic00]. It is
performed until an agreement is reached or the process is termi-
nated without reaching an agreement by one or all of the partners
involved. The objective of this process is to establish a legally
binding contract between the parties concerned, which defines
7
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Figure 2.2: Architecture of a SOA-based Business Web
all agreed-upon terms and conditions next to regulations in the
case of failure of their fulfillment [RL03]. Beam and Segev define
electronic negotiations “as the process by which two or more
parties multilaterally bargain resources for mutual intended gain,
using the tools and techniques of electronic commerce” [BS97].
Electronic negotiations enable market participants to interact
with each other in an ad-hoc manner over large geographical
distances.
For the duration of executing a market transaction, all partners
involved in its processing, such as buyer, seller, service and infras-
tructure providers, are inter-linked in a temporary value chain
in form of a business web [KR00, TTL00]. Enabling such part-
ner networks to be dynamically created as individually needed
can be realized by employing a service oriented architecture
(SOA). Thus, the potential partners are not required to have any
prior knowledge about the technical requirements for coupling
their business applications concerned with processing the mar-
ket transaction and face no additional preparatory work before
communicating electronically.
The MultiNeg Project [Con09] has developed components for
forming a SOA-based business web which shapes an electronic
market. The market participants can offer their products, negoti-
ate with each other and transfer transaction results into their ERP
systems. The business web consists of four kinds of applications,
i.e., marketplace, MultiNeg, Authentication and Authorization
Server (AAS) and ERP systems. Figure 2.2 shows the overall ar-
chitecture of the business web and corresponding data flows. The
marketplace allows sellers to publish catalogs containing their
products or services, which can be subject to negotiations.
MultiNeg is an electronic negotiation support system for bilat-
eral, multi-attributive negotiations. It facilitates the negotiation of
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multiple items with arbitrary, variable attributes. The key objec-
tives for the development have been the design of an architecture
suitable for different industries, company sizes and products and
a communication interface design that allows the integration of
inter-organizational with intra-organizational applications. The
negotiation functionalities are conceptualized for usage in a de-
centralized deployment and are based on open standards. Thus,
they allow the seamless electronic integration of internal and
external business processes.
Several interfaces can be used for the data exchange between
the nodes of the business web. They support the exchange of
messages with different types of collaborating applications on
the inter-organizational as well as the intra-organizational level.
Depending on the type of interface, messages hold different oper-
ational data like negotiation input, content or status information
as well as the negotiation results.
MultiNeg is able to serve as an integration point of intra-orga-
nizational planning and allocation processes with inter-organiza-
tional market processes. MultiNeg can be applied to any kind of
bilateral and multi-attributive negotiations.
The functionalities of MultiNeg are developed for usage in
a decentralized deployment and are based on open standards.
Companies can use MultiNeg to carry out asynchronous and
bilateral negotiations. MultiNeg is a web application which can be
accessed by any browser, i.e., it does not require the installation of
a special client software. The modular component structure grants
functional and administrative application autonomy. Seamless
electronic integration of internal and external business processes
is achieved through the usage of Web Services. Thus, the system
can be used as a stand-alone but may also be used as an add-on
for an electronic marketplace system. Figure 2.3 shows the Web
Services developed and the messages exchanged between the
collaborating applications.
The Init Negotiation Service transfers the data for initializing
a new negotiation from the marketplace to MultiNeg. The XML
document transmitted is the Negotiation Request. It only requires
a confirmation. The Inventory Visibility Service is offered by the
supplier as an addition to his catalog published for providing
up-to-date inventory information to the buyer in the course of
the negotiation. For doing so, the product identification numbers
are used for checking the availability of the particular products in
demand. This service is used as the back-end service for the Tun-
nel Inventory Visibility Service, which executes the querying and
retrieval of the supplier’s stock information requested from the
negotiation platform via the electronic market place. There, the
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Figure 2.3: Interaction of Web Services
tunnel service aggregates the inventory data returned. Assuming
that several suppliers are offering Inventory Visibility Services,
this tunnel service is capable of functioning as a composite Web
Service of the various single supplier services. After concluding
the negotiation, the Contract Transmission Service transfers the
agreed transaction details from the negotiation application to the
negotiation partners’ internal systems. The contract with all de-
tails is sent from the negotiation application after having received
proper company identification from each partner.
In Section 3.3, we propose a new reputation system for the
aforementioned business web. The reputation system enables
market participants, i.e., buyers and sellers, to rate each other
after a concluded transaction. Using the issued ratings, the market
participants can assess the quality of the traded goods as well as
the partner’s performance. This mechanism enables participants
to make better decisions considering the choice of trustworthy
business partners and the negotiation strategy.
2.2.2 Sale by Call for Tenders
With the emergence of communication networks conventional
business processes for trading need to be adapted to the new
electronic environment. One such business process is the Sale
by Call for Tenders (CFT) which is heavily used for trading
perishable goods. The CFT provides a negotiation framework
where a seller instantiates a call for tenders, and buyers make buy
offers on a competitive basis. The winning buy offer is determined
when the CFT is closed. The criterion for determining the winner
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can be simply selecting the highest offer, but may also be based
on other considerations such as past business relationships with
the seller or location. The CFT process can be broken down into
four phases. The phases are described below:
1. Seller calls for tenders A seller initiates a tender process by
submitting lots for sale by way of CFT. More precisely, the
seller announces his intention to sell goods, and invites buy-
ers to make purchase offers based on their valuation of the
goods. Each lot is described by the following information:
lot number, seller reference, branch, sale site organization,
product type, product family, product description, unit,
quantity, date of availability, place of availability, delivery
conditions, and lot price. A seller can modify or delete a
sale offer provided no purchase offer has been made on it.
2. Bid submission Once a CFT process has started, buyers sub-
mit purchase offers on the lots available based on their
valuation. This is a simple process where buyers select lots
they want to buy and the price which they are willing to
pay for each lot. A bid carries the following pieces of infor-
mation as a minimum: tender Id, buyer reference, quantity,
price offered, currency and date and time of bid submission.
A buyer can delete or modify an offer provided the closing
date has not been reached.
3. Winner Determination The selection of winners is done ei-
ther manually or automatically. For bids to be considered,
they must be at least equal to the set reserve price. The
reserve price is set by the seller and is known only to him.
The criterion for determining the winner is based, among
other considerations, on the bid amount where the highest
bids stand a greater chance of winning. Once the winners
have been selected, the seller contacts them and the tender
process is concluded.
4. Tender Conclusion This is the last phase of the sale by CFT.
Once the winners have been determined, following two
statements are distributed: the confirmation statement is
sent by the seller to the winners to confirm their orders. The
transaction statement describes details of the transaction
and the service charges.
The transaction is processed, and payment and delivery executed
in line with prior arrangements by the various parties. The actual
transfer of goods and money is done outside the system.
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A naive translation of the CFT to open networks, e.g. the Inter-
net, introduces new manipulation possibilities like identity mas-
querading, repudiation of messages etc. In Section 3.5, we show
how the basic CFT can be made robust against classical security
attacks. However, this approach does not eliminate fundamental
economic design problems of the CFT itself. To overcome these
problems, we show how the CFT can be protected against manip-
ulations that damage the fairness and economic efficiency of a
market by turning it into a secure sealed-bid auction protocol.
2.3 on securing electronic business processes
A typical business process consists of several tasks which are
performed by different entities belonging to different domains.
Each party can have its state of knowledge by having more or
better information than others as well as its own motives. This
characteristic leads to situations with asymmetric information
in which individual actions cannot be observed. In economics,
an information asymmetry occurs when one party involved in a
transaction has more or better information than the other parties.
This situation can create an imbalance of power in a business
process which again can result in a suboptimal outcome of that
business process. Information asymmetry occurs in particular
in conjunction with external business processes. According to
[WvdHD98], there are two features of external business processes
that cross organization boundaries, which distinguish them from
internal business processes. First, the resources that are needed
for different parts of the process cannot be assigned centrally as
they reside in different organizations. Second, the organizations
have at least a certain degree of autonomy. These two features
together with opportunities offered by information technology
lead to undesirable side-effects. Over open and anonymous net-
works, market participants have to cope with s much higher
amount of uncertainty about the quality of products and the
trustworthiness of other participants [ZLZ05]. Ackerlof showed
that knowledge about the trustworthiness of a seller is vital for
the functioning of a market [Ake70]. Therefore, building trust in
virtual environments is of high importance. Information about
the reputation can be used to build up trust among strangers, e.g.,
new business partners. Learning from experiences of other users
by considering their assessment of a potential partner’s business
performance as well as the quality of the delivered goods can
reduce this uncertainty.
The Sale by Call for Tenders process introduced in the previous
section works well in a closed environment with stable business
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relationships. Buyers and sellers know and trust each other. In
addition, the number of buyers and sellers is small. In virtual
environments all these assumptions do not usually hold. Business
relationships are much less stable, buyers and sellers can flexibly
join and leave a market, and there are virtually no limits to the
number of market participants. A naive adoption of the CFT
to virtual environments is subject to manipulation. Parties can
act under wrong identities, messages can be modified during
transmission or a party sending a message within a CFT process
may later claim it has not originated from it or may dispute the
exact contents of the message.
Documents play a central role in business processes. A docu-
ment is a means for integration and is exchanged among entities
involved in a business process. As a result of BRP, paper docu-
ments were more and more replaced by electronic documents.
As electronic documents introduce several advantages, such as
space saving storage, faster electronic transfer and the possibility
to perform a time saving electronic search. However, electronic
documents also bring new risks. One such risk is that electronic
documents can be stolen more easily. For example, a hacker can
steal electronic documents remotely without entering the build-
ing where the computer on which the documents are stored is
located.
Figure 2.4 shows the amount of loss for several types of com-
puter crime incidents as reported in [GLLR06]. The second largest
amount of loss is attributed to unauthorized access to informa-
tion, which clearly shows the high demand for access control
mechanisms, which are mechanisms to restrict access to autho-
rized persons only. In other words, these mechanisms define who
is allowed or denied to access which object. The fourth largest
amount of loss is caused by the theft of proprietary information.
This sum of this type of loss and of unauthorized access exceeds
the amount of loss by virus contamination. Since the sketched
types of loss can be reduced with access control mechanisms, this
highlights the importance of access control even more. Moreover,
Figure 2.4 shows that only a relatively small amount of loss is
created by outsiders penetrating the system. This indicates that
protection mechanisms should focus on inside attackers, which
are authorized users of the system.
We emphasize the significance of protecting documents with
the help of a concrete application domain. We consider standards,
i.e., documents that contain a classification of products or bill of
materials. Many standards today are commonly used and open to
public use. International organizations like UN/CEFACT inten-
tionally publish their standards and standards’ elements freely
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on the Web to foster their use. Many industry consortiums do the
same. Still, many other standards are used without being open to
the public or without the public even knowing about them. Thus,
access to standards, in part or as a whole, may be restricted. We
can distinguish three major reasons for this. First, business mod-
els can be based on the commercial use of intellectual property
rights for standards, standards’ elements or references. Second,
some standards are not open to the public, e.g., company-wide
internal standards or standards within consortiums. Third, some
references are not open to the public, e.g., because those refer-
ences would unveil ongoing research and development activities.
Against this background, the development of a standard and
its elements is an intellectual endeavor that deeply deserves
protection of use. If political or strategic considerations do not
imply that a standard should be available to the public without
restrictions, a company or consortium that has developed a stan-
dard may want the option of benefiting commercially from this
property.
Instead of using a standard commercially, a company or con-
sortium may want to restrict access to this domain knowledge
to users within the company or consortium, e.g., because this
knowledge is considered to be a competitive advantage. The
same holds true for references between standards. Reasons for
not unveiling this information may be similar.
Besides being a competitive advantage or very company spe-
cific, a new standard element or reference may also unveil, if
made public, information about ongoing research and develop-
ment or marketing activities to competitors. For example, if a new
element is added to a product in a standard, this may alert the
competitor that the company plans to add this new feature to the
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given product. Or, if in a procurement catalog a new ingredient
or part is added, this may reveal that the company is changing
recipes or bills of materials and is preparing to market a new or
modified product.
For these reasons, access to standards and references between
standards may need to be restricted. Therefore, appropriate
access-control mechanisms have to be applied.
Business processes can be more or less organized in some as-
pects. Involved parties performing tasks or the flow of a process,
e.g., the order of tasks, may change during the execution of a
business process. Singh and Huhns [SH05] state that success-
ful business process management requires supporting three key
properties, i.e., autonomy, heterogeneity, and dynamism. Support-
ing autonomy means modeling and enacting business processes
in a manner that offers maximal flexibility to the participants by
only minimally constraining their behavior. Supporting hetero-
geneity means making as few assumptions as possible about the
construction of the components for the parties. Dynamism is re-
lated to the involved parties which can change during a business
process. Supporting these three key properties requires not only
hard security, but also soft security. These terms were first de-
scribed by Rasmussen and Jansson in [RJ96]. They used the term
hard security for traditional mechanisms, e.g., access control, and
soft security for what they called social control mechanisms, e.g.,
reputation systems. In Section 3, we present soft security mecha-
nisms supporting trust building in context of business processes.
In Section 4, we focus on hard security mechanisms for securing
business processes.
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3
T R U S T B U I L D I N G
In this section, we first motivate the need for reputation systems.
For this purpose, we explain the notions of trust and reputa-
tion and their interdependencies. We discuss requirements for
reputation systems and afterwards present two new reputation
systems. The first reputation system supports trust building in
a centralized scenario, i.e., electronic negotiations. The second
reputation system is designed for decentralized P2P networks.
We the analyze a concrete business process, i.e., Sale by Call
for Tenders, with regard to trust relationships between involved
parties and present two protocols to overcome the existing short-
comings of the mentioned business process. At the end of this
section, we review related work and conclude with the summary
of our results.
3.1 notions of trust and reputation
We rely on trust every day: we trust that drivers on the road
will follow traffic rules, we trust that the goods we buy have
the expected quality, etc. Generally speaking, trusting becomes
the crucial strategy to deal with uncertain, unpredictable and
uncontrollable future. This common understanding is founded
by numerous definitions of trust. According to [Rip98], trust is
“an action that is built upon both, a voluntary provision of a risky
service in advance, renouncing any contractual security measure
against opportunistic behavior and the expectation that the per-
son whom this service is provided will not act opportunistically.”
[Szt99] presents a simple and popular definition of trust: “Trust
is a bet about the future contingent actions of others.”
Most definitions of trust consider persons, such as employees
or politicians, as entities to be trusted, i.e., targets of trust. How-
ever, there exists other targets of trust. According to [CT01], four
different targets of trust are needed and should be modeled and
supported:
• trust in the potential partners
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• trust in your agent and in mediating agents
• trust in the environment and in the infrastructure (the socio-
technical system)
• trust in the authorities
The first three forms of trust targets are of special interest in
this thesis. We have to choose the appropriate trust target(s)
depending on the characteristics of a business processes. If we
consider ad-hoc business processes in which unknown business
partners interact with each other, we have two options regarding
trust building. First, we directly evaluate the trustworthiness of
potential partners. This can be done with the help of reputation
systems which are introduced in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Second,
we mandate agents, i.e., Trusted Third Parties, to interact with
business partners on behalf of us. We present such an approach
in Section 3.5.
[TT00] distinguishes between party trust and control trust: ”In
a given situation the trading parties can either directly trust
each other or rely on functional equivalent control mechanisms,
i.e., the procedures and protocols that monitor and control the
successful performance of a transaction.“ If we consider well
organized business processes with known but untrusted partners
and well established technical environments, we can replace the
necessary trust in persons, i.e., business partners, by building
trust in the technical environment and in the infrastructure. In
this case, we substitute party trust by control trust. We focus on
this approach in Section 4. In the following, we focus on party
trust.
In contrast to traditional “real-world” transactions, electronic
transactions in virtual communities lack the direct interpersonal
aspects like mimics, gestures or the personal impression, which
have a significant influence on the amount of trust shown towards
the business partner. According to [Mui02], challenges facing
trust in virtual communities arise ironically from what some
proponents claim to be the advantages of such communities:
being vast, nearly anonymous, simple to join and leave.
The analysis by Akerloff in 1970 on the Market for Lemons is
also applicable to the electronic markets [Ake70]. The main issue
pointed out by Akerloff about such markets is the information
asymmetry between buyers and sellers. Sellers know about their
own trading behavior and the quality of the products they are
selling. On the other hand, buyers can at best guess the behavior
of one specific seller. Market participants can reduce this infor-
mation asymmetry by evaluating the reputation of their potential
business partners.
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The common understanding of the term “reputation” is the
perception that one entity has about another’s intentions and
norms. Reputation has been used in a number of disciplines such
as economics and computer science, among others. Economists
used reputation to explain “irrational” behavior of players in
repeated economic games [Wil85]. Computer scientists have used
reputation to model the trustworthiness of entities in online
marketplaces [ZMM99]. Figure 3.1 depicts the creation of repu-
tation and its influence on trust. The reputation of one entity is
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between Reputation and Trust
subjectively formed by others on the basis of their own direct
experiences or observations. Second hand information has also
an influence on reputation. This kind of information is often
passed through “word of mouth”, e.g., personal recommenda-
tions. Within a certain context reputation may lead to trust or
mistrust, which again is the starting point for a decision making
process concerning a certain kind of behavior. This decision de-
pends also on the utility and the strategy of the decision maker
and may lead to an interaction or further observation.
Reputation is useful in two aspects. First, it helps a market
participant with regard to decision making. This is necessary
when a buyer has to choose between several sellers offering the
same product with comparable conditions. Second, it makes
opportunistic behavior unprofitable, since this would lead to
a bad reputation, which in turn may deter potential business
partners from considering the entity with the bad reputation.
19
3.2 reputation systems
According to [RKZF00], a reputation system collects, distributes,
and aggregates feedback about participants’ past behaviors. Feed-
back is usually collected at the end of each transaction. The
authority responsible for reputation management asks the partici-
pants to submit a rating. Aggregation of feedback means that the
available information about an entity’s transactions is evaluated
and condensed into a few values that allow users to easily make
a decision. Feedback is distributed finally to the participants,
i.e., it has to be made available to everyone who wants to use
it for making decisions on whom to trust. Figure 3.2 shows the
components and actors of a reputation system [SVB05].
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Figure 3.2: Components and Actors of a Reputation System [SVB05]
The target of a rating is called ratee. The collector gathers
ratings from agents called raters. This information is processed
and aggregated by the processor. The emitter makes the results
available to other requesting agents.
One prominent reputation system is eBay’s feedback service.
eBay buyers and sellers are encouraged to rate one another at
the end of each transaction. A rating can be positive, negative
or neutral and may include a short text comment. eBay makes
the ratings submitted for each member and their aggregation
available to all its users. [RZ02] found out that eBay’s feedback
service has managed to provide remarkable stability in an other-
wise very risky trading environment. Dellarocas ascertains that
eBay’s feedback service is successful to a large extent because
people trust eBay [Del01].
[JIB07] distinguishes between centralized and decentralized
reputation systems. Centralized reputation systems have dedi-
cated collectors, processors and emitters. In contrast, decentral-
ized reputation systems do not assume any particular entities to
play the role of collectors, processors and emitters.
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3.2.1 Requirements for Reputation Systems
As mentioned above, the main goal of a reputation system is to
take ratings which have been given to an entity after concluded
transactions, aggregate them and spread the result to produce
information about the reputation of the entity in question. [CH07]
presents a comprehensive security analysis for reputation systems
and identifies the following security requirements for reputation
systems:
availability A reputation system, such as the eBay’s feedback
service, can be a building block of an overall system. In
such cases, the availability of the reputation system has to
be ensured to prevent the reputation system from becoming
a single-point of failure.
integrity of reputation information The reputation in-
formation, i.e., the ratings, should be protected from unau-
thorised manipulation, both in transmission and in storage.
accuracy The reputation system should be accurate with re-
spect to the calculation of ratings.
usability and transparency Evaluators should be able to
comprehend how reputation information is obtained and
what it means.
fairness The values of mutual ratings should be independent
from each other to reflect the objective opinion of their
raters.
accountability Each entity should be accountable for his
actions. This property is necessary to prevent raters from
issuing unfair ratings.
verifiability An evlauator should be able to assign a rating
to the corresponding transactions. This property allows
evaluators to verify the correctness of the rating in question.
performance efficiency The reputation system should re-
quire as few resources for computation, storage and com-
munication as possible.
In decentralized environments, e.g., P2P networks, there is
no central instance which could act as a collector, a processor
and an emitter of a reputation system. As a consequence, an
adequate reputation system for decentralized environments must
fulfill some special requirements. [ZH06] defines the following
requirements for decentralized reputation systems:
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high accuracy To help distinguish reputable peers from ma-
licious ones, the system should calculate the reputation
scores as close to their real trustworthiness as possible.
fast convergence speed The reputation of a peer varies
over time. The reputation aggregation should converge
fast enough to reflect the true changes of peer behaviors.
low overhead The system should only consume limited com-
putation and bandwidth resources for peer reputation mon-
itoring and evaluation.
adaptive to peer dynamics Peers join and leave an open
P2P system dynamically. The system should adapt to these
peer dynamics instead of relying on predetermined peers.
robust to malicious peers The system should be robust to
various attacks by both independent and collective mali-
cious peers.
scalability The system should be able to scale to serve a large
number of peers in term of accuracy, convergence speed,
and extra overhead per peer.
The requirement “robust to malicious peers” needs further ex-
planation. According to [MGM06], malicious peers are one of two
primary types of adversaries in P2P networks. The other type are
the selfish peers. The two types of adversaries are distinguished
by their goals. Selfish peers wish to use resources while mini-
mizing their own contribution. Selfish peers are often referred to
as “free-riders” [FC05]. Malicious peers aim at causing harm to
either other specific peers or the system as a whole. In the context
of this thesis we focus on malicious peers.
Attacks performed by malicious peers, though not proper at-
tacks in the sense of information security, threaten the integrity
— with respect to their goals — of the informational content, i.e.,
ratings, stored in the reputation system. One obvious attack in
P2P networks is the issuing of fake ratings. These are ratings
which do not belong to a real transaction. Especially in decen-
tralized environments without any controlling entities, e.g., P2P
networks, the issuing of fake ratings is a feasible attack.
Dellarocas [Del00] presents two kinds of unfair behavior of
malicious entities. First, a seller colludes with a group of buyers in
order to be given unfairly high ratings to improve his reputation.
This collusion is referred as ballot stuffing. Second, sellers and
buyers collude to rate other sellers unfairly low to drive them out
of the market. This unfair behavior is named bad-mouthing.
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Reputation systems which allow mutual ratings, i.e., both in-
volved business partner rate each other after the end of the
transaction, should prevent that one party can learn the rating
he is supposed to receive before he has issued the rating for his
business partner. This should ensure that a rating reflects its is-
suer’s experience in the context of the corresponding transaction
and it is independent from the rating of the opposite side. For
the same reason, the rater should not be able to modify his rating
after it was given to the ratee.
Since the overall reputation of one party depends on all ratings
which were given to him, it should not be possible for that party
to suppress some of his ratings, i.e., his poor ratings, in order to
improve his reputation.
3.3 a reputation system for electronic negotiations
In this section, we present a new centralized reputation system
for the business web mentioned in Section 2.2.1. It enables compa-
nies to find trustworthy business partners and provides decision
support during a negotiation. In order to achieve these two ob-
jectives, our reputation system provides the necessary data, i.e.,
ratings, whenever it is required for an evaluator and offers dif-
ferent aggregations of this data to simplify the assessment of a
business partner. One of these aggregations reflects a transitive
view from the perspective of the evaluator to the entity to be eval-
uated. This approach helps evaluators to detect malicious high
(or low) ratings which have been issued to improve (or damage)
the reputation of a certain entity.
Our reputation system enables market participants, i.e., buyers
and sellers, to rate each other after a concluded transaction. They
can assess the quality of the traded goods as well as the partner’s
performance. The issued ratings enable participants to make
better decisions considering several aspects. For example a seller
is offering products of excellent quality, but tends to deliver late.
This information is valuable for potential buyers who have to plan
their production in advance. If they decide to buy some goods
from the seller in question, they have to schedule reserve time
for maybe late delivery. Our reputation system encompasses two
phases, i.e., rating phase and rating aggregation phase. Figure 3.3
depicts the rating phase and the rating aggregation phase during
a market transaction which have been explained in Section 2.2.1.
In the rating phase two business partners evaluate each other
after a concluded transaction by giving a rating to the opposite
side. This phase affects the last three transaction phases during
which two business partners interact with each other on a mar-
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ket. During these three phases, including the negotiation, they
form an opinion about each other, which is later reflected by
the corresponding ratings. These ratings are used in the rating
aggregation phase to get information about the reputation of
a market participant. The rating aggregation phase takes place
during the first three transaction phases. In the information phase
and the intention phase a buyer wants to learn more about his
potential negotiation partners, i.e., sellers. For this purpose he
has to evaluate the rating of sellers. During the actual negotiation
both buyer and seller can use the ratings of their opposite to map
out their negotiation strategy. We explain the steps which are
performed by our reputation system during the rating phase and
the rating aggregation phase in the following.
3.3.1 Rating Phase
Our reputation system has to fulfill three requirements at the
end of the rating phase. First, it has to prevent fake ratings. This
requirement means, that ratings should be issued after conducted
transactions. Second, the reputation system must ensure the
authenticity and integrity of ratings. Third, the system has to
make sure that the two ratings issued after a transaction are
mutually independent, i.e., they reflect the real experience of
the rater. Figure 3.4 shows the process of a negotiation and the
subsequent rating phase. We describe the process in the following:
Steps 1-2 After concluding a negotiation the involved parties
evaluate each other by issuing corresponding ratings. A rating
ranges from 0, i.e., poor rating, to 1, i.e., excellent rating. We
support two different types of rating, i.e., buyer rating and seller
rating. A buyer rating is given by a seller to a buyer, whereas a
seller rating is given by a buyer to a seller.
Steps 3-5 After the receipt of the rating data MultiNeg forwards
it to the AAS of the corresponding party. The AAS displays the
rating to its issuer and allows him to digitally sign it. The signed
rating is transferred to the marketplace to be published.
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Steps 6-8 The signature of a signed rating is verified at the mar-
ketplace. In the case of a positive result, the marketplace checks
whether the rating belongs to an existing negotiation. This step
ensures that only authentic ratings are published. If MultiNeg’s
answer is positive, the marketplace publishes the rating if both
ratings of a negotiation have been issued. Publishing two ratings
simultaneously prevents that one negotiation partner changes
his mind (rating) after learning the rating given to him by his
opposite. However, this could protect one party from receiving
a poor rating. In this case the party does not give a rating for
his opposite. To overcome this shortcoming the marketplace pub-
lishes a single rating without the second corresponding rating
after a defined period of time has passed. This rule is known to
all market participants.
3.3.2 Rating Aggregation Phase
Existing ratings of market participants are stored and displayed
at the marketplace where buyers search the catalogs of sellers
and choose partners for a negotiation. The ratings of market
participants can be used to support that decision. Our reputation
system provides a set of different views to the ratings. In order to
simplify the assessment of a certain market participant based on
his ratings, our system allows calculating the arithmetic average
of all his ratings. Although this approach is easy to implement
and to understand, it is not robust against ballot stuffing and
bad-mouthing, since it considers only the number of ratings,
independent from their issuers. In the following, we show how
to overcome this shortcoming.
If we assume that trust is transitive, we can apply the concept
of Web of Trust for the calculation of trust values based on
rating lists. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) was the first popular
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system which used the concept of Web of Trust to establish the
authenticity of the binding between a public key and a user in a
decentralized and open environment, e.g., the Internet [Zim95].
We use the concept of Web of Trust to aggregate ratings in
our reputation system. For this purpose, the evaluator first has
to build up a trust network between himself and the peer for
which he wants to calculate the trust value. The trust network
is a directed graph and should consist of one trust path at least.
A trust path embodies a chain of trust relationships. Each chain
link reflects a trust relationship between a rater and a ratee. The
start vertex of a trust path is the evaluator and the end vertex
is the market participant to be evaluated. In addition, a trust
path contains other vertices, i.e., market participants which have
been rated by the evaluator or by other vertices in the trust
network except the end vertex. In order to keep the calculation
base meaningful, we limit the length of a trust path, i.e., the
number of its vertices [JHP06]. Each edge of a trust network has
a weight, i.e, the rating which was given by the start vertex of the
corresponding edge to the vertex at the end of that edge. In the
case of several ratings, we use their arithmetic average as weight.
We explain the algorithm for the aggregation of ratings based
on Web of Trust with the help of an example. One buyer (Com-
pany A) enters the marketplace and wants to purchase products
which are offered by the seller (Company Z). These two market
participants have never negotiated with each other. But there are
other companies which have negotiated with both, seller and
buyer. The corresponding ratings are shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Trust Network Containing all Ratings
The figure shows an example for ballot stuffing. Company Z
has received 6 unfair high ratings, which have been issued to
improve its reputation. It has only one poor rating issued by
Company B, which reflects its real experience with Company Z.
If Company A only examines the arithmetic average of Company
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Z’s ratings (0,871), it would consider Company Z trustworthy. In
this case, the malicious behavior of Company Z would remain
undetected. To overcome this shortcoming, we use the concept of
Web of Trust to calculate trust values. For this purpose, we use
the existing ratings to build up a trust network between buyer
and seller. If there are several ratings between two parties we
aggregate them into one value, which is the arithmetic average.
In our example, we aggregated the ratings issued by Company X.
Figure 3.6 shows the corresponding trust network of our example.
This trust network is the input for calculating the trust value for
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Figure 3.6: Reduced Trust Network
Company Z from the perspective of Company A. For this, we use
the following algorithm proposed by Caronni [Car00]:
Input: trust network W, start node A, target node Z
Output: TrustValue
TrustValue = 0;1
trust in A = 1;2
for all direct neighbors of Z do3
direct neighbor is X;4
if X is the start node then5
TrustValue = 1− (1− (trust in X)·6
(edgeX,Z) · (1− TrustValue));7
else8
create a copy C of W;9
drop target node Z in C;10
returnValue = calculateTrust(C,A,X);11
TrustValue =12
1− (1− returnValue · edgeX,Z) · (1− TrustValue);
return TrustValue;13
Algorithm 1: Transitive Rating Aggregation [Car00]
The algorithm shown above has three input parameters, i.e.,
trust network W, start node A and target node Z. The initial trust
value in target node Z is initialized as 0 (line 1) and the trust
value in start node A is set to 1 (line 2). Creating a copy of the
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trust network (line 10), which is used for the recursion (line 11),
assures that the computational results to derive the trust in one
neighbor do not influence the trust in any other neighbor of Z.
Even though the algorithm starts close to Z (line 3), it will first
compute the trust in direct neighbors of the start node, due to the
recursion (line 11), and from there move on to derive the trust
into their neighbors, and so on until the target node is reached.
We apply Algorithm 1 on our example trust network depicted by
Figure 3.6. The intermediate steps and their results are shown in
the following:
calculateTrust (W,A,Z)
direct neighbor is B line 4
calculateTrust (W,A,B) line 11
direct neighbor is A line 4
0, 95 = 1− (1− 1 · 0, 95) · (1− 0) line 6
return 0, 95 line 13
0, 285 = 1− (1− 0, 95 · 0, 3) · (1− 0) line 12
direct neighbor is X line 4
calculateTrust (W,A,X) line 11
direct neighbor is C line 4
calculateTrust (W,A,C) line 11
direct neighbor is A line 4
0, 8 = 1− (1− 1 · 0, 8) · (1− 0) line 6
return 0, 8 line 13
0, 16 = 1− (1− 0, 8 · 0, 2) · (1− 0) line 12
return 0, 16 line 13
0, 394 = 1− (1− 0, 16 · 0, 95) · (1− 0, 285) line 12
return 0, 394 line 13
The direct neighbors of Company Z are Company B and Com-
pany X. The algorithm starts with Company B, which is not the
start node. As a consequence, Company Z has been removed
from the trust network and company B is the new target node.
The algorithm calls itself with the new trust network. The direct
neighbor of Company B is Company A (start node). Line 6 of
the algorithm contains the formula for calculating the trust level
of Company A with regard to Company B. The calculated value
(0,95) is returned from the recursive call. It is the input in the
formula in line 12 of the algorithm, where we calculate the trust
level of Company A with regard to Company Z considering the
rating of Company B. The result is 0,285.
We repeat the sketched process again for Company X as next
neighbor of Company Z. Again, we first remove Company Z from
the trust network and set Company X as the new target node. The
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algorithm proceeds with a recursive call. Since Company X is not
a direct neighbor of Company A, we have to remove Company X
and set Company C as the target node. The new trust network
is the input for a recursive call, which calculates the result level
of Company A with regard to Company C (0,8). We proceed to
calculate the trust level of Company A with regard to Company
Z taking into account the ratings of Company C and Company
X. The result is 0,16. The final result reflecting the trust value for
Company Z from the perspective of Company A considering all
intermediate ratings is 0,394. This value is presented to Company
A in addition to the arithmetic average of Company Z’s ratings
which is 0,871. The two values are contradictory and provide
additional information for decision-making with regard to the
perspective of the evaluator.
The aggregation of ratings based on the concept of Web of
Trust does not totally prevent ballot stuffing and bad-mouthing.
However, our example shows that these kinds of malicious behav-
ior lose some of their impact. Recall that ballot stuffing requires
that a (small) set of raters give a large number of unfair good
ratings to a ratee in order to improve his reputation. Since the
approach based on Web of Trust considers the average of ratings
given to a market participant, it defuses the impact of several
unfair ratings. The same reasoning applies to bad-mouthing. In
Section 3.4.8.2 we analyze the robustness of the aggregation of
ratings based on the concept of Web of Trust.
The reputation system explained in this section is centralized.
That means, it relies on the marketplace as a trusted third party
acting as collector, processor and emitter. In the next section,
we propose a decentralized reputation system supporting trust
building in P2P networks.
3.4 a robust reputation system for p2p networks
The reputation system presented in the previous section can be
used in scenarios in which trusted parties are available. How-
ever, we cannot always take the availability of trusted parties
for granted. This case occurs in decentralized P2P networks, in
which no dedicated entities exist. As a consequence, we cannot
use the proposed centralized reputation system in P2P networks.
We need another type of reputation system which is adapted
to the special characteristics of P2P networks. In the following
section, we first give an overview of P2P networks and their traits.
Then, we present a reputation system which takes the traits of
P2P networks into account. Afterwards, we prove the robustness
of this reputation system with the help of simulation.
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3.4.1 Overview of P2P Networks
Schoder and Fischbach define Peer-to-Peer (P2P) as a technology
“that enables two or more peers to collaborate spontaneously in a
network of equals (peers) by using appropriate information and
communication systems without the necessity for central coordi-
nation” [SF03]. This definition looks at P2P from an application
point of view and it emphasizes that the principal focus of P2P is
building a network, in which peers can communicate.
Steinmetz and Wehrle define P2P as a “system with completely
decentralized self-organization and resource usage” [SW05]. This
definition postulates that P2P is a totally distributed system, in
which all nodes are completely equivalent in terms of function-
ality and tasks they perform. This definition fails to encompass,
for example, systems that employ the notion of “supernodes”,
i.e., nodes that function as dynamically assigned localized mini-
servers, such as Kazaa, which are, however, widely accepted as
P2P [ATS04].
A more general definition of P2P networks is given by Rous-
sopoulos et al. in [RBR+04]. They state that P2P networks have
three characteristics: self-organization, symmetric communication
and distributed control.
self-organization Nodes organize themselves into a net-
work through a discovery process. There is no global direc-
tory of peers or resources.
distributed control Peers determine their level of partici-
pation and their course of action autonomously. There is no
central controller that dictates behavior to individual nodes.
This dynamics of peer participation is referred to as churn
[SR06].
symmetric communication Peers are equals. They request
and offer services, rather than being confined to either client
or server roles.
These three characteristics lead to the potential benefits of P2P net-
works. These are among others cost reduction, improved scalabil-
ity and reliability, and increased autonomy [MKL+02]. However,
the same characteristics cause some problems in P2P networks.
Due to the lack of any dedicated instance responsible for coor-
dination and control tasks and the dynamic of P2P networks, a
wide range of security issues can occur. An overview of security
issues in P2P networks can be found in [Wal03]. In [BLP05], Balfe
et. al argue that existing security services and mechanisms which
have been developed for client-server systems cannot be used in
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P2P systems. In traditional client-server systems, users are typi-
cally identified with a user account, and system-specific controls
can be built on these accounts to provide security services, such
as access control and non-repudiation. In addition, client-server
systems are normally built up on central entities, which can act as
trusted third parties supporting security mechanisms. However,
these assumptions do not hold in decentralized P2P networks. As
a consequence, another type of security mechanisms is needed
for decentralized environments. We present such a mechanism,
i.e., a decentralized reputation system, in the following.
3.4.2 Usage Scenario
We explain our reputation system with the help of one concrete
scenario. This scenario reflects a typical business process between
two autonomous peers in commercial settings. Basically, one peer
can have two roles in our P2P network. It can be an expert who
sells his knowledge or a customer who is willing to pay for the
expert’s service. We refer to all commercial interactions between
customers and experts as transactions. A transaction consists of
four phases, which are depicted in Figure 3.7.
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Request
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Figure 3.7: Transaction Phases
information phase In this phase a customer searches for
an expert who is able to provide a specific service. If the
customer finds some experts with whom he had no direct
interactions before, he may want to learn more about their
trustworthiness. In this case the reputation of the experts
in the P2P network is crucial for the customer. Therefore,
the customer wants to learn more about potential business
partners. For this purpose, the customer sends queries into
the P2P network.
After finding the suitable expert the customer asks the
expert for the specific service. At this stage, the expert may
wish to learn more about the customer and he can use the
same mechanisms like the customer to get some reputation
information about the opposite side.
request phase If the expert agrees to deliver the service the
customer sends his request to the expert in this phase.
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response phase In this phase the expert provides the service
to the customer.
rating phase In this phase the two parties rate each other. The
customer may evaluate the quality of services provided by
the expert and the expert may assess the payment practice
of the customer.
3.4.3 Basic Idea
The main challenge for a reputation system for P2P networks is
to cope with the characteristics of that kind of networks which
have been described in Section 3.4.1. The lack of any central in-
stances responsible for certain control and coordination tasks, i.e.,
acting as collector, processor and emitter in context of a reputa-
tion system, is the main problem. Our approach for solving this
problem is based on the introduction of two additional peers, i.e.,
witnesses, who are involved in a transaction between a customer
and an expert. These two peers are ordinary peers. They appear
as witnesses and have three tasks. First, they testify the authen-
ticity of a transaction. This should prevent fake ratings. Second,
they ensure the fairness of mutual ratings. That means, that both
customer and expert have to issue their ratings before they are
published. And the third task of the witnesses is to publish the
rating lists of the customer and the expert at the end of the cor-
responding transaction. Generally speaking, the two witnesses
act as collector, processor and emitter of a reputation system in
the context of one single transaction. Figure 3.8 illustrates the
involvement of the witnesses in a transaction.
Both, the customer and the expert choose their own witness.
Each witness has to observe the actions of the opposite side, i.e.,
customer’s witness observes the expert and makes a transcript as
a proof of interaction. The transcript is a record of all messages
which were received by a witness as well as all results which were
produced by that witness, e.g. the result of a signature verification.
Observing the customer’s actions and making a corresponding
transcript is the task of the expert’s witness. This assignment of
the observation tasks to the witnesses makes malicious behavior
difficult, since the expert or the customer cannot collude with
the witness which was chosen by him and he does not know
the witness which is supposed to observe him in advance. We
assume that peers which are involved in a transaction stay online
until the transaction is completed.
Associating a history of behavior with a particular peer re-
quires a sufficiently persistent identity. We assume that each peer
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Figure 3.8: Basic Model
has a cryptographic key pair and a digital certificate issued by a
trusted Certification Authority (CA). This assumption hampers
the decentralized character of a P2P network. However, alterna-
tives, i.e., decentralized solutions, usually require identifiers that
are costly to produce, though not strictly unforgeable. Costly
identifiers help to slow the rate of whitewashing or generating
multiple identities, but do not eliminate it [Dou02].
In the following sections, we first explain the operations and
data structures of our reputation system. Then, we present four
protocols for the phases depicted by Figure 3.7.
3.4.4 Operations and Data Structures
Figure 3.9 lists the cryptographic operations which are used in
the protocols of our reputation system.
Encrypting a message m with the key k Enc(k,m)
Decrypting a message m with the key k Dec(k,m)
Signing a message m with the key k Sig(k,m)
Verifying the digital signature of Ver(m)
signed message m
Computing the hash value of a message m Hash(m)
Figure 3.9: Basic Cryptographic Operations
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As mentioned above, we assume that each peer has a crypto-
graphic key pair, i.e., secret key SK and public key PK. We denote
the owner of a certain key by adding his initials as an index to
that key, e.g., PKCW is the public key belonging to the witness of
the customer.
Two peers (expert and customer) rate each other after a con-
cluded transaction. We define two data structures for this pur-
pose: transaction rating and rating list. The latter consists of all
transaction ratings of a specific peer P and has the following
structure:
RatListPi := {Rat
E1,C1
1 , . . . ,Rat
Ei,Ci
i }
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , i} : Ej 6= Cj; (P = Ej)∨ (P = Cj)
The rating list RatListPi contains i transaction ratings of a
specific peer P, which he has received after the end of each
transaction, in which he was involved either as an expert or
as a customer. This condition is denoted by Ej 6= Cj. Storing
all transaction ratings for P independently from his role in a
transaction delivers a broader information about P’s behavior,
since this view reflects one of the key features of P2P networks,
namely, symmetric communication.
The data structure for a transaction rating after the i-th trans-
action is defined as follows:
Rat
E,C
i := Sig(s, (
Sig(SKC,RatC→E),
Sig(SKE,RatE→C),
Sig(SKEW , TranscriptEW),
Sig(SKCW , TranscriptCW),h))
s ∈ {SKEW ,SKCW}
h ∈ {Hash(RatListEi−1),Hash(RatListCi−1)}
The whole transaction rating is signed using the key s of the
witness which publishes the rating. This entity is either the cus-
tomer’s witness CW or the witness who was chosen by the expert
EW. This condition is denoted by s ∈ {SKEW ,SKCW}. A transac-
tion rating contains following elements:
• the signed rating which was given by the customer to the
expert
Sig(SKC,RatC→E)
• the signed rating which was given by the expert to the
customer
Sig(SKE,RatE→C)
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• the transcript which was written and signed by the cus-
tomer’s witness
Sig(SKCW , TranscriptCW)
• the transcript which was written and signed by the expert’s
witness
Sig(SKEW , TranscriptEW)
• the hash value of the former rating list of either the cus-
tomer or the expert
h ∈ {Hash(RatListEi−1),Hash(RatListCi−1)}
The transaction rating contains both the signed rating of the
customer as well as the signed rating of the expert for two reasons.
First, this approach allows the evaluator of a transaction rating to
get more information about the corresponding transaction, since
he knows also the “reverse of the medal”. Second, removing a
transaction rating from the rating list becomes a risky action for
a malicious peer, since the corresponding reputation list of the
business partner may contain the two signed ratings which have
been removed. This would lead to a discrepancy between the two
rating lists. As a consequence, the cheating of the malicious peer
would be detected.
Similar to the signed ratings, the contained transcripts deliver
also valuable information for a potential evaluator. In addition,
they prove the existence of the corresponding transaction.
Since different peers may be witnesses of different transactions
of one specific peer, i.e., customer or expert, we have to ensure
that all ratings of that peer are tied together like a chain. For that
we add a hash value to the transaction rating. This hash value
serves as a pointer to the last rating list of a peer. This pointer
allows to build a chain of all transaction ratings of a certain peer.
It helps to check the integrity of rating lists, since removing any
transaction rating apart from the last ratings from the rating
list would breach its integrity. In Section 3.4.7, we present an
approach for detecting a manipulated rating list from which the
last ratings have been removed.
Figure 3.10 shows a simplified transaction. Details for all phases
are presented in Sections 3.4.8-3.4.7. We assume that a rating
can range between 0 and 10, where 0 is the poorest and 10 is
the best rating. Before the transaction begins, the rating list of
the customer contains three transaction ratings and the expert’s
rating list has five ratings. The rating lists are exchanged during
the information phase. Each peer calculates a reputation value
which is based on a rating list and reflects the trustworthiness
of the rating list’s owner. A peer can use different algorithms
for this purpose. We discuss this in Section 3.4.8. We assume
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Figure 3.10: Simplified Transaction
that both partners decide to start the transaction. The customer
sends his request to the expert who in turn sends a response
to the customer. In the rating phase, the business partners rate
each other. In our scenario, the customer rates the performance of
the expert with 7 and he gets a rating of 5. The new transaction
ratings are added to the rating lists. The new transaction ratings
contain pointers to the last rating lists. For example, the new
transaction rating in the updated rating list of the customer
(RatListC4 ) has a hash value of the last rating list (RatList
C
3 ).
The sketched approach binds ratings to the course of a spe-
cific transaction. This could lead to delays, when a peer has to
wait for the end of a transaction, i.e., his rating, before he can
start a new transaction. Particularly, very active peers, e.g., pow-
ersellers, would be negatively affected by the delays caused by
the reputation system. In Section 3.4.7, we show how to solve this
issue.
In the following, we describe the protocols for all four phases
shown in Figure 3.7 in detail. Since ratings of a peer are aggre-
gated in the information phase, we describe this phase in the
end.
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3.4.5 Request Phase
In this phase, the customer sends his request to the expert. The
challenge in this phase is to involve the witnesses into the process
of transferring the request from the customer to the expert. At
the end of this phase both witnesses should know that the expert
has received the customer’s request without knowing the request
itself.
Our approach for fulfilling these requirements is that the expert
has to interact with the witness in order to get access to the
customer’s request. This has to take place in a way that no one
of the parties involved can cheat. The expert should not be able
to deny that he has received the same request which was sent
by the customer. Vice versa, the customer should not be able to
deny that he has sent a certain request to the expert. Figure 3.11
depicts our protocol for the request phase.
p1 = 
Enc(PKE,request)
p2 = Enc(PKCW,p1)
p3 = Enc(PKEW,p2)
h1 = Hash(p1)
h2 = Hash(p2)
p4 = Dec(SKEW,p3)
h2 ?= Hash(p4)
make transcript
p3
h2
h1
p3
p4
p5 = Dec(SKCW,p4)
h1 ?= Hash(p5)
make transcript
p4
p5
request = Dec(SKE,p5)
t
Expert Expert’s Witness Customer’s Witness Customer
1
2
3
6
4
5
Figure 3.11: Protocol for Submitting the Request
At the beginning of this phase the customer encrypts his
request first for the expert Enc(PKE, request). The resulting
cipher text p1 is then encrypted for the customer’s witness
Enc(PKCW ,p1). The resulting cipher text p2 is again encrypted
for the expert’s witness p3 = Enc(PKEW ,p2). Note that the order
of the encryption steps is significant, since it defines the order of
interaction steps performed by the expert. p3 is sent to the expert.
However, he cannot read it; he has to interact with the witnesses
first. In other words, the expert asks the two witnesses to decrypt
the encrypted request. This approach enables the witnesses to
observe the interaction between the customer and the expert.
We have to ensure that the witnesses are able to verify the
authenticity of the encrypted packages presented by the expert.
For this purpose, the customer computes two hash values of
packages which were encrypted for the witnesses h1 and h2.
These hash values are sent to the corresponding witnesses.
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q1 = Enc(PKC,response)
q2 = Enc(PKEW,q1)
q3 = Enc(PKCW,q2)
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q4 = Dec(SKCW,q3)
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Figure 3.12: Proctol for Submitting the Response
After receiving p3 the expert has to interact with the witnesses
to get access to the customer’s request. Since the outer encryption
of p3 can be decrypted only by the expert’s witness the expert
sends p3 to his witness. The witness of the expert decrypts p3
and computes the hash value of the result p4 with h1 which he
received from the customers. If the two hash values are equal
the expert’s witness knows that he just decrypted the package
which was sent from the customer to the expert. The expert’s
witness makes a transcript of his actions and sends p4 to the
expert. The latter has to interact with the customer’s witness
to remove the outer encryption of p4. He again sends p4 to the
customer’s witness who first decrypts the package, compares the
hash value of the result p5 with h2, makes a transcript and sends
p5 to the expert. Now the expert is able to decrypt the encrypted
request with his private key.
3.4.6 Response Phase
Figure 3.12 depicts our protocol for the response phase. Since the
protocol steps are similar to those in the request phase we refrain
from explaining them again.
3.4.7 Rating Phase
In this phase the customer and the expert rate each other. Three
requirements have to be fulfilled during and after this phase.
First, it should be prevented that one party can learn the rating
he is supposed to receive before he has issued the rating for
his business partner. This should ensure that a rating reflects its
issuer’s experience in the context of the corresponding transaction
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and is independent from the rating of the opposite side. Second,
the rater should not be able to modify his rating after it was given
to the ratee. This should prevent the rater from acts of revenge.
Third, we have to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the
ratings, i.e., the new transaction ratings should be added to the
corresponding rating lists as described in Section 3.4.4.
We describe the protocol steps for the rating phase which are
depicted by Figure 3.13. At the beginning, the two witnesses sign
their transcripts. For this purpose, the expert’s witness performs
the operation Sig(SKEW , TranscriptEW) and the customer’s wit-
ness signs his transcript TranscriptCW accordingly. After signing
the witnesses distribute their signed transcripts to the involved
parties. This is necessary since the signed transcripts are going
to be contained in the new transaction ratings. The receivers of
the signed transcripts have to verify both its signature and its
content.
Ver(s2)
s3 = Sig(SKC,RatE C)
h5 = Hash(Rand1, S3)
m1 = Enc(PKCW,h5)
m2 = Enc(PKEW,m1)
h6 = Hash(m1)
s1 = Sig(SKEW, TraEW)
Ver(s1)
s2 = Sig(SKCW, TraCW)
h5 ,m2
h7,m4
Ver(s2)
s4 = Sig(SKE,RatE C)
h7 = Hash(Rand2, S4)
m3 = Enc(PKEW,h7)
m4 = Enc(PKCW,m3)
h8 = Hash(m3)
, h6
, h8
m5 = Dec(SKEW,m2)
Hash(m5)?=h6
m2
m5,m4 m6 = Dec(SKCW,m5)
Hash(m6)?=h6 
m7 = Dec(SKEW,m4)
Hash(m7)?=h8
p8 = Dec(SKEW,m7)
Hash(m8)?=h7
s3,Rand1
Request(s4,Rand2)
s3,Rand1
s4,Rand2
Ratj = Sig(SKEW, 
Sig(SKE,RatE C), 
Sig(SKC,RatC E),
Sig(SKEW, TranscriptEW),
Sig(SKCW, TranscriptCW),
Hash(Rep  )))
Request(s3,Rand1)
Rati = Sig(SKCW, 
Sig(SKE,RatE C), 
Sig(SKC,RatC E),
Sig(SKEW, TranscriptEW),
Sig(SKCW, TranscriptCW),
Hash(Rep  )))
Expert Expert’s Witness Customer’s Witness Customer
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H7 ?= Hash(s4,Rand2)
H6 ?= Hash(Enc(PKWC, 
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H5 ?= Hash(s3,Rand1)
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Figure 3.13: Protocol for Rating
If the expert and the customer agree with the transcripts they
begin to issue the rating for the opposite side. The basic idea for
this purpose is that the rater first seals his rating and commits to
the sealed rating. After both ratings have been issued the raters
unseal their ratings.
We consider only the actions of the expert, since the cus-
tomer takes according steps. The expert first signs his rating
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Sig(SKE,RatE→C) to guarantee its integrity and authenticity.
Then, the expert computes the hash value of the signed rating
result s4 together with a random number Rand2. The random
number is used to prevent known-plain-attacks since a rating is
an element belonging to a finite set. The computed hash value
h7 is encrypted for the expert’s witness. The encryption result
m3 is again encrypted for the customer’s witness. This multiple
encryption forces the witnesses to interact with each other dur-
ing the progress of the protocol. This interaction is necessary to
ensure both the commitment of the raters and the simultaneous
publishing of the transaction ratings. After the multiple encryp-
tions the expert computes the hash value h8. The expert sends
h8 together with his current rating list RatEi−1 to the customer’s
witness. Sending the current rating list by its owner is necessary
to ensure its consistency in the case of concurrent transactions.
With this approach, the owner of a rating list can coordinate the
updates of his rating list and avoid inconsistent rating lists. Af-
terwards, the expert sends m4 to his witness. In order to remove
the outer encryption of m4 the expert’s witness forwards it to
the customer’s witness. The latter decrypts m4 with his private
key SKCW . The result is m7. The customer’s witness sends m7 to
the expert’s witness if the hash value of m7 is equal to h8 which
was sent by the expert. After receiving m7 the expert’s witness
decrypts it with his secret key Dec(SKWE,m7) and compares the
hash value of the result m8 with h7.
Similar steps are carried out on the customer’s side. At this time
both the customer and the expert have committed themselves
to their ratings which are only known to them at this time. The
witnesses ask the business partners to unseal their signed ratings
by sending them and the according random numbers to them.
Again, we explain the next protocol steps from the perspective
of the expert. He sends his signed rating for the customer s4 and
the random number Rand2 to the witnesses. Each witness has
to carry out tasks which we can divide into three categories, i.e.,
verifying ratings, updating rating list and publishing updated
rating lists.
The expert’s witness verifies the signatures of the signed rat-
ings of the customer Ver(s3) and of the expert Ver(s4). Then
he checks the integrity of the commitments (h6 and h7) he has
received from the business partners. In the case of the customer’s
commitment h6, the expert’s witness checks whether h6 is equal
to Hash(Enc(PKWC, (Hash(Rand1, s3)))). If the result is true,
the expert’s witness knows that the customer has sent the same
rating which was sent earlier by him. After verifying the ratings,
the expert’s witness creates a new transaction rating for the cus-
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tomer. This has the structure which was described in Section
3.4.4.
After creating the new transaction ratings the witnesses broad-
cast them to the P2P network. This broadcasting is significant,
since it exploits one of the main characteristics of P2P networks,
i.e., churn introduced in Section 3.4.1, to make malicious behavior
difficult in such networks. At the time of broadcasting new trans-
action ratings, a peer does not know all the other peers which
are connected to the network. Any connected peer could receive
the broadcast message and store it. As a consequence, the owner
of a rating list does not know the other peers who also could
have his rating list. Therefore, presenting a manipulated rating
list, i.e., a list containing only the first good transaction ratings,
is a risky malicious action which can be detected. In order to
check the integrity of a rating list, the evaluator can ask connected
peers for the ratings of the peer to be evaluated. If the evaluator
receives ratings which have not been presented by the owner of
the rating list, he can conclude that the presented rating list has
been manipulated. In this case, the evaluator would refrain from
interacting with the malicious peer.
3.4.8 Information Phase
In this phase, a customer looks for experts who are able to provide
a certain service. He may wish to get some reputation informa-
tion of possible candidates by evaluating their reputation lists.
These can be stored by the customer itself or by another peer
including the experts in question. It it obvious that storing a
rating list by only its owner simplifies malicious behavior. For
example, an expert who first behaved in an expected way and
received good transaction ratings and then started to deliver
poor quality and received bad ratings as a consequence could
present his old reputation list with good rating to new customers.
His true reputation would remain undetected. To overcome this
shortcoming, we proposed the broadcasting mechanism which
prevents this kind of malicious behavior in Section 3.4.7. The
effect of that mechanism is that rating lists are spread out across
the P2P network and are stored by several peers.
After getting the rating lists the customer has to draw the
reputation information about the owners from the rating lists.
We refer to this reputation information as trust value. Calculating
one trust value is done by aggregating of transaction ratings.
The algorithm to be applied for this purpose is chosen by the
evaluator. He can aggregate the ratings according to the approach
which has been described in Section 3.3.2 and apply Algorithm
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1 proposed by Carroni [Car00]. We evaluate the robustness of
this approach against malicious behavior, i.e. ballot stuffing and
bad-mouthing, with the help of a simulation which is explained
in the following.
3.4.8.1 Simulating Malicious Behavior
In this thesis, we consider malicious peers who collude either
to discredit the reputation of an honest peer to benefit from it
later on (bad-mouthing) or to advertise the qualities of their own
services more than their real values with the help of unjustified
high ratings (ballot stuffing). This kinds of behaviors are attacks
against the reputation system. As stated in [LZY05], “different
attackers usually have different intents even when they issue
the same attack.” For example, a hacker may want to demon-
strate his hacking capacity, whereas business competitors may
attack each other’s information systems to gain market share.
[LR04] describes how malicious market participants try to shill
recommender systems in order to promote their own goods and
services. This behavior is similar to ballot stuffing attacks against
reputation systems. We believe that the robustness against ballot
stuffing and bad-mouthing is crucial in context of business pro-
cesses. In the following, we focus on simulating of these kinds of
attacks.
Our simulation allows us to setup a P2P network with two
kinds of peers, i.e., honest peers and malicious peers. The size of
each peer group is set with the help of a simulation parameter.
The simulation runs through several steps. All peers can interact
with others at each step. This behavior is also defined with three
parameters. We can define (a) the probability for interaction, (b)
the value of rating which is given after a transaction depending
on the opposite peer’s type and (c) the minimum trust value
necessary for interacting with a certain peer depending on its
type. However, malicious peers always interact with each other
independently from trust values. In the following, we describe
the results of rating aggregations after ballot stuffing and bad-
mouthing attacks.
3.4.8.2 Ballot Stuffing
Figure 3.14 depicts a network after 30 steps. The trust network
consists of 20 malicious peers (red vertices) and 80 honest peers
(green vertices). An edge between two peers indicates an inter-
action between them and its weight reflects the average value
of ratings which have been given by the start vertex to the end
vertex. For instance, peers 4 and 70 interacted with each other.
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Since peer 4 is a malicious peer and performs poorly, it gets a
poor rating (0.1) from peer 70. On the other hand, peer 4 gives a
poor rating (0.01) to peer 70. This behavior is part of a predefined
rating schema. Honest peers give good ratings to each other and
poor ratings to malicious peers. Malicious peers also give good
ratings to each other in order to improve their reputation which is
the objective of ballot stuffing. They give good or poor ratings to
honest peers in order to confuse in the case of a good rating or to
pretend that the whole transaction did not fulfill the expectations
on either side in the case of a poor rating.
Figure 3.14: P2P Network after 30 Steps
We computed trust values based on the ratings in the trust
network shown above with Algorithm 1. The result is depicted
by Figure 3.15.
The figure shows from the perspective of all honest peers, i.e.,
peer 20 to peer 100, the average trust value calculated for a certain
peer type at a certain step. The red surface shows the trust values
for malicious peers and the green surfaces shows the trust values
for honest peers. It is obvious that the red surface converges
towards the green surface with the increasing number in transac-
tions. In other words, the average trust value for a malicious peer
increases depending on the number of transactions. This trend
leads to an indistinguishability between honest and malicious
peers. We explain the reason for this phenomenon in Section
3.4.8.4.
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Figure 3.15: Transitive Rating Aggregation in Presence of Ballot Stuffing
3.4.8.3 Bad-Mouthing in Conjunction with Ballot Stuffing
The simulation of a bad-mouthing attack differs from the afore-
mentioned simulation, since bad-mouthing needs more coordina-
tion between the attackers.
The attackers build a group of malicious peers, the size of the
group is defined by a simulation parameter. We also set a certain
peer as the initiator. This peer’s objective is to benefit from the
bad-mouthing attack. We assume that the initiator wants to to
drive one of his competitors out of the market. The group has
to agree on the victim and the time for acting against the victim.
The time is defined by a simulation parameter.
Figure 3.16: P2P Network before Bad-Mouthing Attack
Choosing the victim depends on the situation in the network at
the defined time. Since the initiator wants to put a competitor, i.e.,
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a peer, out of business by damaging his reputation, the victim’s
reputation should be better than the initiator’s before the attack.
After receiving poor ratings from the group of attackers, the
reputation of the victim should be worse than the initiator’s
reputation. The latter remains unchanged, since the initiator does
not interact with the victim to avoid receiving a poor rating.
Figure 3.16 shows a P2P network before a bad-mouthing attack.
The group of attacker consists of five peers, which have inter-
acted only among each other so far. Before the bad-mouthing
attack, the group of attackers has to choose a victim. This is done
in consideration of the initiator’s trust value. The initiator is peer
0 and his trust value is 0.9007038. Table 1 shows possible victims.
Since peer 79’s trust value would decrease the most after the
attack, the group of attackers chooses this peer as the victim.
Peer Id Current Anticipated Trust Anticipated
Trust Value Value after Attack Damage
21 0.9035478 0.7428383 -0.15786551
26 0.9036963 0.7344971 -0.16620667
79 0.9020773 0.7332189 -0.16748486
Table 1: Possible Victims for Bad-Mouthing
Figure 3.17: P2P Network Immediately after Bad-Mouthing Attack
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Figure 3.17 shows the network immediately after the bad-
mouthing attack. The group of attackers consisting of peers 1, 2,
3 and 4 have interacted with peer 79 which received poor ratings
from the attackers. Peer 0 stays in the background, i.e., he does
not interact with peer 79 to avoid a poor rating.
Figure 3.18 shows the network 15 steps after the attack. In
this period of time all peers behave as described in the previous
section, i.e., malicious peers try to improve their reputation with
the help of ballot stuffing and honest peers interact only with
peers which have a minimum trust value.
Figure 3.18: P2P Network 15 Steps after Bad-Mouthing Attack
We evaluate the robustness of Algorithm 1 against bad-mouth-
ing. For this, we calculate trust values for the network shown in
Figure 3.18. Figure 3.19 shows the resulting trust values. Again,
we observe that the calculated trust values converge in course of
time.
3.4.8.4 Robust Transitive Rating Aggregation
In the previous section, we found out that the average trust
value for a malicious peer calculated by Algorithm 1 increases
depending on the number of transactions. The reason for this
phenomenon is the increasing number of so-called parallel paths.
We explain parallel path with an example given in [JHP06] . It
is shown in Figure 3.20. It shows three parallel paths from A
to E, namely (A → B → C → E), (A → D → C → E) and
(A→ B→ D→ C→ E).
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Figure 3.19: Transitive Rating Aggregation in Presence of Bad-
Mouthing
A
B
C
D
E
Figure 3.20: Parallel Paths
The weight of an edge is between 0 and 1. Algorithm 1 mul-
tiplies the weights of edges to an end vertex for each parallel
path, then the result is subtracted from 1. The result is the trust
value. It highly depends on the number of parallel paths, i.e.,
incoming edges. Since malicious peers do not stop to interact
with each other, the number of edges directed towards this kind
of peers increases with the time. Our simulation shows that the
algorithm proposed by Caronni is vulnerable to ballot stuffing
and bad-mouthing attacks.
To overcome this shortcoming, we propose an algorithm which
does not depend on the number of parallel paths. Instead of mul-
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tiplying their weights, we calculate their average. This approach
is shown in the following algorithm:
Input: trust network W, start node A, target node Z
Output: TrustValue
i = 0;1
TrustValue = 0;2
for all direct neighbors of Z do3
direct neighbor is X;4
i++;5
if X is the start node then6
TrustValue = TrustValue+ edgeX,Z;7
else8
create a copy C of W;9
drop target node Z in C;10
returnValue = calculateTrust(C,A,X);11
TrustValue =12
TrustValue+ (returnValue · edgeX,Z);
TrustValue = TrustValue/i;13
return TrustValue;14
Algorithm 2: Robust Transitive Rating Aggregation
This algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1. Both of them are
recursive but they vary in the way of aggregating parallel paths.
Our proposal shown above counts the number of parallel paths
in line 5 and returns the average of them in line 14. This value is
calculated in lines 6, 12 and 13.
To evaluate the efficiency of our proposal, we calculated the
trust values for the P2P network shown in 3.14. Figure 3.21 il-
lustrates the result. The two surfaces remain divergent with in-
creasing steps, thus our proposal is robust against ballot stuffing
attacks.
Figure 3.21: Robust Transitive Rating Aggregation in Presence of Ballot
Stuffing
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We analyze the robustness of our algorithm 2 against bad-
mouthing attacks using the network shown in Figure 3.18. The
result is depicted in Figure 3.22.
Figure 3.22: Robust Transitive Rating Aggregation in Presence of Bad-
Mouthing
The figure shows that the trust values for honest and malicious
peers differ strongly from each other over the course of time. In
other words, our algorithm for transitive rating aggregation is
robust against bad-mouthing.
3.4.9 Evaluation
Like numerous other systems, modeling a reputation system for
P2P networks is also a trade-off because of conflicting require-
ments. For example, making a reputation system robust against
malicious behavior means implementing additional actions. This
again leads to some overhead caused by the reputation system.
We evaluate our reputation system with the help of the require-
ments identified by Zhou and Hwang [ZH06] and discussed in
Section 3.2.1 in the following.
high accuracy Our model helps to distinguish reputable peers
from malicious ones. This is done by the algorithm for tran-
sitive rating aggregation which is robust against attacks
aiming at manipulating the reputation of peers.
In addition, since our reputation system ensures that the
values of two mutual ratings are independent from each
other, the resulting reputation is based on the real experi-
ences of the raters.
fast convergence speed Since new transaction ratings are
published immediately after a concluded transaction, the
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(new) reputation information of the involved peers is prop-
agated fast to other peers. In addition, each peer is respon-
sible for the rating aggregation. As a consequence, they will
not be any delays caused by central entities.
low overhead Our system causes additional overhead for
computation and communication. This overhead is not in-
vestigated yet.
However, it seems reasonable that in some cases the use
of the reputation system is inappropriate. For example,
if two peers have closed numerous joint transactions and
have given good ratings to each other, they should not
use the reputation system for new transactions because
new positive transaction ratings would not improve the
reputation of those peers.
adaptive to peer dynamics Our system in only partly adap-
tive to peer dynamics. Requiring that all involved parties,
especially the witnesses, are online during the whole trans-
action is a strong assumption. However, since our reputa-
tion system does not require any predetermined peers, it is
adaptive to peer dynamics.
robust to malicious peers Our reputation system does not
prevent malicious behaviors, but makes it difficult. A group
of peers can collude to improve the reputation of its mem-
bers. However, this malicious act requires a big effort. The
malicious peers have to follow the steps defined in Sections
3.4.5 - 3.4.7. Nevertheless, this malicious behavior can be
detected during the information phase with the help of the
algorithm proposed in Section 3.4.8.4.
The robustness of our reputation system is based on the
data structures proposed in Section 3.4.4. In particular, the
data structures for single transaction ratings and rating
lists ensure that manipulations of these data objects will be
detected.
scalability Our approach does not require any central in-
stances. The witnesses are normal peers. Therefore, it can
be used by a large number of peers as well as by a small
peer group.
3.5 sale by call for tenders
We described the business process “Sale by Call for Tenders”
(CFT) in Section 2.2.2. A naive translation of the CFT to open
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networks introduces new manipulation possibilities like identity
masquerading, repudiation of messages etc. We explain these
attacks in Section 3.5.1. Then, we show in Section 3.5.2 how the
basic CFT can be made robust against these classical security
attacks. However, this approach does not eliminate fundamental
economic design problems of the CFT itself. In Section 3.5.3,
we show how the CFT can be protected against manipulations
that damage the fairness and economic efficiency of a market by
turning it into a secure sealed-bid auction protocol.
3.5.1 Requirements for Secure CFT
The CFT process introduced in Section 2.2.2 works well in a closed
environment with a small number of buyers and sellers with
stable business relationships. That means the business partners
know and trust each other.
In Internet-based marketplaces all these assumptions usually
do not hold. Business relationships are much less stable, buyers
and sellers can more flexibly join and leave a market, and there
are virtually no limits to the number of market participants.
A naive adoption of the CFT to open networks is subject to
manipulation. We can distinguish four main sources of attacks:
eavesdropping of messages Messages may be spied out and
the observed information can be misused by unauthorized
third parties.
masquerading of identity Parties can act under wrong iden-
tities.
message manipulation A message can be modified during
its transmission.
repudiation of messages A party sending a message within
a CFT process may later claim it has not originated it or it
may dispute the exact contents of the message.
From the above attacks we derive requirements for a CFT
applied in an open marketplace setting.
data confidentiality (privacy) The messages exchanged
during the CFT process between seller and bidders should
be private. Thus, it should not be possible for an unautho-
rized third party to eavesdrop the message contents.
message origin authentication The receiver of a message
should be assured of the identity of the sender to avoid
masquerading of identity.
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message integrity An unauthorized party should not be able
to modify or corrupt message contents without being de-
tected in order to guard against message manipulation.
transaction authentication Each message which is ex-
changed should be unique, such that it cannot be inter-
cepted and replayed by an unauthorized third party with-
out being detected.
non-repudiation To prevent the subsequent denial of a CFT,
all messages exchanged among sellers and bidders need to
be legally binding and non-repudiable. Thus, the sender of
a message cannot later deny ownership of the message if it
was sent with his/her digital signature.
We discuss in Section 3.5.2 how the basic CFT can be supple-
mented with non-repudiable communications including authenti-
cation of origin, message integrity, and transaction authentication.
This approach ensures that no new manipulation possibilities
are introduced by the realization of CFT with computer support.
However, this approach does not eliminate fundamental design
problems of the CFT process itself. Further drawbacks of the CFT
protocol surface in the economic design of the protocol. The main
source of manipulation caused by the design of the CFT are:
asymmetry of knowledge In the bidding phase of a CFT
the state of knowledge on the current bidding status is
unevenly distributed between the bidders and the seller.
During this phase a seller can open the present offers and
exploit this knowledge. For example, the seller can inform
other market players on the current bidding status and
motivate them to outperform the current bids.
asymmetry of control The manual winner selection is solely
controlled by the seller. In contrast to auction protocols, the
CFT thus cannot give any guarantees with respect to the
winner selection. In practice, the winner determination is
based on criteria beyond the price like a bidder’s identity
and the trust already established in the business relation-
ship between the bidder and seller.
In addition, the CFT protocol can result in a sub-optimal allo-
cation of goods. The manual winner selection cannot guarantee
that the bidder selection is the most efficient solution, i.e., the
solution that maximizes the surplus of the economy. Furthermore,
the protocol motivates bidders to speculate on the bids of their
opponents.
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To overcome the manipulation possibilities caused by the asym-
metry of knowledge and the asymmetry of control an extended
CFT protocol demands the following requirements:
bid confidentiality To avoid the manipulation possibilities
caused by the asymmetry of knowledge, we demand that
bids can only be opened when the CFT expires. Addition-
ally, it should be ensured that invalid bids cannot violate
the integrity of the CFT process.
fairness To avoid asymmetry of control the winner determina-
tion needs more transparency for the bidders to increase
their trust in the CFT process. For a fair winner determina-
tion, it is required that the rules for the winner determina-
tion are stated a priori by the seller in the CFT, e.g., only
best price like in auctions or a combination of price and
delivery time etc. One prerequisite for fairness is that rules
allow to rank the bids in a total order where the highest
ranked bid is the winning bid.
In addition, a fair CFT requires that the bidders can re-
strict the amount of information revealed to the seller. That
is, only the information required to determine the winner
should be accessible by the seller. Thus, information like
identity, location, business profile etc. should only be acces-
sible if required by the seller for the winner determination.
The existence of comprehensible winner determination
rules also allows bidders to verify the correctness of the
selection process carried out by the seller.
3.5.2 CFT with Non-Repudiation
In the following, we will present an electronic version for a
reliable CFT that allows the involved parties to detect a variety
of attacks performed by malicious parties and provides legal
bindingness by using techniques for non-repudiation. The goal
of our approach is to cope with problems that result from
• eavesdropping messages,
• manipulating messages,
• masquerading of identities,
• replaying messages,
• repudiation of messages.
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The first problem in this list can be solved by encrypting the
transmitted data. The encryption of data at the transport level
can be achieved via TLS [DR06]. In the following, we assume that
all data are transmitted in an encrypted way. In order to tackle
the remaining vulnerabilities, there are basically two security
concepts that will be applied: digital signatures and availability of
authentic public keys. The combination of them ensures that any
modification of signed documents can be easily detected since
this would cause the invalidity of the signature. Additionally, the
identity of the signer can be obtained by the certified public key
assigned to a specific identity. Replay of old statements can be
detected if the signed documents are unique. Such attacks can be
avoided by the usage of sequence numbers or time stamps and
a receiver that will never accept an identical message twice. The
non-repudiation results from the property that no other party
is able to calculate the digital signature since the secret key is
known exclusively by the owner.
Bidder Seller
Publish signed CFT
Submit signed bid
Confirm receipt
End of bidding phase
Signed notification
Confirm notification
1
2
3
5
4
Figure 3.23: The Sale by Call for Tenders Protocol
The security of the electronic CFT is achieved by designing
a protocol that basically applies digital signatures relying on a
infrastructure that guarantees the authenticity of public keys.
Therefore, it is necessary to find a suitable sequence of messages
that have to be exchanged between the seller and the bidders
in order to meet the previously described requirements. In the
following, we will explain the protocol steps which are depicted
by Figure 3.23 and give reasons for them.
1. In the first step, the seller issues a digitally signed CFT.
It has to be emphasized that the signed message should
include the seller’s identity, a description of the goods to
be sold, and all further relevant conditions of the CFT such
as the time in which the seller will accept the submission
of bids. Because of the digital signature a bidder can verify
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the integrity and the validity of the CFT. Since the signature
also depends on some time constraints replay attacks can
be avoided. Thus, a malicious party cannot take a copy of
an old CFT and publish it elsewhere in order to make a
buyer submit his bid. Since the origin of the CFT can be
verified the bidder can be sure that this CFT does not come
from a fake seller. In case there is one very famous seller
in the market that attracts a lot of bidders, other sellers
could claim his identity and thereby draw the attention
of some customers to themselves. A further motivation for
masquerade could be the damage of reputation of an honest
seller. All these attacks can be avoided if the seller signs all
the information that he publishes to make the authenticity
verifiable.
2. The second step deals with the submission of bids. Here, we
assume that the bidder takes a form that is provided by the
seller and fills in all the relevant data such as his identity
and his bid amount and finally signs all this information
before submitting it to the seller. With this signed bid the
bidder declares that he is willing to buy the offered goods
for the price proposed by himself while respecting the
seller’s conditions. The form provided by the seller should
contain the corresponding signed CFT or a reference to it.
The application of a digital signature helps the seller to
verify the integrity of the bid and to identify the bidder.
Furthermore, replay attacks are not possible since there
exists a unique relation between the CFT and each specific
bid. Thus, if the seller receives a signed message twice this
would have no effect as long as the offered goods are only
sold to one bidder as a whole. In another context, if bidders
are allowed to ask for some smaller portions of the offered
goods, and if more than one winner is allowed, then some
further bid identification information should be included.
If not, then a malicious party is able to send copies of one
signed bid in a replay attack and thereby bids for multiple
portions of the offered good while masquerading the bidder.
The signature on the bid can be used as an evidence by the
seller in the case of a dispute in which the bidder denies his
bid. Such an evidence can be used to convince any other
party that the bidder behaves in a malicious way.
3. In the third step, the seller sends a signed confirmation of
receipt to the bidder. Such a confirmation includes a unique
reference to the received bid. This confirmation ensures the
bidder that his bid will be considered in the determination
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of the winner. But this confirmation is also of use for the
seller regarding his interests. Without the existence of such
a confirmation, a malicious bidder that is powerful enough
could try to intercept all concurrent bids. This would be
advantageous for him since in the winner determination
other bids would be out of the game. By such an attack, the
seller does not become aware of better bids. But since in the
protocol considered here the bidders expect a confirmation
of their bids such an attack would become obvious.
4. After the declared time interval of the bidding phase the
seller selects the winner(s) and performs the fourth step in
the protocol. This step focuses on the notification of the win-
ner(s). For the sake of simplicity and without constraining
generality, we assume that there is one winner. This noti-
fication should be signed by the seller for several reasons.
Furthermore, the notification should be uniquely related
to the bid. The winner can ensure that the message is not
faked since he can verify its origin and integrity. Replaying
the notification message would make no sense since the
receipt of copies will not mislead or confuse the winner.
Even a malicious winner cannot gain any profit from copy-
ing the notification and requesting the goods for each copy
since each acceptable notification is unique and copies will
not be accepted. On the other hand, the signature of the
notification provides an evidence that can be used in the
case of a dispute that may arise if the seller changes his
decision after the notification. In such a case, the evidence
will entitle the winner to claim the goods.
5. In the fifth step, the winner confirms the receipt of the
notification message exchanged in the previous step. In
order to make this confirmation undeniable, the winner
has to sign it. If such a confirmation is not included in the
protocol a malicious seller could leave out the notification
in the previous step and claim afterwards that he has sent
this notification. Thereby, he would be able to request the
amount of money included in the undeniable bid of the
second step without informing the winner. In order to have
an evidence that he correctly followed the rules of the game
the seller has to collect the winner’s confirmation. But on
the other hand, this confirmation also protects the seller
against a malicious winner that denies having received the
notification. If a malicious winner refuses to send the confir-
mation then the seller could force him to do so by using an
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official delivery service. Thus, the seller has the guarantee
that he will always have the required confirmation.
The CFT protocol as previously described is more or less an
adaptation of the real world CFT scenario to the electronic world
using security techniques to avoid the described attacks. Thereby,
it is the intention of the seller to have a rather unbalanced model.
In the CFT protocol it is requested that the winner determination
is done manually and also that the rules for this process are not
obvious for the bidders. Furthermore, the whole CFT process
is controlled exclusively by the seller and he gets a complete
insight in all the strategies of the bidders. Thus, besides all the
security that was introduced by the previous protocol, there are
still various possibilities for unfairness. These problems can be
solved by using sealed-bid auction models.
3.5.3 Sealed-bid Auction with Trusted Third Party
Auctions provide another approach for price discovery mech-
anisms and for the selection of suitable partners for business
relations. In this section, we present a secured solution for elec-
tronic sealed-bid auctions. The auction approach provides an
interesting alternative for a CFT since it overcomes some short-
comings of the secure electronic CFT, e.g., concerning fairness.
In the CFT model, the seller was free to determine the winner
in whatever way he decided. The rules for this process were not
public. In contrast, we assume that the rules for the winner deter-
mination in auctions are publicly known [KF98b, KF98c, MM87].
Furthermore, all bidders have the possibility to check whether
the seller, i.e., the auctioneer, really follows these rules. Thereby,
we achieve another quality in this kind of business processes
dealing with bid collections and selections from various offers.
The focus of this section is on the sealed-bid auction type. In
general, in sealed-bid auctions submitted bids are not visible for
any bidder. A sealed-bid auction basically consists of two phases:
the bid collection phase and the winner determination phase.
During the bid collection phase, the bids are submitted in a way
that their contents remain hidden not only to competitive bidders
but also to the auctioneer. This prevents an unfair auctioneer
from colluding with another bidder by notifying him about the
best bid. Before the bids are revealed, the auctioneer commits to
the sealed bids. In the winner determination phase, the bids are
revealed and the winner is singled out. Our solution thus ensures
that all involved parties are able to verify that the auctioneer
really follows the auction rules without possibilities to cheat.
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Furthermore, there is a need for means that prevent bidders to
deny or to withdraw their bids once they have submitted them.
Further properties of our approach for sealed-bid auctions are
non-repudiation, anonymity of the bidder, and prevention of
message manipulation and masquerading attacks. The auction
model approach involves the role of a trusted third party (TTP).
The reason for the introduction of a TTP is mainly motivated by
the goal of anonymity to be combined with the prevention of
bid withdrawals. Anonymity is necessary since the auctioneers
could draw conclusions from the knowledge of a bidder’s iden-
tity concerning his concealed bid. Other work in the context of
anonymity can be found, e.g., in [Cha85, Cha88, GRS96, RSG98].
In our concept, the TTP has to be trusted only by the bidder, the
auctioneer’s trust is not necessary. Thus, there arises no difficulty
in finding a TTP which is trusted by both parties. Each bidder
can choose any desired TTP. The auctioneer can be in contact
with several TTPs executing the protocol. Besides the reason of
anonymity, the existence of a TTP offers a higher level of comfort
for the bidders. By using a TTP’s service they do not have to care
about sending messages in time according to the time conditions
defined in the auction rules.
In contrast to the traditional sealed-bid auction [MM87], in
our model the auctioneer gets insight into all bids during the
winner determination phase. This decision is motivated by the
fact that under certain circumstances it is of high interest to the
auctioneer to find out about the demand for specific goods. This
knowledge can be used in organizing subsequent auctions. A
further property of our approach is using efficient primitives that
results in feasibility.
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume in the following that
the winner determination rules concentrate exclusively on the bid
amount. In a more general approach, there could also be further
variables besides the bid amount that could affect the winner
determination, provided that they can be put in a total ranking.
However, by our restriction we do not constrain the generality of
our approach.
We assume that the bidder has somehow received all the rele-
vant information about the auction, e.g., the goods that can be
purchased in the auction, and the auction rules like the auction
start time and deadline. For reasons of authentication, all this
information is signed by auctioneer A. Before bidder Bi partici-
pates in the auction he selects one of the available TTPs to use
its services. Another bidder Bj also interested in the auction can
select either the same or a different TTP. During the bid collection
phase, Bi starts the following protocol:
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Bidder TTP Auctioneer
Signed order
Confirm receipt
Signed bid
Confirm receipt
Forward receipt
(optional)
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 3.24: Protocol for the Bidding Phase
1. In the first step of the protocol, Bi prepares an order order
that consists of the following parts to be sent to the TTP:
orderi = order_detailsi, Enc(Ki,amounti),
Enc(PKA,Ki),Sig(SKBi , (order_detailsi,
Enc(Ki,amounti), Enc(PKA,Ki)))
In this context, these variables have the following defini-
tions. The variable order_detailsi describes all necessary
information that is needed later by the TTP in order to
participate in the auction on behalf of Bi such as iden-
tity of Bi, the auction Bi is interested in, the auctioneer
A, and auction details (e.g., rules, time constraints). The
term Enc(Ki,amounti) describes the ciphertext obtained
by symmetric encryption of amounti, i.e., the amount of
money Bi is willing to pay in the auction, using key Ki
which is randomly chosen by Bi. This ciphertext will be
used later as a part in the sealed bid to be forwarded to A.
As long as A does not possess Ki he is not able to reveal
the amount. The term Enc(PKA,Ki) specifies the ciphertext
obtained by asymmetric encryption of Ki using the auc-
tioneer’s public key PKA. Using asymmetric encryption, a
secure channel from Bi to the auctioneer via TTP for later
exchange of Ki is established. Bi’s digital signature on a
document doc is described by Sig(SKBi ,doc). This part ful-
fills the requirements concerning message integrity, data
origin authentication and non-repudiation.
2. In the second step, TTP confirms the receipt of the message
obtained in the previous step. In order to do this, TTP
replies a digital signature on the received message.
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3. In the next step, TTP extracts some parts of the message
obtained in the first step and creates a bid to be forwarded
to A. This bid contains the following elements:
bidi = auction_details, Enc(Ki,amounti),bidIDi,
Sig(SKTTP,
(auction_details, Enc(Ki,amounti),bidIDi))
With bidi, auctioneer A possesses a commitment concern-
ing the amount of money Bi is willing to pay without know-
ing the amount. This means that neither Bi nor TTP are able
to change this amount afterwards. Furthermore, signing the
bid by TTP meets the requirement of non-repudiation. In
addition, Bi’s identity remains unknown to the auctioneer.
Thereby, the requirement of anonymity remains fulfilled.
The bidIDi is selected by the TTP and will be used after-
wards for an easy re-identification of bidi. Thus, the bidIDi
has to be unique.
4. In this step, the auctioneer informs TTP that he has included
the received bid in the actual auction by replying a signed
declaration. Thereby, TTP is ensured that bidi was received
and will also be considered in the auction. Furthermore,
TTP and therewith Bi have an evidence in a possible case
of dispute that bidi has to be considered in the winner
determination phase.
5. TTP passes the received confirmation to Bi after having
signed it again. Thereby, the latter knows that TTP has
executed his order properly. This step is not mandatory.
Since Bi trusts TTP this message serves more the purpose
of notification than that of evidence.
Let us assume that the auctioneer receives n bids via m TTPs
with 1 6 m 6 n during the bid collection phase. After the end of
the bid collection phase, the winner determination phase which
is shown in Figure 3.25 starts. In this phase, the involved parties
continue with the following protocol:
6. After having collected n bids via m TTPs, the auctioneer
composes a new message list which contains the auction_
details referencing to the corresponding auction, all the
received ciphertexts of the bid amounts amount1, . . . ,
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Bidder TTP Auctioneer
Signed list
Signed decryption info
Auction result
Confirm receipt
6
7
8
9
Confirm receipt
Signed notification
10
11
Figure 3.25: Protocol for the Winner Determination Phase
amountn, the bid identifications bidID1, . . . ,bidIDn, and
his signature on all these variables.
list = auction_details,
Enc(K1,amount1),bidID1, . . . ,
Enc(Kn,amountn),bidIDn,
Sig((SKA, (auction_details,
Enc(K1,amount1),bidID1, . . . ,
Enc(Kn,amountn),bidIDn))
By this message, the auctioneer creates a commitment on
all the encrypted bids he received. After the generation of
this message, he distributes it to all the TTPs involved in
the auction. Thereby, each TTP is able to verify whether all
the bids submitted by himself are taken into account in the
auction. If not all the bids are contained in list the TTP can
complain using the evidence he received in protocol step
4. The same evidence can also be used in the case if one
TTP does not receive list in time. The time constraints are
known to all participants by the auction rules.
7. Upon receipt and positive verification of list, all involved
TTPi for i = 1, . . . ,m generate a new message resolve_info
containing, beside others, the secured decryption keys for
all the encrypted bids with identities bidIDi1 , . . . , bidIDil
sent by the same TTPi where {i1, . . . , il} ⊂ {1, . . . ,n}. Fur-
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thermore, the message contains the TTP’s signature on this
content.
resolve_info = auction_details,
Enc(PKA,Ki1),bidIDi1 , . . . ,
Enc(PKA,Kil),bidIDil ,
Sig(SKTTPi , (auction_details,
Enc(PKA,Ki1),bidIDi1 , . . . ,
Enc(PKA,Kil),bidIDil))
In the case in which a TTP does not send his message in
time the auctioneer can request the corresponding resolve_
info using the evidence of step 3.
8. Upon receipt of the message resolve_info, the auctioneer
confirms the receipt by signing and returning it. This mes-
sage assures the TTP that the auctioneer has really received
the correct information.
After the auctioneer has collected all the messages resolve_info
from the m different TTPs he can start the auction resolution in
order to determine the winner, i.e., to find the highest amount.
In the case of two or more coinciding bid amounts, there can be
some further rules to be applied for resolving the auction. For the
sake of simplicity and without restricting generality, we assume
that there is a unique highest bid amount. In order to execute
the winner determination, the auctioneer applies the key Ki to
Enc(Ki,amounti) for i = 1, . . . ,n. Ki is obtained by decrypt-
ing of Enc(PKA,Ki) with the auctioneer’s secret key SKA. With
this information, the auctioneer is able to compare the amounts,
which leads to the determination of the winner in the auction
without the possibility to manipulate the result of the auction.
He composes a message result in which the winning bid, i.e.,
bidi, with amountmax = amounti is published besides the re-
maining n− 1 bids. With revealing this information, all further
parties involved in the auction are able to verify that the auc-
tioneer executed the auction correctly. Since the auctioneer has
given a commitment on the encrypted bids in step 6 there is no
way to introduce later new bids of other bidders or to manip-
ulate the amount of existing bids. This reasoning is based on
the assumption that it is not possible for an auctioneer with a
colluding bidder Bj to find a key K˜ that decrypts the committed
value Enc(Kj,amountj) to the decryption result amount that
is greater than amountmax. In general, this can be achieved by
the introduction of some redundancy in the representation of
amounti for i = 1, . . . ,n.
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9. The auctioneer composes a message result to be sent to
all TTPs participating in the auction. By this message, all
TTPs can verify the correctness of the winner determination
process.
result = auction_details,
K1,amount1,bidID1,
...
Ki,amounti,bidIDi, ←− winner
...
Kn,amountn,bidIDn,
Sig(SKAuc, (auction_details,
K1,amount1,bidID1, . . . ,
Kn,amountn,bidIDn))
In the verification, a TTP checks if all the parameter val-
ues sent by himself are properly contained in the message
result. Additionally, they can apply the keys Ki to their cor-
responding ciphertexts Enc(Ki,amounti) for i = 1, . . . ,n
to obtain the values of amounti. By the bidIDi, the veri-
fiers are able to identify the bids sent by themselves. Fur-
thermore, all TTPs are able to reconstruct the winner deter-
mination. If the auctioneer tried to manipulate the winner
determination, this can be detected.
10. In this step, the TTP confirms that he received the message
result and that he accepts the result of the auction by
sending a signed reply.
11. In the last step of the protocol, the TTP informs the bid-
der about the result of the auction. The message to be ex-
changed depends on the fact whether the receiving bidder
won the auction or not.
In all the steps that were performed during the auction the
identities of the bidders remain hidden to the auctioneer. Thereby,
we have fulfilled the requirement of anonymity at the same level
at which this is also fulfilled in real world auctions. Therein,
agents can operate on behalf of their clients. The subsequent
steps such as shipment and payment are outside the auction
itself. But even there, depending on the services offered by the
TTP, these steps can be performed via the TTP. Thus, the winner
can remain anonymous to the auctioneer also after the auction is
finished.
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The protocol was designed to keep the overhead for computa-
tion, communication, and the number of required components,
e.g., servers, small. Furthermore, the presented auction approach,
which focuses on a single-round sealed-bid auction, can easily be
adapted to the need of multi-round auctions.
3.6 related work
In the following, we review related work proposed by the scien-
tific community and compare them with our contributions in this
section.
Repuation Systems
[ZMM99] proposes two complementary reputation systems, name-
ly Sporas and Histos. Sporas is an evolved version of existing on-
line reputation models, e.g., eBay’s rating system. In this model,
only the most recent rating between two users is considered.
Another important characteristic is that users with very high rep-
utation values experience much smaller rating changes after each
update than users with a low reputation. In order to prevent a
user from choosing a new identity, a user’s reputation value will
never fall below a beginner’s value. Histos is a complement to
Sporas and builds personalized system. Similar to our reputation
system, Histos is based on the concept of Web of Trust to calculate
personalized reputation values. In contrast to our work, Sporas
and Histos do not provide any means for exchanging mutual
ratings in a secure way. In addition, protecting ratings is another
open issue.
[LZRD04] proposes a reputation system, i.e., R-Chain, for P2P
networks. It has two similarities to our proposal. First, it uses hash
chains to protect rating data from being manipulated. Second,
it relies on a witness, which has to be involved in a transaction.
However, in contrast to our work, R-Chain does not provide any
algorithms for a rating aggregation.
Au et al. present a framework for enabling cross-organizational
trust establishment [ALA01]. They introduce trust tokens which
are issued by trust servers. These tokens are required when a
user wants to access a protected resource. Au et al. also use the
concept of Web of Trust to model the trust relationship between
the trust servers. However, in contrast to their work, we build up
a Web of Trust based on ratings and can calculate the trust level
in an ad-hoc manner.
Kamvar et al. propose the EigenTrust algorithm for reputation
management in P2P networks [KSGM03]. This work is close to
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our system, since both are based on the concept of transitive trust.
But in contrast to our work, Eigentrust relies on good choice of
some pretrusted peers, which are supposed to be trusted by all
peers.
In [Mau96], Maurer proposes an approach to model a user’s
view of a public key infrastructure (PKI). From this view, a user
draws conclusions about the authenticity of other entities’ public
keys and possibly about the trustworthiness of other entities. A
user’s view consists of the user’s statements about the authen-
ticity of public keys and the trustworthiness of their owners, as
well as a collection of certificates and recommendations obtained
or retrieved from the PKI. The approach is similar to our work,
since it relies on transitive relationships. However, we use other
data, i.e., transaction ratings, to calculate the trustworthiness of
market participants.
Gupta et al. propose in [GJA03] a reputation system for P2P
networks to assess peers’ levels of participation in a P2P system.
The main goal of this system is to give the peers an incentive to
actively participate in the system and to discredit freeriders. For
this purpose, they introduce a reputation score which is based on
the behavior of the peers as well as on their capabilities. The part
of the reputation score that represents the behavior consists of the
“content search contribution”, i.e., the willingness to forward and
process requests, and the “content download contribution”, i.e.,
the willingness to serve data. The second part of the reputation
score, which represents the capabilities, consists of the processing
power, bandwidth, storage capacity and memory of the peer. Two
schemes are used to calculate reputation scores with the help of a
centralized “reputation computing agent” (RCA). This approach
differs from our decentralized reputation system. In addition, the
proposal of Gupta et al. does not enable peers to rate each other
after a conducted transaction.
Fair Auctions
In general, the World Wide Web provides a ubiquitous platform
for the execution of electronic auctions. In [Kle00], a framework
of constituting elements of auctions is presented and the impact
of the Web on the proliferation of auctions is discussed. A short
discussion on auctions’ benefits and a description of the goods
and services traded in auctions is given in [Tur97]. Franklin and
Reiter present a solution in [FR96] which is based on a distributed
system approach in which the security requirements are fulfilled
as long as not too many out of the auction servers’ set operate
maliciously and do not collude. In our context, the requirement
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for multiple servers is not suitable for small companies intending
to take on the role of an auctioneer. Furthermore in order to
prevent collusions between these servers they have to be offered
and maintained by different parties.
In [HKT98], an adaption of the first price and second price
sealed-bid auctions to computational environments is presented.
Like in [FR96], the privacy of submitted bids is preserved by
using a form of secure distributed computation. The mechanism
ensures that the auctioneers and participants (except for the
winner) will be completely unaware of the non-winning bids.
The solution of [KHT98] considers multiple auctioneer servers
and multi-round auctions. [KF98a] describes a variety of com-
monly used auction mechanisms and present a software ar-
chitecture for electronic auctions. Other work in the area of
electronic auctions with focus on security aspects was done in
[NPS99, Cac99, SS99, SA99]. In [WTL00], a method to earn strate-
gies for multilateral negotiations such as auctions is presented.
The economic design of auction protocols has been widely
discussed in auction literature. The objective is to design auc-
tions on solid economic principles and to ensure that participants
have incentives to bid as they truly value the item. An overview
and analysis of the underlying economic principles is given in
[MM87]. In [Vic61], Vickrey has designed a sealed-bid second
price auction that is incentive compatible, and maximizes con-
sumer surplus. The analysis and investigation of the economic
properties of auctions usually assumes a trustworthy auctioneer
or auction house. With the application of auctions to the Internet
this assumption can no longer be maintained. The application
of auctions to computational environments and its implications
are discussed in [KF98c, Tyg98]. In [San96], problems and limita-
tions of automated Vickrey auctions are discussed and means to
circumvent them are developed.
3.7 conclusions
In this chapter, we analyzed less organized business processes, in
which involved parties, e.g., market participants, have their state
of knowledge by having more or better information than others
as well as their own motives. As a result, the mentioned parties
may distrust each other. In order to overcome this shortcoming,
we focused on trust building for open networks. We proposed
two different reputation systems and a fair auction protocol. The
first reputation system is centralized, i.e., it relies on a trusted
third party. This reputation system has two key features. First,
it supports market participants during all phases of a market
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transaction including the negotiation. Second, it provides a set of
different algorithms for rating aggregation which in turn increase
the usability of the reputation system. The main features of the
second reputation system are its fully decentralized character
and its robustness against coalition attacks. As a consequence,
the proposed reputation system can be used in P2P networks.
We verified the robustness of our decentralized reputation sys-
tem with the help of a simulation. In Section 3.5, we showed
how a concrete business process, i.e., Sale by Call for Tenders,
can be made robust against classical security attacks, such as
identity masquerading and repudiation of messages. In addition,
we explain how to overcome economic design problems of the
mentioned business process.
All the proposed approaches are soft security mechanisms
and can be applied in business process where involved parties
have less stable relationships with each other. In the next chapter,
we focus on more organized business processes for which we
propose a set of hard security mechanisms for usage control.
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4
U S A G E C O N T R O L
This section deals with usage control for electronic business
processes. In particular, we focus on controlling the usage of
digital objects, e.g, electronic documents, which demands two
functionalities. First, we need methods for defining usage rules.
Second, mechanisms for enforcing the defined usage rules are
required. In this section, we address both aspects of usage control.
Electronic documents play a central role in business processes,
since they are a means of integration and are handled among
business partners. Some documents are sensitive and thus have
to be protected from being accessed by unauthorized parties.
For this purpose, we propose in Section 4.1 a flexible access
control model for electronic documents. Our model captures the
information about the operations performed on documents. This
history information can be used to define access control rules.
The proposed access control model is the result of our joint work
with Patrick Röder and is presented in his PhD thesis [R0¨8]. In
Section 4.1.7, we show how to apply our access control model in
context of business processes.
In Section 4.2, we consider scenarios, in which customers are
involved in the execution of a special kind of business processes,
such as selling and consuming digital goods. In these cases, digi-
tal goods have to be protected from being used in an unautho-
rized way, i.e., being shared in public networks. This requirement
reflects another facet of usage control. In this context, we have to
define usage rules for digital content, e.g., music files. These rules
have to be enforced on customers’ platforms. Thus, the integrity
of customers’ platform will be verified before transferring digital
goods. For this, we propose a robust integrity reporting protocol
which is necessary when a remote platform, e.g., a customer’s
computer, has to perform security relevant operations, e.g., to
enforce a security policy. This protocol can be used for developing
a robust Digital Rights Management (DRM) system that supports
the transfer of digital goods to other users or devices. We present
such a DRM system in Section 4.2.7.
69
4.1 access control for xml-documents
[SR01] explains the key advantages of the eXtensible Markup
Language (XML). These are the support for multiple views of
the same content, selective (field-sensitive) queries over networks,
e.g., the Internet, and a standard data and document interchange
infrastructure. Consequently, XML is the key technology for stor-
ing and sharing of business data. Since some of this data can
embody confidential information, protecting this kind of data
is crucial. In this section, we propose a flexible model for con-
trolling access to XML documents. We present a usage scenario
which is used to drive requirements for access control to XML
documents and to explain our model with the help of concrete
example rules.
In our scenario, we consider three companies. The first com-
pany is SmartChips, which is a supplier of car computers. The
other two companies are EcoCars and FastCars, both of them are
car manufacturers and competitors as well. Each company has
its own standard for the classification of its products or its bill of
materials. There are also public standards that can be accessed
by all companies without restrictions. Competitors should not
be able to access the standards of their adversaries. SmartChips
and EcoCars have a strong collaboration. Therefore, SmartChips
is allowed to edit the standard of EcoCars and can copy parts
of its own standard to EcoCars’ standard. Since SmartChips is
also a supplier to FastCars, SmartChips has read access to the
FastCars standard and can copy parts of this to its own standard.
Figure 4.1 shows the permitted data flows in our scenario. In our
SmartChips’
Standard
EcoCars’
Standard
FastCars’
Standard
Public
Standard
Copy operations all parties
are allowed to perform
Copy operations SmartChips 
is allowed to perform
Figure 4.1: Permitted Data Flows
example, we consider a business process between SmartChips
and FastCars, during which SmartChips views the standard of
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FastCars and copies some parts of this to its own standard. From
FastCars’ point of view, SmartChips should not be able to copy
parts of FastCars’ standard to EcoCars’ standard to avoid unde-
sirable information flows. For this, the concept of noninterference
has been proposed by [GM82]. [Man03] presents the following
common intuitive understanding of noninterference: “a group of
processes is noninterfering with another group of processes if the
actions of the first group have no effect on the observations of the
second group.” To ensure noninterference, SmartChips’ access to
EcoCars’ standard must be restricted once FastCars’ standard has
been accessed by SmarChips. Depending on the requirements
of the scenario, we can define three alternatives for limiting
the access of SmartChips. In the first instance, SmartChips is
not permitted to access the standard of EcoCars. In the second,
SmartChips is not allowed to edit the standard of EcoCars. In the
third, SmartChips is allowed to edit the standard of EcoCars, as
long as no data is transferred from FastCars’ standard. This case
occurs when SmartChips transfers data from a public standard
to EcoCars’ standard.
This scenario illustrates several requirements with regard to ac-
cess control. First, we need a mechanism for recording accesses to
standards, which are stored in documents. This recorded informa-
tion must contain information about each operation performed
and its context. The context must include relevant data for access
decisions, e.g., the subject that performed the operation and the
time at which the operation was performed. Second, we must be
able to define access to documents depending on former accesses.
As a consequence, we need a model where access is defined
based on the history of previous operations. Third, since stan-
dards contain descriptive texts which can be partly reused in
other standards, the access-control system has to be able to define
access to these parts individually. Fourth, since standards are
usually stored in XML documents, we need a model that can
define access to XML documents.
In the next section, we introduce a model that fulfills the four
requirements mentioned above. We start with a description of the
histories, continue with the operations defined in our model and
finally present the syntax of our access rules. Then, we present
a system architecture including algorithms which are necessary
when we apply our model in a distributed environment. At the
end of this section, we show how to use our model to define
access for the aforementioned scenario.
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4.1.1 Overview of History-Based Access Control
Our access control model defines which subjects are allowed or
denied to access certain parts of an XML document. Concerning
the subjects of our model, we design our model for human users.
The objects of our model are different parts of an XML docu-
ment. These parts can either be entire XML elements (including
attributes and text content), attributes or parts of the text content
of an XML element. We define a set of operations, which enables
the user to view and edit XML documents. The effects of these
operations are recorded in the history. When we record an oper-
ation in the history, we also log the context information of that
operation. Generally speaking, context information can be any
information that helps to specify the situation of the operation
more precisely. In our case, we record the date and time of the
operation, the subject that performed the operation and the role
the corresponding subject was active in. Summing up, the history
stores how a document was created.
Finally, we use access control rules to define that subjects in a
certain role are allowed or denied to perform a given operation
on specific objects. These objects are described by a condition,
which defines predicates on the content of the current document
and on the history. When a user tries to perform an operation on
an object, we check whether there is an access control role that
matches with the active role of the user, with the operation that he
wants to perform and with the object. The first two aspects can be
verified directly using the current role of the current user and the
invoked operation. In contrast to this, to find out whether a rule
matches with an object, we must check whether the object has
the properties described by the condition of the rule. Therefore
the condition must be evaluated for the current object.
4.1.2 Histories
We use histories to keep track of changes caused by the operations
create, copy, delete, and change attribute. The operation view
is also logged in the histories. These operations are described
in detail in Section 4.1.3. We keep one history for every element
itself including its attributes and one history for its text content.
The latter history uses markup elements to divide the text into
text blocks with a block ID. This mechanism enables us to keep
track of sub-elements of arbitrary size. The markup elements
are defined by ac:block elements, where ac is the prefix for the
namespace of the access control system. We use the block IDs to
reference individual text blocks in the history for the text content.
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If a view is created for a user, the ac:block elements are omitted.
Keeping track of such implicitly defined sub-elements allows
us to manage protection units smaller than an XML element.
Technically, we use XML elements to define those sub-elements,
but from a user’s point of view, these sub-elements are not visible.
A new text block is created in two cases. First, we create a
new text block as a result of a copy operation, at both the source
and the destination element. Second, we create a new text block
whenever text is added to an element.
In addition to the histories, we maintain a unique element ID
for each element to reference it independently of its current posi-
tion within the document. Moreover, each document has a unique
document ID. We use these IDs to keep track of copy operations
by maintaining an is-copy-of relation among the elements and
text blocks. Two objects are in is-copy-of relation with each other
if one object is a copy of the other.
Figure 4.2 shows a graphical illustration of the is-copy-of rela-
tion of the objects mentioned in the scenario described in Section
4.1. We refer to this kind of illustration as a copy-graph. In this
example, all objects are text blocks. In the general case, objects
can be XML elements as well.
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Standard
FastCars’
Standard
SmartChips’ Standard
FastCars’
Standard
SmartChips’ 
Standard
EcoCars’
Standard
Figure 4.2: Example Copy-Graph
A history entry consists of an action element, which contains
details on the operation and a context description. In addition to
the operation, an action element can have up to two arguments
that describe the action. For the actions related to attributes,
we store the name of the corresponding attribute. The change
attribute and create attribute operations additionally store
the new value of the attribute. The create text and delete text
operations store the block ID of the corresponding text block.
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4.1.3 Operations
In this section, we describe the details of the operations supported
by our model. These are view, create, delete, change attribute
and copy. Most of the operations can be applied to elements, text
and attributes. Each operation, except for view, has an effect on
the document itself as well as on the histories. The view operation
creates a history entry only. The create operation is divided into
creating elements, creating attributes and creating text.
The create element operation creates an element without any
attributes or text. In addition to the element itself, the history
of the element is created. The first entry of the history for the
element describes its creation. The attributes of an element are cre-
ated with the create attribute operation, which is also logged
with an entry in the history of the enclosing element. It can be
required that elements have mandatory attributes. This require-
ment should be checked on the application level and not within
the access control system. This also applies to the deletion of
mandatory attributes.
The create text operation is used to add new text to an ele-
ment. This operation has an argument that specifies the position
of the new text. If this position is within an existing block, this
block is split at the position where the new content should be
placed and the new content is placed in-between the split blocks.
The split blocks keep their original histories, whereas the new
content gets a new history with one entry describing its creation.
The boundaries of the split content pieces are denoted by the
ac:block elements, as described in Section 4.1.2.
The delete operation is used to delete elements, attributes, text
or parts of the text. Since elements and their attributes are checked
in rules, we need to keep them after deletion. For that purpose,
the context of a delete operation is captured in the element history
with a delete action entry. A context is a tuple of Date, Subject
and Role, where Date refers to a date including time and Role is
the role of the subject that performs the corresponding operation.
The copy operation is used for elements, text or parts of the
text. In all cases, we apply the corresponding create operation to
create a new instance at the destination as a copy from the source,
which is registered in the destination element. Additionally, the
is-copy-of relation of the elements is updated.
The view operation displays elements which have not been
deleted. When a user wants to view a document, the view op-
eration is invoked for every element of the document itself, but
also for its attributes and text. In contrast to the read operation of
74
some other systems, e.g., [BL73, BN89], the view operation does
not imply a data transfer.
The change attribute operation allows users to change the
value of a specific attribute. Since former values of an attribute
can be checked by rules, we record the change with an entry in
the corresponding element history.
4.1.4 Rules
In this section, we define a syntax for Access Control (AC) rules,
which can express policies that depend on the content of the
current document, the recorded history information and the
content of dependent documents. Generally speaking, a rule
has the typical structure of subject, operation, object and mode.
The mode field of a rule defines whether it is positive (allow) or
negative (deny). The default semantics of our model is deny: if
the access to the object is not defined by a rule, then the object is
not accessible. If conflicts occur, we take the rule with the superior
role and finally apply “deny takes precedence over allow”.
We use roles [SCFY96] to model the subjects to gain a higher
level of abstraction and therefore more flexibility compared to
directly listing individual subjects.
Instead of listing individual objects in rules in an ACL-like
manner [GD72], we describe objects by their properties, e.g., loca-
tion within a document or attribute values. For this purpose, we
use XPath patterns [BBC+07] to describe the objects for which
a rule is applicable. We use XPath, since its clearly defined se-
mantics presented in [DFF+07] makes the interpretation of the
resulting rules unambiguous. Moreover, XPath has a predefined
set of mechanisms that can be used for our purpose.
We define two types of rules. The first type of rules defines
permissions for the unary operations create, view, delete and
change attribute. The objects of an AC rule are defined by an
XPath pattern. The second type of rules defines permissions for
the binary copy operation, which requires the specification of a
source and a destination object. We use two XPath patterns for
this. The syntax of both types of rules is listed in Figure 4.3.
4.1.5 Accessing History Information with XPath
We use XPath patterns in rules to define access depending on
histories. As a consequence, we need a mechanism to access
the histories within an XPath pattern. Therefore, we extend the
function library of XPath by a set of functions, which we collect
in the following six groups. The namespace of our functions is
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Unary rule Copy rule
Element Description Element Description
Role role Role role
Operation view|create|delete| Operation copy
change attribute
Object XPath Object XPath
Destination XPath
Mode allow|deny Mode allow|deny
Figure 4.3: Syntax of Access Control Rules
indicated by the prefix ‘ac:’. In the context of XPath, we speak of
a node instead of an object.
Getting Copies of a Node
This group of functions is related to the is-copy-of relation of
nodes among each other. It is required to express rules that define
access depending on the source of an object or on the locations
to where an object was copied.
The function ac:copies returns all nodes that are in is-copy-
of relation with the current node, whereas the function ac:-
predecessors returns all nodes of which the current node is a
copy. Finally, the function ac:successors returns all nodes that
are copies of the current node. All three functions also return
nodes that are in indirect is-copy-of relation to the current node,
e.g., ac:successors also returns the copies of the copies of the
current node.
Getting Attribute Values
The function ac:attribute-values returns a chronologically sort-
ed list of tuples of an attribute value and the context corre-
sponding to the change of the attribute value. It is required to
define rules, which inspect former values of an attribute. For
example, the rule {researcherB, View, deny, /Report[count(ac:-
attribute-values(’funded-by’)[value=’Company A’]) > 0]/*}
states that subjects in the role researcherB are not allowed to
view reports that were funded by ’Company A’ in the past or at
present.
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Getting Related Nodes Depending on Time
This group of functions retrieves nodes addressed relatively to
the context node that existed within a specified time interval. In
the XPath terminology, the element to be checked against the
pattern is called the context node. XPath offers functions to re-
trieve nodes addressed relatively to the context node, but without
the specification of a time interval, since XPath only considers
the current state of a document. This time interval is required
to select related nodes depending on time, since nodes can be
deleted. Therefore, each of these functions can have a time in-
terval as parameter, e.g., ac:children-at(t1, t2) returns all
nodes that were children of the context node in the time in-
terval between t1 and t2. To inspect a single point in time, t2
can be omitted. The functions of this group are ac:parent-at,
ac:following-at, ac:preceding-sibling-at, ac:preceding-at,
ac:following-sibling-at, ac:children-at, ac:descendant-at,
ac:root-at and ac:self-at.
Getting the Context of a History Entry
This group of functions offers access to the context of a specific
history entry. Each function returns an element consisting of
subject, role and time. These functions are ac:creation-context
and ac:deletion-context.
Getting Accessed Nodes
This group of functions is used to get all nodes which have
been accessed by a specified user or by a user in a certain role.
Amongst others, these functions are required to express Chinese
Wall policies [BN89]. The functions are ac:created, ac:viewed,
ac:changed-attribute and ac:deleted. Each function refers to
a specific operation, e.g., ac:viewed returns viewed nodes. In
addition, the function ac:accessed returns all accessed nodes in-
dependently of the operation. All functions have two parameters
that define conditions on the returned nodes. The first parameter
user specifies to return only nodes that have been accessed by
the specified user. Analogously, we define the parameter role.
Both parameters can be set to any to indicate to return nodes
accessed by any user or in any role. Optionally, each parameter
can be set to current. In this case, the current user or his current
role is used for the check. For example, created(any, current)
returns all nodes which have been created by users who were
active in the same role as the one in which the current user is
active in.
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Getting Specific Nodes of Current Rule
We define three functions for accessing specific nodes within an
XPath pattern. The function ac:current-node returns the node in
question for which the XPath pattern is evaluated. This function
is required when the pattern’s context changes to a document
that is different from the document for which the pattern was
initiated. The function ac:src-node retrieves the source node in
question when checking a copy rule. In a similar fashion, the
function ac:dest-node returns the destination node of a copy
rule. The last two functions are necessary to define copy rules
which compare the source and destination objects with each
other.
4.1.6 System Architecture
Applying our model in a scenario where multiple users concur-
rently edit multiple documents introduces four requirements.
First, since access rights of one document depend on other doc-
uments, we need a method for accessing these distributed doc-
uments when calculating access rights. Second, changes to one
document require the recalculation of the views of all dependent
documents, which are currently viewed. The straight forward
approach for this is to recalculate the views of all dependent
documents after a document has been changed. However, this
results in a much higher number of view recalculations compared
to models which only define access depending on the currently
edited document. For example, editing 20 depending documents
concurrently, leads to a 20 times higher number of view recalcu-
lations with the straight forward approach. Therefore, we need a
method which reduces the number of these view recalculations.
Third, the changes by one user to a document can revoke the
access rights of other users which are currently editing depen-
dent documents. As a consequence, access rights can be revoked
during an editing process, which can lead to conflicts regarding
the content of the document and the access rights. Consequently,
we need a method for handling these conflicts. Fourth, the afore-
mentioned straight forward approach causes intermediate editing
steps to become relevant for access decisions of other users, which
is not desired. For example, a user can change a policy relevant
element of a document by first deleting it and then replacing it
with an updated version afterwards. In this example, the first
step can revoke the access rights of another user, whereas the
second step might restore these access rights.
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In the following we present a system architecture that meets
the four requirements mentioned above. Its components are ex-
plained in the following sections. Additionally, we describe the
algorithms and protocols that are required for the interaction
between the components.
4.1.6.1 Overview
Our system architecture and its components are depicted in Fig-
ure 4.4. Our system uses four databases. The document database
(Doc DB) contains all the documents of the system. The rule
database (Rule DB) contains the AC rules, which specify allowed
or denied accesses to the documents and their parts. The copy
database (Copy DB) stores the is-copy-of relation of the objects.
Since the is-copy-of relation can be depicted by a graph, we speak
of an edge when we refer to a single is-copy-of relation between
two objects. Finally, the user database (User DB) stores the cre-
dentials of the users of the system as well as the corresponding
roles including their hierarchy.
UI
PDP
User DP
PEP
Rule DB
Copy DB
Doc DB
User DB
Figure 4.4: System Architecture for History-based Access Control
The user interface (UI) presents documents to the user and
offers operations that can be performed on the documents. If
the user invokes such an operation, the corresponding request
is sent to the document processor (DP), which performs the
requested operation if it is permitted. Inside the DP, the policy
enforcement point (PEP) intercepts each operation and asks the
policy decision point (PDP) whether the requested operation is
allowed. The PDP uses the four databases to decide whether to
allow or deny the requested operation. This architecture allows
us to access distributed documents when a rule is evaluated
and therefore it represents a solution for the first requirement
mentioned in Section 4.1.6. In the following, we explain the
workflow for editing a document to illustrate the processes within
our architecture.
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4.1.6.2 Workflow
A document must be opened before it can be viewed or edited.
Therefore, the UI offers a command to open a document. This
command is sent to the DP, which loads a copy of the document
from the document database. We refer to this process as check-out,
since it has semantics similar to the check-out command of a
version control system [Tic85]. After the check-out, the user can
edit the document by applying the operations of our model. The
changed content of an opened document including the corre-
sponding histories becomes relevant for access decisions of other
documents after it is checked-in. Up to then, the content of the
opened document is only relevant for access decisions concerning
that document itself. The document and the corresponding histo-
ries are kept as a local copy in the DP. To check-in a document, the
user must invoke the corresponding command of the UI. Then,
the DP stores the copy of the document back to the document
database.
The check-in and check-out concept is more efficient and offers
a higher usability compared to directly working on the policy-
relevant version of a document. The first concept is more effi-
cient, because changed content must be propagated less often.
In other words, we propagate the changes only when a docu-
ment is checked-in and do not propagate them immediately after
each change. This also reduces the overhead for recalculating
permissions. The usability is also higher because of the trans-
action semantics of the approach. With this concept a user can
decide when the changing of a document is done, instead of
having potentially unwanted intermediate states become relevant
for access decisions. With this concept we give a solution for the
second and fourth requirement mentioned in Section 4.1.6.
In the following, we present and explain a set of algorithms for
implementing the workflow sketched above.
4.1.6.3 Check-out
When a user invokes the command to check-out a document,
the DP first loads a copy of that document from the Doc DB.
The Doc DB maintains a list for each document that denotes by
which users the corresponding document is currently opened
to support concurrent access to documents. The PDP executes
Algorithm 3 to create a view. This algorithm removes nodes
from the document for which the user in question has no view
permission and deleted nodes. For that purpose, the algorithm
adds a marker to each node which is set initially to “default”,
where a node can either be an element, an attribute or a text
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block. Next, we sort all rules by their role and their mode. More
special roles are priorized over less special roles and deny rules
are placed before allow rules. Then, we remove inapplicable rules.
For each of the remaining rules, the corresponding XPath pattern
is evaluated. The result of this step is a set of nodes that match
with the current XPath pattern, which defines the applicable
objects of the rule. For each of these nodes, the marker is set
according to the mode field of the current rule. If all nodes have a
marker different from “default” we stop inspecting rules. Finally,
we remove every node with a marker set to “default”, every node
with a marker set to “deny” and deleted nodes. After that, the
PDP sends the view to the DP, which creates history entries for
the view operation and forwards the view to the UI.
Input : rulesall, rolecurr, role_hierarchy, doc
Output: doc
add marker to every node of doc1
set marker of every node of doc to “default”2
sort rulesall by role (special first) and mode (deny first)3
for each rulei of rulesall do4
if operation of rulei is not “view” or role of rulei is not5
inferior or equal to rolecurr then
continue with next iteration of loop6
nodesresult ← evaluate XPath of rulei for doc7
for each nodej of nodesresult do8
if marker of nodej is “default” then9
set marker of nodej to mode of rulei10
if all markers of doc are different from “default” then11
exit loop12
for each nodej of doc do13
if marker of nodej is “default” or “deny” or the node is14
deleted then
remove nodej and subtree below from doc15
return doc16
Algorithm 3: Create View
4.1.6.4 Editing
To edit a document, the user first selects an operation offered by
the UI. This operation is sent to the DP, where the PEP intercepts
the operation to check whether it is allowed. For this purpose,
the PEP sends the requested operation together with the current
document to the PDP, which evaluates the rules to answer the
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request of the PEP. For this purpose, the PDP performs Algorithm
4.
Input : rulesall, rolecurr, role_hierarchy, op, doc, obj,
docdest, objdest
Output: deny | allow
sort rulesall by role (special first) and mode (deny first)1
for each rulei of rulesall do2
if operation of rulei is not op or role of rulei is not inferior3
or equal to rolecurr then
continue with next iteration of loop4
if op is “copy” then5
nodesresult ← evaluate XPath for source of rulei for6
doc
else7
nodesresult ← evaluate XPath of rulei for doc8
if obj is not contained in nodesresult then9
continue with next iteration of loop10
if op is “copy” then11
nodesresult ← evaluate XPath for destination of rulei12
for docdest
if objdest is not contained in nodesresult then13
continue with next iteration of loop14
return mode of rulei15
return “deny”16
Algorithm 4: Evaluate Rules
The algorithm for rule evaluation sorts all rules like the pre-
vious algorithm. Then, it checks the applicability of each rule
by inspecting its role and its operation. For each rule, the XPath
pattern is evaluated to check whether it matches with the ob-
ject in question. In the case of a copy operation (line 11), the
XPath pattern for the destination is evaluated, too. If the rule is
applicable, its mode is returned. After evaluating all rules, the
algorithms returns “deny”, if none of the rules was applicable.
The PDP sends the result of this algorithm back to the DP. If the
result is deny, the DP does not perform the requested operation
and informs the user via the UI. If the result is allow, the DP
performs the requested operation. For that purpose, it executes
the algorithm for the selected operation. To give details on how
the operations of our model are performed and how histories
are recorded, we present the corresponding algorithms in the
following.
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Create
The create operation is used to create elements, attributes or
text. In all cases, we add history information that describes the
operation. Algorithm 5 is used for creating a new element. It
creates the element itself and the corresponding history entry.
Since the algorithm for creating a new attribute is very similar to
the one for creating a new element, we refrain from describing it.
Input : docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr
Output:
elemnew ← create new element at elemdst in docdst1
create element history for elemnew2
create_hist_entry(“Create elem.”, subj, role, timecurr)3
Algorithm 5: Create Element
Algorithm 6 is used to add new text to an element. For this
purpose, the DP first determines the creation context of the ex-
isting element and the current context. Then, both contexts are
compared. If they are different the algorithm for splitting blocks
is invoked. After that, a new text block is created to which the
new content is added. Then, the corresponding history entry is
created. If the contexts are equal, the new content is inserted into
the element.
Input : docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr, content, posinsert
Output:
split_block(docdst, elemdst, posinsert)1
blockdst ← create_block(docdst, elemdst, posinsert,2
content)
create_hist_entry(“Create text”, blockdst, subj, role,3
timecurr)
Algorithm 6: Create Text Content
Algorithm 7 splits text blocks. This is needed when text is cre-
ated, copied or deleted. If position possplit, at which the new text
blockold should be added, is not within an existing text block, the
algorithm terminates immediately. In the other case, the existing
text block blockold has to be split at possplit. Therefore, we remove
the content after possplit from blockold. This removed content is
added to the new text block blocknew which is positioned after
blockold. Next, blocknew gets a copy of the history of blockold. If
the split block was in an is-copy-of relationship with other blocks,
the effect of the splitting has to be captured. For this purpose, the
DP copies all edges of the Copy DB which either point to blockold
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or originate from it and modifies them to point or originate from
blocknew. The DP stores these edges in its internal memory until
the document is checked-in.
Input : docdst, elemdst, possplit
Output:
if possplit does not point within a block then1
return2
blockold ← text block where (docdst, elemdst, possplit) point3
into
content← text content of blockold from possplit to end4
delete text content of blockold from possplit to end5
posnew ← end of blockold6
blocknew ← create_block(docdst, elemdst, posnew, content)7
get subj, role, time from history entry of blockold8
entries← copy of history entries for blockold9
modify entries to reference blocknew10
edgesto ← copy of edges of Copy DB that point to blockold11
modify all edges in edgesto to point to blocknew12
edgesfrom ← copy of edges of Copy DB that originate from13
blockold
modify all edges in edgesfrom to originate from blocknew14
add edgesto, edgesfrom to global set of temp. edges15
Algorithm 7: Split Text Block
Copy
The copy operation is used to copy elements or text. Algorithm 8
is used for copying elements.
Input : docsrc, elemsrc, docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr
Output:
create_element(docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr)1
edgenew ← create_edge(docsrc, elemsrc, docdst, elemdst)2
add edgenew to global set of temp. edges3
for each attri of elemsrc do4
if attri is not deleted then5
create_attribute(docdst, elemdst, subj, role,6
timecurr, name of attri); change_attribute(docdst,
elemdst, subj, role, timecurr, name of attri, value of
attri);
Algorithm 8: Copy Element
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The algorithm first creates a new element at the destination
document by applying Algorithm 5. After that, the DP captures
this copy by adding a corresponding edge into its internal mem-
ory. The copied element gets all attributes including their values
of its source element which have not been deleted.
Algorithm 9 is used to copy text. It splits both the text blocks
at the source document and the text blocks at the destination.
Then, it creates a new block at the destination document for
each of the copied blocks. It creates and stores the corresponding
edge reflecting the copy. The new block gets its first history entry
describing its creation context.
Input : docsrc, elemsrc, textstart, textend, docdst, elemdst,
posinsert, subj, role, timecurr
Output:
split_block(docsrc, elemsrc, textstart)1
split_block(docsrc, elemsrc, textend)2
split_block(docdst, elemdst, posinsert)3
for each blocksrc within textstart and textend of elemsrc do4
content← text content of blocksrc5
blockdst ← create_block(docdst, elemdst, posinsert,6
content)
edgenew ← create_edge(docsrc, elemsrc, blocksrc,7
docdst, elemdst, blockdst)
add edgenew to global set of temp. edges8
create_hist_entry(“Create text”, docdst, elemdst,9
blockdst, subj, role, timecurr)
posinsert ← end of blockdst10
Algorithm 9: Copy Text Content
Change Attribute and Delete
Changing an attribute value is also logged with an entry in the
history of the element containing that attribute. The correspond-
ing algorithm is similar to the algorithm for creating an element.
The delete operation can be applied to elements, attributes and
text. Since the required algorithms are similar, we explain only
Algorithm 10 for deleting text. If start or end of the text to be
deleted point into a block, the affected blocks have to be split to
keep track of the deleted parts. Each deleted text block gets a
final history entry to indicate its deletion. This history entry is
used to exclude the deleted block from future views.
Since performing an operation can lead to modifications of
view permissions, the DP asks the PDP to update the view as
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Input : docsrc, elemsrc, textstart, textend, docdst, elemdst,
subj, role, timecurr
Output:
split_block(docsrc, elemsrc, textstart)1
split_block(docsrc, elemsrc, textend)2
for each blocksrc within textstart and textend of elemsrc do3
create_hist_entry(“Delete text”, docdst, elemdst,4
blockdst, subj, role, timecurr)
Algorithm 10: Delete Text Content
described above. The updated view is generated by executing
Algorithm 3. The result is presented to the user via the UI.
4.1.6.5 Check-in
A user can invoke the check-in command of the UI to save his
changes to an opened document doca, which is currently stored
only within the DP, to the Doc DB. As a result of this, the checked-
in version of the document becomes relevant for the access de-
cisions of other documents, which also includes concurrently
opened versions of doca. For these documents the permissions
must be recalculated, which possibly revokes permissions of cur-
rently edited documents. The concurrent editing of a document
can also lead to conflicts, where the editing of one user to doca is
incompatible to the editing of another user, who also has edited
doca. For these reasons, we have to perform two steps when a
document is checked-in. In step one, we have to solve conflicts
between the concurrent versions of a document. In step two, we
must update the permissions of other affected documents whose
permissions depend on the saved document.
To perform step one, we first retrieve the list of concurrently
edited versions of doca, which is maintained by the Doc DB for
each opened document. Next, we must merge all concurrently
edited versions of doca to one consistent version. We apply a
conflict resolution strategy to solve conflicts between concurrently
edited documents. It depends on the scenario to define a specific
strategy. One possible strategy is to resolve conflicts manually.
An automatic strategy can accept or reject changes depending on
the role of the subject that performed the changes or depending
on the time the changes were performed, since this information
is available in the corresponding histories. After the conflicts are
solved, the temporarily stored edges, which correspond to the
accepted operations, are saved to the Copy DB.
To perform step two, we first inspect the Copy DB to retrieve
the opened documents that might depend on doca. These docu-
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ments have at least one node, that is in is-copy-of relation with
a node of doca. Then, we recalculate the permissions of these
documents for their current users. In some cases, permissions
of edited nodes are revoked. In these cases, the UI asks the user
whether he wants to reject the current changes or keep them and
accept being unable to make further changes. These two steps
provide a solution for the third requirement mentioned in the
introduction.
4.1.7 Modeling Access to Standards
In this section, we model our scenario described in Section 4.1
using the history-based approach that we have presented in the
previous sections. We assume that the role hierarchy depicted
in Figure 4.5 is used and that all subjects act in one of these
roles. We use the generic role employee to describe an employee
of any of the three companies of our example. We use special
roles for the employees of each company and derive these roles
from the generic role employee. For example, we use the role
employee-smartchips as a role for employees of the company
SmartChips. Moreover, we assume that every XML document
ecocars-employee
employee
smartchips-employee fastcars-employee
Figure 4.5: Role Hierarchy
defining a standard has a class attribute at its root element.
This attribute defines which company the standard belongs to
or that the standard is public. In the first case, the attribute
is set to the name of the corresponding company, whereas in
the second case, the attribute is set to public. We assume that
a security administrator maintains the attribute class and that
other subjects are not allowed to change this attribute.
For each statement of the scenario, which defines an allowed
or forbidden action, we need to specify one or more AC rules.
Because of the default semantics of our model, all unspecified
operations are denied. As a consequence, we only need to define
allow rules and, in addition, exceptions from these allow rules.
First of all, we need a set of rules to define the fact that em-
ployees of a company are allowed to view and edit the standard
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of that company. Rule 4.6 is an example of such a rule. This rule
states that employees of the company SmartChips are allowed to
view documents that have a root element with the attribute class
set to SmartChips. In other words, employees of SmartChips
are allowed to view their own standard. Similar rules must be
defined for the remaining operations (create, delete, copy and
change-attribute) and for the other two companies (EcoCars
and FastCars).
Role employee-smartchips
Operation view
Object /*/@class == ’SmartChips’//*
Mode allow
Figure 4.6: Allow Employees of SmartChips to View their own Standard
Next, we define a rule that states that every employee is allowed
to view parts that were copied from a public standard. In Rule 4.7,
we use the functions ac:copies to determine where the part was
originally copied from, where the namespace of our functions is
indicated by the prefix ’ac:’. This function returns all nodes that
are in is-copy-of relation with the current node. The returned list
of nodes is sorted according to the time of creation of the nodes,
in ascending order. We can retrieve the first node of this list with
the expression ac:copies()[1]. This is the original node from
which all other nodes on the list have been copied. We inspect
the attribute class of the corresponding document containing
the first node and check whether the attribute is set to public. In
this case, the viewing is allowed.
Role employee
Operation view
Object fn:root(ac:copies(.)[1])/
@class == ’public’
Mode allow
Figure 4.7: Allow Viewing if the Object is Copied from a Public Stan-
dard
In addition to the previous rule, we define Rule 4.8, which
allows the copying of parts of public standards. In this rule, we
also use the function ac:copies. Using this function offers the
advantage that public parts within a company’s standard can
also be copied. For example, this rule allows the copying of parts
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of a public standard that reside in the standard of SmartChips.
Moreover, this rule defines no restriction for the destination. In
other words, it allows copying parts of a public standard to
anywhere. Since our model requires a view permission on an
object to perform another operation, a subject can only copy
parts to locations for which it also has the view permission. This
restriction avoids the possibility that EcoCars could copy parts
of a public standard to FastCars’ standard, since employees of
EcoCars have no permission to view the standard of FastCars.
Role employee
Operation copy
Object fn:root(ac:copies(.)[1])/
@class == ’public’
Destination //*
Mode allow
Figure 4.8: Allow Copy if Source is Public
We stated in Section 4.1 that employees of SmartChips are
allowed to view both, the standard of EcoCars and the standard
of FastCars. Rule 4.9 expresses this statement by inspecting the
attribute class of the corresponding root element of the element
in question.
Role employee-smartchips
Operation view
Object //*[(/*/@class == ’EcoCars’) or
(/*/@class == ’FastCars’)]
Mode allow
Figure 4.9: Allow SmartChips’ Employees to View other Standards
Recall that we did not restrict the destination of copy opera-
tions in Rule 4.8. In addition, Rule 4.9 adds view permissions on
FastCars’ standard for employees of SmartChips. These added
view permissions enable employees of SmartChips to copy parts
of public standards to the standard of FastCars, since view per-
missions are required to perform any other operation. However,
employees of SmartChips should not be allowed to modify Fast-
Cars’ standard. As a consequence, we need a rule that prevents
unwanted copy operations. For this purpose, Rule 4.10 explic-
itly denies all transfers to FastCars’ standard for employees of
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SmartChips. Rule 4.10 takes precedence over Rule 4.8, since deny
rules take precedence over allow rules.
Role employee-smartchips
Operation opy
Object //*
Destination //*[/*/@class == ’FastCars’]
Mode deny
Figure 4.10: Deny Copying to FastCars’ Standard by SmartChips
As stated in the scenario, SmartChips’ employees are allowed to
copy parts of their own standard to the standard of EcoCars. Rule
4.11 fulfills this condition. It inspects the original location of the
parts instead of their current location. We retrieve the standard
where the part was created by using the ac:copies function. With
this rule, we also allow the employees of SmartChips to copy
parts of their standard that are located in the standard of EcoCars
to another location within EcoCars’ standard.
Role employee-smartchips
Operation copy
Object fn:root(ac:copies(.)[1])/
@class == ’SmartChips’
Destination //*[/*/@class == ’EcoCars’]
Mode allow
Figure 4.11: Allow SmartChips’ Employees to Copy to EcoCars Stan-
dard
As described in the scenario, employees of SmartChips are
allowed to copy parts from FastCars’ standard to their own stan-
dard. Rule 4.12 implements this condition and uses similar mech-
anisms to Rule 4.11. In this case, we also inspect the original
location of these parts, which also allows copying them from
other locations, e.g., from SmartChips’ standard.
Under their agreement with EcoCars, employees of SmartChips
need to edit the standard of EcoCars. As a consequence, we must
define the corresponding permissions by a set of rules. We need
a rule for create, delete and change attribute. Rule 4.13 is the
corresponding rule for the create operation. Since the other two
rules differ only in their operation field, we refrain from listing
these rules.
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Role employee-smartchips
Operation copy
Object fn:root(ac:copies(.)[1])/
@class == ’FastCars’
Destination //*[/*/@class == ’SmartChips’]
Mode allow
Figure 4.12: Allow SmartChips’ Employees to Copy from FastCars
Role employee-smartchips
Operation create
Object //*[/*/@class == ’EcoCars’]
Mode allow
Figure 4.13: Allow SmartChips’ Employees to Edit the Standard of
EcoCars
When editing EcoCars’ standard, employees of SmartChips
should not delete objects or modify attributes that have not been
created by them. Rule 4.14 implements this restriction by checking
the creation context of an object before granting a delete oper-
ation. The corresponding context is retrieved with the function
ac:getCreationContext(). Then, we inspect the role attribute of
the retrieved context. An employee is not allowed to delete or
change an object if he did not create this object. In addition, we
need a similar rule for denying the modification of attributes
by employees of SmartChips. Since this rule differs only in its
operation field from Rule 4.14, we refrain from presenting it.
Role employee-smartchips
Operation delete, change-attribute
Object //*[ac:getCreationContext()/
@role != employee-smartchips]
Mode deny
Figure 4.14: Deny Deleting Elements and Changing Attributes by
SmartChips
Since employees of SmartChips can both read the standard of
FastCars and edit the standard of EcoCars, they could transfer
knowledge from EcoCars to FastCars. There are several possibili-
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ties for defining restrictions to prevent this. We can model this
condition in three alternative ways, for which we present AC
rules in the following paragraphs:
1. After an employee of SmartChips has accessed the standard
of Fast-Cars, we deny him the viewing of EcoCars’ standard.
Since view permissions are required for any other operation,
employees of SmartChips cannot perform any operation on
EcoCars’ standard in this case.
2. After an employee of SmartChips has accessed the standard
of Fast-Cars, he is still allowed to view the standard of
EcoCars. However, editing of the standard is denied.
3. After an employee of SmartChips has accessed the standard
of Fast-Cars, he is still allowed to edit the standard of
EcoCars. However, copying of parts of FastCars’ standard
to EcoCars’ standard is denied.
Within each of these three alternatives, we have two options
regarding which subjects we define the restrictions for:
1. We can restrict access for all employees of SmartChips after
any of them has accessed the standard of FastCars.
2. We can restrict access only for the specific subject that has
accessed the standard of FastCars.
We start by modeling the first alternative. As stated above, we
have two options for how to model this alternative. The most
restrictive option is to deny any access to the standard of EcoCars
after any employee of Smart-Chips has accessed the standard of
FastCars. Rule 4.15 implements this version of the scenario.
Role employee-smartchips
Operation view
Object //*[(/*/@class == ’EcoCars’) and
(fn:count(ac:accessed(any, current)
[/*/@company == ’FastCars’]) > 0)]
Mode deny
Figure 4.15: Deny Access to EcoCars’ Standard for SmartChips
This rule revokes the view permissions, which are needed as
a basis for any other operation. The rule checks two conditions.
First, the corresponding object must reside in the standard of
EcoCars. The second condition uses our ac:accessed function
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to check whether any employee of SmartChips has previously
accessed FastCars’ standard. This function has the parameters
user and role that define conditions on the returned nodes. The
first parameter user specifies that only nodes that have been ac-
cessed by the specified user should be returned. Analogously, we
define the parameter role. Both parameters can be set to any to
indicate that nodes accessed by any user or in any role should be
returned. In Rule 4.15, we use any, current as parameters for the
ac:accessed function, which indicates that all objects accessed by
any subject who was active in the same role as the current subject
should be returned. As a result, all objects that were accessed
by an employee of SmartChips are returned. If we use current,
any as parameters for the ac:accessed function, we get different
semantics. In this case, all objects that were accessed by the cur-
rent subject are returned. As a result, access is blocked only for
an individual employee, while the access of other employees is
not blocked. The requirements of the scenario determine which
of the two options is chosen. If access is restricted at the level of
employees, we retain more flexibility since other employees of
SmartChips can continue to work on EcoCars’ standard while
only employees that have accessed FastCars’ standard are not
permitted to edit it. On the other hand, if the information in the
FastCars’ standard is very confidential, this flexible version might
not be sufficiently restrictive; employees of SmartChips could
pass on their knowledge outside the IT system, and a different
employee could transfer the confidential information. In such
cases, the more restrictive version should be applied.
Next, we explain how to express the second alternative with
our AC rules. Instead of denying any access, we can deny edit
access only. To do this, we need to define rules similar to Rule 4.15,
where we need one rule for each of the editing operations create,
delete, change-attribute and copy. In a similar fashion to the
case where we denied the viewing, we can deny the editing
both at the level of employees as well as at the level of the
entire company. Rule 4.16 and Rule 4.17 deny editing access for
all employees of SmartChips if any employee of Smart-Chips
has accessed FastCars’ standard. Alternatively, editing can be
denied for only the specific employee if the parameters of the
ac:accessed function are set to current, any.
The third alternative is the least restrictive one. In this case,
we only deny explicit transfers of parts of FastCars’ standard to
EcoCars’ standard. Rule 4.18 is the AC rule for this alternative. It
is the least restrictive version of the three sketched alternatives
since both viewing and editing are still allowed.
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Role employee-smartchips
Operation create, delete, change-attribute
Object //*[(/*/@class == ’EcoCars’) and
(fn:count(ac:accessed(any, current)
[/*/@company == ’FastCars’]) > 0)]
Mode deny
Figure 4.16: Deny Editing by SmartChips after Access to FastCars’ Stan-
dard
Role employee-smartchips
Operation copy
Object //*[fn:count(ac:accessed(any, current)
[/*/@company == ’FastCars’]) > 0]
Destination //*[/*/@class == ’EcoCars’]
Mode deny
Figure 4.17: Deny Copying by SmartChips after Access to FastCars’
Standard
The three alternatives show that our history-based approach is
sufficiently expressive to offer different ways for defining access
to standards. In [RTE07b], we have explained how our model
can be used to enforce the policies of the Chinese Wall model
proposed by Brewer and and Nash [BN89]. The resulting rules
provide the same level of security as the original Chinese Wall
model while being less restrictive. Thus, we believe that our
model provides a flexible and expressive method to define access
depending on histories.
In this section, we focused on defining rules for controlling
access to XML documents. In the next section, we consider scenar-
ios, in which customers are involved in the execution of a special
kind of business processes, such as selling and consuming digital
goods. In these cases, digital goods have to be protected from
being used in an unauthorized way, i.e., being shared in public
networks. This requirement reflects another facet of usage control.
In this context, we have to define usage rules for digital content,
e.g., transferring music files, and we show how to enforce such
kinds of rules.
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Role employee-smartchips
Operation copy
Object //*[fn:root(ac:copies(.)[1])/
@class == ’FastCars’]
Destination //*[/*/@class == ’EcoCars’]
Mode deny
Figure 4.18: Deny Copying after Access to FastCars’ Standard
4.2 controlled sharing of digital content
Efficient compression algorithms and high bandwidths allow
companies to set up business models based on selling digital
content, such as digital music and electronic books. However,
the same technical possibilities allow users to share digital con-
tent over communication networks at low cost. This led to the
emergence of file sharing networks over which users illegally
distribute digital content. The content owner and the content
provider respond to that illegal distribution with the concept of
Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems. Basically, DRM aims
at controlling the usage of digital content. DRM is sophisticated
and cannot been analyzed in isolation [Rum03], therefore there
are different definitions of it [Ian01, LSNS03]. [RMT01] proposes
a popular reference model for a DRM system, which is depicted
in Figure 4.19. The following outlines the process flow depicted
in the DRM reference model:
1. User obtains content.
2. User attempts to use, i.e., to render, the content in some
way. This triggers the DRM controller. Once activated, the
DRM controller gathers information necessary for gener-
ating a license. This includes identity information for the
user and/or client device and information from the content
package, including the content identifier.
3. DRM-client makes rights request.
4. The license server verifies the submitted client identification
or attributes against an identity database.
5. The license server looks up rights specifications (usage
rules) for the content.
6. The license generator pulls together rights information,
client identity information, and encryption keys, and cre-
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Figure 4.19: DRM Reference Model [RMT01]
ates a license, which is itself encrypted or at least tamper
proofed.
7. The license is sent back to the client.
8. After the license has been generated and any authentication
steps are complete, the DRM controller can decrypt the
content and release it to the rendering application.
9. Finally, the rendering application plays or shows the content
to the user.
The process sketched above illustrates the basic idea behind
DRM systems. They enable content providers to define usage
rules with the help of Rights Expression Languages (RELs). RELs
consist of a grammar (a schema), also called the language con-
cept [Gut03], that describes the basic grammar for the expression
of rights terms and conditions, and their relation to the assets in
question and the parties involved. The resulting right definition
is referred to as a license object. Since this object defines the
usage of a certain content for a certain customer, the rights object
itself and the application processing, i.e., DRM controller and
rendering application, should be protected against manipulation.
Otherwise, the content could be used in a way other than defined
by the content provider.
With respect to their purpose, RELs are similar to our Access
Control rules presented in Section 4.1.4. Both define access to
digital objects. However, since they are meant to support different
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usage scenarios, they differ significantly regarding the addressing
of objects and subjects.
Existing DRM systems have two shortcomings. First, they build
their protection measures on the basis of unreliable software-
based solutions, such as obscurity techniques. Publicly available
documentation for common rights management systems from
Microsoft [Mic08] or Apple [App08] do not disclose how they
resist replay attacks for their (proprietary) dynamic license im-
plementations. Obscurity techniques are as long effective as long
as the obscurity is undiscovered. Moreover, most of the current
DRM solutions are closed software and cannot be verified for
inherent security flaws. In addition, this approach may lead to
unwanted side-effects. A prominent example for these unwanted
side-effects is the Sony BMG CD copy prevention scandal [Han06].
Sony BMG included a software for copy prevention on music
CDs. This software was automatically installed on Windows com-
puters when customers tried to play their CDs. This installation
has proved to be particularly problematic, since the installed
software interferes with the normal way in which the Windows
operating system plays CDs and creates security holes that can
be exploited by malicious software such as worms or viruses
[Rus05].
Second, existing DRM systems have been developed from the
content providers’ point of view. Consequently, they do not re-
gard consumers’ expectations. As stated in [Fet03], the neglect of
consumers’ expectations may hamper the overall acceptance of
DRM. According to the survey [DSVW05], 75% of the consumers
want to share music with their friends and families and would
pay more for this kind of usage.
Against this background, we realize that a successful DRM
system has to respect consumers’ expectations while providing
reliable security mechanisms to protect digital content from unau-
thorized usage.
Trusted computing technologies provide the necessary tech-
nical foundation for building reliable systems which behave in
an expected way. They basically provide a set of techniques to
enforce security policies. Although trusted computing has a bad
reputation, we believe that this technology has the necessary po-
tential for a wide range of sensitive applications. We agree with
[KG03], which states that trusted computing technologies are not
the same as DRM systems. In the following, we first give an intro-
duction to trusted computing technologies. Then we propose a
protocol which can be used for developing a robust DRM system
that supports transfer of licenses to other users or devices. We
the present such a DRM system in Section 4.2.7.
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4.2.1 Background on Trusted Computing Mechanisms
The increasing complexity of IT-systems is a major factor for the
growing number of system vulnerabilities. Trusted Computing
techniques [BCP+03] offer one possibility to overcome this short-
coming by providing a tamper-resistant hardware component
that provides a root of trust. The introduction of the Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM) which is specified by the Trusted Computing
Group (TCG) provides vital functions for IT-security. Besides the
potential of offering a protected storage for storing cryptographic
keys, the TPM also offers the possibility to attest the configura-
tion of the local platform to a remote platform which is called
remote attestation (RA). This process is of particular interest in
the context of DRM [LSNS03] or Enterprise Security [SvDW04]
to ensure that the client platform is trustworthy and is behaving
in accordance with a defined policy. This becomes relevant when
sensitive data is transferred which should only be used in an
authorized way, i.e. the content can be used by an authorized
user on a specified platform. For this purpose, a policy can be de-
fined which is enforced by the local client software. If the policy
enforcement mechanism is executed on the client-side with the
help of software, an attacker can deactivate this mechanism by
modifying the local client software.
To detect these kinds of attacks one may attest the status of the
client platform using the RA before sending sensitive data to the
client. Thus, the sender has a confirmation about the trustwor-
thiness of the platform in question. However, RA protocols are
not per se resident against masquerading attacks. These attacks
are in [GPS06] referred to as relay attacks. An attacker who is
in control of one malicious and one honest client may bypass
the remote attestation by spoofing his malicious client to be the
honest one. The attacker simply forwards all attestation queries
and sends them to one client, which is in a trustworthy system
state. The honest client sends the answer back, which must only
be transferred back to the requester. This attack is a masquerad-
ing [RMAW99] attack, with the extension that the attacker is
also in possession of the honest client. But, as we will see in the
following sections, this is not an essential requirement. After this
attack the malicious client platform state has then been approved
trustworthy. Afterwards, the protected digital content is trans-
ferred to the pretended trusted platform, that does not enforce
any policies to protect the content.
We believe that the masquerading attack is critical in the context
of DRM systems. In this case, the content provider must be
sure, that the policy, which defines the usage permissions, is
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enforced correctly on the DRM-client. Therefore, the content
provider first attests the state of the platform before he delivers
protected digital content. This content is encrypted to bind it to
the attested machine. However, the content provider is never sure
that the key which is used for binding the content is stored on
the attested client and is not on a second machine. In the latter
case, the policies for protecting the content from being used in
an unauthorized way will not be enforced.
The core of the TCG mechanisms [Tru08, BCP+03] is the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM), which is basically a smartcard soldered
on the mainboard of a computer. The TPM serves as the root
of trust, because its hardware implementation makes it difficult
to tamper with, and therefore it is assumed to be trustworthy.
One must also assume that the hardware vendor is trustworthy
and has designed the TPM chip according to the specification.
Although the TPM chip is not specified to be tamper-resistant, it
is tamper-evident, meaning that unauthorized manipulations can
be detected.
The TPM can create and store cryptographic keys, both sym-
metric and asymmetric. These keys can either be marked mi-
gratable or non-migratable, which is specified when the key is
generated. In contrast to non-migratable keys, migratable keys
can be transferred to other TPMs. Due to its limited storage ca-
pacity, the TPM can also store keys on the hard disk. In this case,
these keys are encrypted with a non-migratable key, assuring the
same level of security as if the keys were stored directly in the
TPM. The TPM is able to perform calculations on its own, e.g., it
can use the generated keys for encryption and decryption.
In the context of this thesis, the Platform Configuration Regis-
ters (PCRs) are of particular interest. These registers are initial-
ized on power up and are used to store the software integrity
values. Software components are measured by the TPM and the
corresponding hash-value is then written to this platform con-
figuration register by extending the previous value of a specific
PCR. The following cryptographic function is used to calculate
the values for the specific registers:
Extend(PCRN, value) = SHA1(PCRN||value)
For every measured component an event is created and stored
in the stored measurement log (SML). The PCR values can then
be used together with the SML to attest the platform’s state to
a remote party. To make sure that these values are authentic,
they are signed with a non-migratable TPM signing key, the
Attestation Identity Key (AIK). The remote platform can compare
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these values with reference values to see whether the platform is
in a trustworthy state or not.
The TCG assumes a trusted operating system which is not part
of the TCG specifications. The assumed trusted operating system
measures the hash value of every process started after the boot
process. For a description of a trusted operating systems confer
[GPC+03, SZJD04].
The TPM additionally offers a number of different signing
keys. One major key is the Endorsement Key (EK) which is
generated by the module manufacturer and injected into the
TPM. The EK uniquely identifies the TPM and is used to prove
that the TPM is genuine. In addition, the EK is used to obtain
an Attestation Identity Key (AIK). An AIK is created inside the
TPM, signed with the private portion of the EK, and the public
part is transferred to a third party (a Privacy-CA). The Privacy-
CA verifies that the platform is a genuine TPM and creates a
certificate which binds the identity key to the identity label and
generic information about the platform. This certificate, also
known as identity credential is sent to the TPM and later used to
attest the authenticity of a platform configuration.
To reduce the amount of non-volatile memory required inside
the TPM, it acts as an access control device for externally stored
keys rather than storing all keys itself. For this purpose, the TPM
generates the storage root key (SRK). This is a 2048-bit RSA key
and is created when an user takes ownership of the TPM. The
private part of SRK remains permanently in the TPM. The SRK
is used to encrypt all other externally stored keys. This strategy
offers the same security level as if all keys were stored internally.
4.2.2 Remote Attestation
The remote attestation is used to attest the configuration of an
entity to a remote entity. This procedure is widely used to get
integrity information before a client proceeds with the commu-
nication in order to use a service or receive data, e.g., digital
content. This mechanism is referred as integrity reporting and
can be applied in many scenarios and different applications, such
as controlling access to a network depending on the trustworthi-
ness of the client [SJZvD04]. The integrity reporting mechanism
is also a required mechanism in the context of DRM applications,
since it is obviously required that the DRM-client software is
in a trustworthy state and executes a certain policy to prohibit
unauthorized use, copy or redistribution of intellectual property
[RC05].
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[SZJvD04] states that the goal of integrity reporting protocols
is “to enable a remote system, i.e., the challenger, to prove that
a program on another system, i.e., the attesting system owned
by the attestor, is of sufficient integrity to use”. In this section,
we discuss an integrity reporting protocol proposed by [SZJD04],
which is based on the challenge-response authentication [BM92]
and is used to validate the integrity of an attesting system.
Figure 4.20 illustrates the remote attestation of B against A
and provides the background information on integrity reporting
protocols. In step 1 and 2, A creates a non-predictable nonce and
sends it to attestor B. In step 3a, the attestor loads the Attestation
Identity Key from the protected storage of the TPM by using the
storage root key (SRK). In the next step, the attestor performs a
TPM_Quote command, which is used to sign the selected PCRs
and the provided nonce with the private key AIKpriv. Addition-
ally, the attestor retrieves the stored measurement log (SML). In
step 4, the attestor sends the response consisting of the signed
Quote, signed nonce and the SML to A. The attestor also delivers
the AIK credential which consists of the AIKpub that was signed
by a Privacy-CA.
1. A : create 160 bit nonce
2. A→ B : ChallengeRequest(nonce)
3a. B : load AIKpriv
3b. B : retrieve Quote = Sig(AIKpriv, (PCR, nonce))
3c. B : get SML
4. B→ A : ChallengeResponse(Quote, SML) and
cert(AIKpub)
5a. A : validate cert(AIKpub)
5b. A : validate Quote
5c. A : validate nonce and SML using PCR
Figure 4.20: Integrity Reporting Protocol [SZJD04]
In step 5a, A validates if the AIK credential was signed by a
trusted Privacy-CA thus belonging to a genuine TPM. A also
verifies whether AIKpub provided by B is still valid by checking
the certificate revocation list of the trusted issuing party. This
step was also designed to discover masquerading by compar-
ing the unique identification of B with the system identification
given in AIKpub. Nevertheless, this verification does not discover
masquerading attacks as we will see in the next section.
In the next step, A verifies the signature of the Quote and
checks the freshness of Quote in step 5c. Based on the received
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SML and the PCR values A processes the SML and recomputes
the received PCR values. If the computed values match the signed
aggregate, the SML is valid and untampered. A now only veri-
fies if the delivered integrity reporting values match the given
reference values, thus A can decide if the remote party is in a
trustworthy system state.
According to [SZJD04], the protocol described above should
be resistant against replay, tampering and masquerading attacks.
However, an attacker can successfully perform a masquerading
attack on that protocol. We describe this attack in the following
section.
4.2.3 Masquerading Attack Scheme
The attacker considered here has two platforms under his control.
One platform runs a trustworthy operating system with the
client software that enforces a certain policy, e.g., the DRM-client.
This platform (C) represents the client that is conform to the
original client software and therefore untampered. This platform
is also equipped with a genuine TPM that supports the policy
enforcement of the DRM-client. The attacker is also in control
of one malicious client platform (M) that wants to gain control
of protected digital content. We refer to this client as malicious
client, since his enforcement mechanism has been tampered with
and it is not conform to the original client software. We require
for our attack that C answers the request from M, i.e. C is not
configured to answer only requests from A. This is a necessary
requirement for the success of the attack and is discussed in
detail in section 4.2.4.
In our attack scheme, the attacker bypasses the remote attes-
tation of M, by using the platform configuration of the honest
client C to attest his malicious client running on M.
Figure 4.21 depicts the attack against the integrity reporting
protocol. The challenging party A wants to securely validate
the integrity of the attesting malicious system M. The malicious
system M itself transfers all messages from A to the honest client
C. The protocol is the same as the protocol shown in Figure
4.20 except for step 2a and 4, in which only the messages are
forwarded.
Figure 4.22 simplifies the attack on the presented protocol
by reducing it to the transferred messages. This figure shows
the challenger (platform A) that wants to attest the client (M)
before protected data is transferred. Platform M and C are work-
ing collaboratively. Platform M is authenticated on the basis of
the provided information through platform C, this is simplified
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1. A : create 160 bit nonce
2. A→ M : ChallengeRequest(nonce)
2a. M→ C : ChallengeRequest(nonce)
3a. C : load AIKpriv
3b. C : retrieve Quote = Sig(AIKpriv, (PCR, nonce))
3c. C : get SML
4. C→ M : ChallengeResponse(Quote, SML) and
cert(AIKpub)
4a. M→ A : ChallengeResponse(Quote, SML) and
cert(AIKpub)
5a. A : validate cert(AIKpub)
5b. A : validate Quote
5c. A : validate nonce and SML using PCR
Figure 4.21: Attacking the Integrity Reporting Protocol [STRE06]
through step 5 and 6. The figure also shows that the attack can-
not be prevented with the use of a secure mutual authenticated
TLS channel, since this protocol only authenticates subjects, i.e.,
a client or a server. The protocol does not consider AIKs. An
attacker may be able to extract the X.509 certificate and the cor-
responding keys for a mutual authentication. Since standard
TLS-applications, e.g., web browsers, support the export of the
keys by the platform owner, he may transfer the certificates and
the private keys from C to the non-conformant host M. The server
(platform A) then authenticates the client based on the certificates
and sends an attestation request to the malicious platform, which
answers the request in the previously described manner. The
shortcoming of the integrity reporting protocol is caused by the
restricted usage possibilities of AIKs. According to [Tru08], the
AIKs can exclusively be used for proving the authenticity of a
platform. This means AIKs can neither be directly used to estab-
lish secure channels nor to authenticate communication partners.
Therefore, the challenger cannot be sure whether the received
message belongs to the attesting system. He only knows that he
received a message from a genuine TPM.
Additionally, the possession of multiple AIKs is possible, the
only requirement is, that the corresponding certificate must be
certified by a trusted Privacy-CA thus belonging to a valid EK. As
a consequence, the challenging party cannot verify the integrity
of a platform only with the help of the AIKs belonging to that
platform.
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Figure 4.22: Collaborative Masquerading Attack on RA
Even if the server has the AIKpub certificate and forbids the
creation of new AIKs, masquerading attacks cannot be prevented,
since the attesting system M pretends that it is in possession of
the corresponding AIKpriv by using the integrity values with a
valid AIK signature from platform C (Steps 5 and 6 in Figure
4.22). The challenging system is therefore not able to detect this
attack in step 5a (Figure 4.21), since the attesting system delivers
all information that identifies it as platform C. After the platform
is authorized, the malicious platform is assumed to be trusted.
We explain the relevance of the masquerading attack by a con-
crete usage scenario, i.e. the initialization phase of a DRM-client.
This phase includes steps 2, 3 and 4 shown in Figure 4.19. At this
time, the DRM-client has not yet exchanged a cryptographic key
with the server. This key is needed to bind the digital content to
the client platform by means of encryption. Before exchanging
the key, the server attests the client platform state to ensure that
the client is running a trustworthy DRM-client software. If the at-
testation is successful the DRM-client software supports the user
by the creation of an account and an appropriate cryptographic
key on the client machine. This key is later used to establish
a mutual authenticated channel (e.g. TLS-channel) which also
authenticates the user. After the initialization, the server encrypts
the digital content using the client key and transfers it to the
client. However, this key was generated on a non-conformant
platform, on which the enforcement of usage rules are bypassed.
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4.2.4 Evaluation of Possible Approaches
In this section, we present some possible approaches to overcome
the previously described shortcoming of integrity reporting pro-
tocols. However, we explain for each of these approaches why
they fail to prevent the described attack.
Verifying Attestation Challenges
Since the attacker cannot modify the software on the honest
platform, the honest platform may decide which attestation chal-
lenge (represented by a nonce) it will answer and which it will
reject. For this purpose, the challenger could sign the attestation
challenge and the prover validates the signature using a prein-
stalled certificate before he answers the challenge. In this case, the
server’s certificate must be included in the integrity measurement
of the client software to detect a manipulation on that certificate.
However, any arbitrary software component that is able to
answer attestation challenges can respond to the malicious chal-
lenge. An attacker can use such a software to circumvent the
verification of the challenge of the client software. However, the
verifying party detects that this software component is listed in
the SML, where the correct software is also listed. On the down-
side, the SML does not tell which software issued the answer to
the attestation challenge. The attacker can either use a software
supplied by himself to answer the attestation challenge or he can
misuse an existing application that serves a legitimate purpose. In
the latter case, the issuing software appears to be trusted, because
its software vendor might offer valid SML-reference values.
Regardless of which client software responds to the attestation
challenge, the only requirement is that the nonce, which was
sent from the server-application (platform A) is used for the
attestation. Hence, bugs or design flaws that cause any arbitrary
attestation challenge to be answered, affect other trusted client
software. One approach is to forbid the installation of other client
software components. However, this leads to high restrictions
which can hardly be accepted in open environments.
Using Shared Secrets
One method may be to exchange a shared secret key between
server and client, which is generated in the TPM. This shared
secret key must be marked as a non-migratable key and the
public part must be transferred to the server. This key is used
to securely exchange a key for the following communication.
However, this public key must be transferred through a protected
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second channel, otherwise the server is not sure that the key
belongs to the correct communication partner.
Using AIK as Session Key
Another method is to use the public part of the AIK as encryption
key to exchange the shared key for the following communica-
tion. In this case, the following traffic cannot be decrypted by
the attacker, since he does not have the private portion of the
AIK, which is stored in the protected storage of the TPM. This
approach is for example proposed in [KS07] to ensure that trans-
ferred data is directly bound to a specific AIK. However, actual
TPMs do not allow to decrypt data using the private part of the
AIK. This is due to the specification that clearly forbids using the
AIK as encryption key [Tru08].
Using Network Monitors
One alternative possibility to achieve a binding between the
platform that issues the measurements and the challenger is to
use a network monitoring agent [CHJ07]. This agent monitors
all incoming and outgoing network connections and integrates
a measurement of the network events into the PCRs. Thus, the
challenger can determine if the network address of the platform
that provided the measurements is equal to the network address
of the challenger. At first glance, this approach seems to be a
very elegant approach, however, it suffers due to the fact that it
is not usable if the system is behind a router that uses network
allocation tables (NAT). In addition, an attacker can easily modify
his own network address, since network addresses do not provide
any means of authenticity. It is thus very likely that the attacker
is able to spoof the network address and is able to impersonate
the address of the platform that provided the measurements.
4.2.5 A Robust Integrity Reporting Protocol
To overcome the masquerading attack, the malicious host, who
is placed between the server and the collaborative host must
be excluded from the following communication flow. Therefore,
cryptographic keys must be used and included in the signed
messages from C in the response phase. The specification of the
TPM_Quote command allows us to include additional data and
to sign it with the AIK. Thereby, it is possible to use the challenge
response messages for the key-exchange.
One possibility is to adopt the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key ex-
change protocol [DH76] and to integrate it into the integrity
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reporting protocol. One may also use RSA [RSA78] and gener-
ate the corresponding keys inside the TPM. Subsequently, these
keys are used to exchange a shared session key which is used to
encrypt the upcoming communication. Since the TPM does not
provide support symmetric encryption for other applications, the
CPU must be used for that purpose. The main difference between
both approaches is that the DH parameters must be generated
by the CPU whilst the RSA keys are generated by the TPM. Both
approaches are equivalent in terms of security, since they both
offer a secure way to exchange a key. Computing the RSA key
within the TPM offers no advantage compared to computing the
DH parameters with the CPU, since the shared communication
key must be passed to the CPU anyway. In both cases the re-
quired random numbers can be computed by the secure random
number generator of the TPM.
1a. A : create 160 bit nonce
1b. A : GenerateKey(KApub, K
A
priv)
2. A→ C : ChallengeRequest(nonce,KApub)
3a. C : GenerateKey(KCpub, K
C
priv)
3b. C : load AIKpriv
3c. C : retrieve Quote = Sig(AIKpriv,
(PCR, SHA1(nonce, KCpub)))
3d. C : get SML
3e. C : ComputeSessionKey(KAC)
4. C→ A : ChallengeResponse(Quote, KCpub, SML) and
cert(AIKpub)
5a. A : validate cert(AIKpub)
5b. A : validate Quote
5c. A : validate nonce and SML using PCR
5d. A : ComputeSessionKey(KAC)
6. A : create 160 bit nonce1
7. A→ C : ChallengeRequest(nonce1)
8. C : compute Response = Enc(KAC, nonce1)
9. A→ C : ChallengeResponse(Response)
10. A : validate nonce1
Figure 4.23: Enhanced integrity reporting protocol
To protect the integrity reporting protocol against masquerad-
ing attacks, we enhance it with a key agreement protocol. The
modified integrity reporting protocol is shown in figure 4.23 with
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the extension to use Diffie-Hellman parameters. It is essential
for the protocol that both parties agree on one common genera-
tor g and one common group m. The asymmetric keys are then
generated and computed as described in [DH76].
In step 1b, A generates KApub = g
a mod m, while a is the private
part of KA. The major enhancement is that the attesting party
generates a public key KCpub in step 3a, includes the generated
key together with the PCRs and the nonce in the Quote mes-
sage and signs the Quote with the AIK. The public key KCpub is
generated using the client’s CPU and is injected as external data
into the TPM_Quote operation. Since the TPM_Quote command
only allows to include 160 bits of external data, the package must
be reduced to fit the 160 bit length by applying a hash function.
The resulting fingerprint is sent together with KCpub to the verifier.
Because C is running a trusted OS with a trustworthy platform
configuration the private part of the key is not accessible to a
potential malicious client. Finally, in step 5d the challenging party
computes the shared session key KAC by using its own private
part and the public part of C. After the session key has been com-
puted, A verifies whether C is also in possession of this shared
key, by executing a second challenge-response authentication
which is carried out in steps 6 - 10.
4.2.6 Protocol Discussion
The presented protocol prevents an attacker from camouflaging
his malicious software configuration since all following messages
are encrypted with the computed session key. It is also impossible
for M to compute an own session key between him and A since
his software is in a compromised state and his TPM is providing
malicious platform configurations to A. Given that, the malicious
host has no access to the private part of the generated session
key which is stored on platform C. The generated symmetric
session key KAC has to be used to encrypt all following data,
which can only be decrypted on the machine which possesses
the session key. This session key cannot be transferred to the
malicious host by the platform owner, since the extraction, e.g.,
by memory dump or by modifying the system software, would
lead to a non-conformant system state which will be detected in
the attestation phase.
It may be possible for the malicious client M to substitute KApub
with his own public key KBpub and then transfer this key to C.
Since M cannot modify the response from C, A generates the
shared session key KAC which is later used for the encryption. The
second challenge response authentication detects this substitution
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since neither M nor C are in possession of the correct KAC and are
therefore not able to encrypt the delivered nonce1. It may also be
possible that M modifies the common generator g, or the common
group m. The substitution of KApub and the modification of g or m
do not lead to a security problem, since in both cases the attacker
would not be able to perform the second challenge-response
authentication.
One could also create a bound keypair and use TPM_CertifyKey
to prove that the corresponding private key is held in a trusted
TPM. This asymmetric key is then used to exchange a shared
symmetrical key between both parties. However, this approach is
less performant compared to our solution since it requires three
additional operations: The generation of an asymmetrical bound
keypair, the signing of this keypair with TPM_CertifyKey and
the signing of the symmetrical keypair with the generated bound
keypair. Moreover, using CertifyKey would lead to additional
signature verification procedures.
The integrity reporting protocol proposed in this section can
be used as a building block for robust DRM systems. We present
such a system in the following section.
4.2.7 A Fair Digital Rights Management System
In this section, we present a fair DRM system. As argued in Sec-
tion 4.2, existing DRM systems neglect consumers’ expectations.
In particular, they bind legally purchased content to consumers’
hardware and do not allow consumers to transfer their content to
their other devices or to other users. However, 75% of consumers
want to share music with their friends and families and would
pay more for this kind of usage [DSVW05]. This willingness to
pay would enable content providers to set up a new range of busi-
ness modells. In the following, we sketch a DRM system which
enables consumers to transfer their legally purchased content.
Figure 4.24 shows the use cases supported by our DRM system.
The system enables a content provider to offer his digital con-
tent. As discussed in Section 4.2, selling digital content always
implicates selling the associated license. Accordingly, purchasing
digital content implicates purchasing the corresponding license.
The DRM system checks the availability of an appropriate license
each time the customer wants to use, e.g., render, digital content.
A special kind of usage supported by our DRM system is trans-
ferring digital content from one user to another. In this case the
according license or a part of it is transferred, as well.
Figure 4.25 depicts the architecture of our DRM system. The
Figure shows two kinds of applications, i.e., a rendering applica-
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Selling Content Selling License
Purchasing License Purchasing Content
Using Content
Content Provider
CustomerTransfer Content
Transfer License
<< include >>
<< extend >>
<< include >>
<< include >>
Check License
<< include >>
Figure 4.24: Use Case Diagram of Fair DRM System
tion on the client side and a license server. Each time a rendering
application wants access to protected digital content, the DRM
reference monitor is contacted which decides whether the ac-
cess is granted or denied. Thus, the DRM reference monitor has
similar characteristics as a policy decision point.
Trusted Platform Policy Enforcment
Policy Decision
DRM Reference 
Monitor
Secure Storage
Licenses Policies
Storage
Protected Content
Secure 
Network 
Interface
Root of Trust
TPM
Trusted Path
based on
Rendering 
Application
License 
Server
Storage
Content
Figure 4.25: Architecture of the Fair DRM System
The DRM reference monitor itself is built on top of a trusted
platform. This platform offers two functionalities, i.e., a secure
storage and a secure network interface. The secure storage is
necessary for storing licenses for digital content and policies,
which determine the behavior of the DRM reference monitor, e.g.,
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evaluating the trustworthiness of other platforms. The secure
storage protects licenses and policies by sealing all data stored
inside the secure storage, i.e., binding data to the state of the
complete platform including the DRM reference monitor. Thus,
sealed data can only be read if the DRM reference monitor is
untampered and in a trusted state. We assume that access to the
secure storage is only possible by the DRM reference monitor.
This means that it is not possible to access the secure storage with
different means rather than the interface provided to the DRM
reference monitor. The secure network interface is responsible for
building trusted communication channels. This is done using the
robust integrity report protocol presented in Section 4.2.5.
Basically, the DRM system offers three functionalities, i.e.,
purchasing content, using content and transferring content. We
present the necessary protocols in the following sections.
Purchasing Content
The protocol for the purchasing process is depicted in Figure 4.26.
At the beginning, the content provider has to verify the trust-
worthiness of a client’s platform, i.e., its DRM reference monitor.
The integrity reporting protocol which we presented in Section
4.2.5 is used for this purpose. The result of this step is the shared
session key Ksession. This key is used in the next step to encrypt
the customer’s order including information about the digital
content he wants to purchase and his intended usage. The en-
crypted order is transmitted to the content provider. The content
provider decrypts the order with the help of Ksession, generates a
symmetric key, i.e., Kcontent and encrypts the desired content with
that key. Afterwards, he generates a license including the usage
rules and Kcontent. The license itself is encrypted using Ksession.
The encrypted license and the encrypted content are sent to the
customer.
Customer's
DRM Reference 
Monitor
Content Provider's
License Server
Attestation & Agreement of Ksession
2
1
3
4
Order
Order = Enc(Ksession,Order)
Dec(Ksession,Order)
Generate Kcontent
Content = Enc(Kcontent,Content)
Generate License
License = Enc(Ksession,License) Content, License
License= Dec(Ksession,License)
Seal(License)
Save(Content)
Figure 4.26: Protocol for Purchasing Digital Content
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After decrypting the license, it is bound to the client’s plat-
form configuration with the help of sealing. The client saves the
encrypted content without decrypting it.
Figure 4.27 shows a prototype of our DRM system. The proto-
type supports customers to buy content, to render content and to
transfer content to other devices or users. The screenshot shows
Alice’s licenses. In this case, Alice is allowed to play the shown
content five times and transfer it. A detailed description of the
prototype is given in [Stä06].
Figure 4.27: Screenshot Showing the Fair DRM System
Using Content
Figure 4.28 depicts the process of using content. A rendering
application and a DRM reference monitor are involved in this
process. Both applications are located at the user’s platform (Com-
pare Figure 4.25). At the beginning, the rendering application has
to prove its trustworthiness with the help of attestation. Based on
the received integrity information, the DRM reference monitor
decides whether the rendering application is trustworthy or not.
For this, we use the protocol proposed in Section 4.2.5. The re-
sulting key Ksession is used to ensure confidentiality during the
next steps. The rendering application prepares a UsageRequest.
This message is encrypted with Ksession and contains informa-
tion about the content and the intended usage. After receiving
the UsageRequest, the DRM reference monitor decrypts it with
Ksession and checks the availability of the corresponding license.
If the license is available, the DRM reference monitor checks
112
whether the customer possesses the necessary usage rights which
are given in the UsageRequest. In the case of a positive result,
the DRM reference monitor decrypts the encrypted content with
Kcontent which is stored in the license. Afterwards, the license is
encrypted again with the Ksession. This approach ensures that only
the trusted rendering application can access the content. Before
sending the encrypted content, the DRM reference monitor up-
dates the license. This is an optional action and is only necessary
when the license limits the number of usage. After receiving the
encrypted content, the rendering application decrypts it with
Ksession and renders it to the user.
Rendering 
Application
DRM Reference 
Monitor
Attestation & Agreement of Ksession
2
1
3
4
UsageRequest
UsageRequest = Enc(Ksession,
(ObjectId, Usage))
Dec(Ksession,UsageRequest)
Check License
Content = Dec(Kcontent,Content)
Content = Enc(Ksession,Content)
Update LicenseContent
Content= Dec(Ksession,Content)
Render Content
Figure 4.28: Protocol for Using Content
A critical attack on the secure storage of our DRM system are
replay attacks, where a user replays the actual secure storage with
an old secure storage. This attack is especially relevant if a user
only possesses a limited number of usage rights on a particular
protected content. To achieve protection against attacks of this
type, the monotic counter of the TPM could be used as already
explained in [SSSW06] or [SE08].
Transferring Content
Figure 4.29 shows the process of transferring digital content
from one customer to another customer. This kind of usage is
a key feature of our DRM system and does not only support
the exchange of digital content between customers. In addition,
it allows the transfer of digital content between devices of one
customer. As argued in Section 4.2, customers value this kind of
usage and would pay for it.
We assume two customers in our scenario, namely Alice and
Bob. Alice wants to transfer a certain digital content or part of it
to Bob. At the beginning, Alice’s DRM reference monitor checks
whether she has the right to transfer the content in question. This
permission is stored in the corresponding license, which can be
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Content, LicenseBob
LicenseBob= Dec(Ksession,LicenseBob)
Seal(LicenseBob)
Save(Content)
Check LicenseAlice
Content = Enc(Kcontent     ,Content)
Generate LicenseBob
LicenseBob = Enc(Ksession,LicenseBob)
Update LicenseAlice
Bob
Generate Kcontent   Bob
AliceContent = Dec(Kcontent ,Content)
Figure 4.29: Protocol for Transferring Content
accessed only if Alice’s DRM reference monitor is trusted. If Alice
has the right to transfer the content, her DRM reference monitor
requires an attestation from Bob’s DRM reference monitor to
verify its trustworthiness. For this purpose, we apply the protocol
presented in Section 4.2.5. The key Ksession is the result of this
step and is used for the next steps to ensure that only Bob’s DRM
reference monitor can access the upcoming messages. After the
attestation, Alice’s DRM reference monitor decrypts the content
using the symmetric key KcontentAlice . This key is stored in the
corresponding license, which is only accessible if Alice’s DRM
reference monitor is untampered. After this decryption, Alice’s
DRM reference monitor generates the symmetric key KcontentBob
and encrypts the content using that key. Afterwards, Alice’s
DRM reference monitor generates a license for Bob and updates
its own license. Bob’s license includes the KcontentBob and usage
rights and is encrypted with Ksession and is sent together with the
encrypted content to Bob’s DRM. After receiving the message,
Bob’s DRM reference monitor decrypts the license and binds it to
Bob’s platform configuration by sealing it to the actual platform
configuration. Afterwards, Bob’s DRM reference monitor stores
the encrypted content.
The process of transferring digital content between different
users or devices of one user is similar to the process of purchasing
content except for two additional steps. These are checking the
sender’s license with respect to transfer rights and updating the
sender’s license before generating and transferring the receiver’s
license. In contrast to purchasing content, transferring content
does not require any interactions with the content provider. How-
ever, the proposed protocol ensures that the transferred content
can only be used according to usage rules, which were defined
by the content provider at the time of purchase.
To prevent that a customer transfers digital content to another
customer and then replays an old secure storage, we again pro-
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pose to use the monotonic counter of the TPM. Using this concept,
it can be ensured that a misbehaving customer cannot replay an
old secure storage after he transferred digital content to another
customer.
4.3 related work
In the following, we review related work proposed by the scien-
tific community and compare them with our contributions in this
section.
Access Control for XML-Documents
The model proposed in [BF02] supports selective authorizations
to parts of documents based on the semantic structure of XML
documents. Authorizations can be defined for different nodes
together with propagation options. Regarding these aspects, the
model is very similar to our work. However, the supported op-
erations and their semantics are different, since our approach
is able to differentiate between objects with different histories.
The support of copying data differs from our work, since the
model proposed in [BF02] supports only a push of different
views of a document to different sets of users, whereas our
model allows us to define which elements of one document may
be reused in other documents. Similar approaches can be found
in [DCPS00, DdVPS02, GB02, MTK06], where [GB02, MTK06]
consider access control rules for the read operation only. All
these approaches consider the XML element as the smallest unit
of protection, in contrast to our approach, which is capable of
handling parts of the text stored in an XML element.
Iwaihara et al. allow to define access based on the version rela-
tionship of documents and elements among each other [ICAW05].
They define six operations including copy, which is similar to our
copy operation, but can only be applied to elements or subtrees
and not to text content or parts of the text content. In contrast to
our model, the modification of the text content of an element is
modeled by the operation update only, which describes that the
entire content of a node is replaced with a new content. Concern-
ing AC, Iwaihara et al. only consider read and write operations
and do not define a copy operation as part of their privileges.
Consequently, they cannot express which transfers among doc-
uments are permitted or denied. Moreover, they do not have
the concept of splitting copied elements to have different history
information for parts from different sources.
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Controlled Sharing of Digital Content
Since the specifications of the TCG are still in progress, many
open issues exist. There is a large number of work focusing on
the concepts of trusted computing. [SZJD04] presents a compre-
hensive prototype based on trusted computing technologies. In
particular, it comes up with an architecture for integrity measure-
ment, which contains the integrity reporting protocol, which we
enhanced in Section 4.2.5 to make it resistant against masquerad-
ing attacks.
Terra [GPC+03] provides an approach for remote attestation. It
supports the integrity measurement of virtual machines provid-
ing runtime environment for sets of processes. The approach does
not build up on TPM and does not provide a protocol for integrity
reporting to remote entities, which are the main differences to
our work.
Our work is based on the assumption that a trusted OS pro-
vides us with the measurement of all executed code, i.e. binary
attestation. In contrast to that, [HCF04, SS04] focus on semantic at-
testation based on attesting the behavior of software components.
Nevertheless, these approaches require also robust integrity pro-
tocols for submitting their measured properties.
[BLP05] proposes the integration of key exchange protocols
into Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [BCC04] in P2P net-
works, which is basically similar to our approach. However, the
objectives of the integration of key exchange protocols are dif-
ferent, since [BLP05] aims at building stable identities in P2P
networks. Additionally, the presented approach does not fea-
ture integrity reporting and cannot be directly applied to remote
attestation.
Another related work is [GPS06] which aims at building se-
cure tunnels between endpoints. But this approach adds a new
platform property certificate, which links the AIK to the TLS-
Certificate. Moreover, the presented approach focuses on server
attestation, which needs in turn an additional trusted CA that
offers the platform property certificate. In contrast to that, our ap-
proach focuses on client attestation without an additional trusted
CA, since we directly bind the cryptographic channel to the AIK.
4.4 conclusions
In this chapter, we focused on organized business processes. In
this kind of business processes, the involved parties have more
stable relationships with each other. Stable relationships allow
the use of hard security mechanisms, since this kind of mecha-
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nisms require established settings, e.g., shared keys and known
identities. In this context, we addressed usage control which is a
prerequisite for a wide range of business processes. Usage control
demands two functionalities. First, we need methods for defining
usage rules. Second, mechanisms for enforcing the defined usage
rules are required. In this section, we addressed both aspects of
usage control.
In Section 4.1, we proposed a model for controlling access to
XML documents. The main features of our model are its flexibil-
ity and expressiveness. Both are the result of our history-based
approach for addressing objects in an access control rule. We use
histories to record operations which are performed on an XML
document or parts of it. The history information can be used for
specifying objects in access control rules. This approach allows
us to define usage rules.
In Section 4.2, we focused on enforcing defined usage rules
on remote platforms. For this, we proposed a robust integrity
reporting protocol which is necessary when a remote platform
has to perform security relevant operations, e.g., to enforce a
security policy. This protocol can be used for developing a robust
Digital Rights Management (DRM) system that supports transfer
of digital goods to other users or devices. We presented such a
DRM system in Section 4.2.7.
117

5
C O N C L U S I O N S A N D F U T U R E W O R K
In this work, we had been primarily concerned with trust building
and usage control in context of business processes. In Section
2, we argued why addressing these two topics is crucial when
companies make an effort to streamline their business processes
with the help of information technology.
In Section 3, we proposed a reputation system for electronic
negotiations to enable market participants to evaluate each other
and their offered goods. For this purpose, we developed a sys-
tem architecture which allows business partners to evaluate each
other with the help of ratings after a concluded transaction. These
ratings are aggregated to support a market participant to find a
trustworthy business partner. This aggregation is based on the
concept of Web of Trust to make the reputation system robust
against malicious behavior aiming at manipulating the reputa-
tion of some market participants. In addition to the aggregated
values, our approach offers differentiated views for assessing a
business partner’s capabilities. Instead of an overall information,
a potential partner can get insight about the business behavior
and the quality of the offered goods separately, since these do
not necessarily depend on each other.
In addition to the central reputation system, we proposed a
decentralized reputation system for P2P networks. We designed
and implemented a set of protocols supporting trust building
in P2P networks. Our protocols allow peers to rate each other
after concluded transactions. This is done without any trusted
third party. This feature preserves the decentralized character of
P2P networks. Special attention was paid to the robustness of the
proposed reputation system. For that purpose, we analyzed exist-
ing algorithms for rating aggregations with help of a simulation
and found a shortcoming. We found out the impact of malicious
behavior depends on the number of transactions in a market.
In other words, the computed trust value of a malicious peer
increases in course of time. To solve this issue, we proposed a
robust algorithm for rating aggregation and proved its efficiency
with the help of simulation.
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In addition to the reputation systems, we have analyzed a con-
crete business process, i.e., Sale by Call for Tenders (CFT), with
respect to trust building. It was shown that a naive adoption of
the CFT to open market places is subject to security attacks like
eavesdropping of messages, masquerading of identity, message
manipulation, and repudiation of messages. The new secure CFT
protocol introduced in Section 3.5.2 shows how the basic CFT can
be supplemented with non-repudiable communications includ-
ing authentication of origin, message integrity, and transaction
authentication. This approach ensures that no new manipulation
possibilities are introduced by the realization of the CFT protocol
with computer support.
Our analysis revealed that further drawbacks of the CFT pro-
tocol surface in the economic design of the protocol. The main
source of manipulation is caused by the unequal distribution
of knowledge and of control between buyers and sellers within
the CFT process. The secure sealed-bid auction protocol intro-
duced in Section 3.5.3 provides an interesting alternative to a CFT
because it overcomes these limitations. It provides means for a
bidder to verify the result of the auction process, and thus, intro-
duces trust among the participants because a correct application
of the winner determination rules is guaranteed.
In Section 4, we addressed usage control from different per-
spectives. In Section 4.1, we showed how to define usage rules
for controlling access to XML documents in a flexible way. In
Section 4.2, we explained how to enforce security polices, i.e.,
usage rules.
In Section 4.1, we have presented a model for access control for
XML documents. In our model, access to a document and its parts
can be defined based both on the current document content and
on the history information that captures the operations performed
on that document. Moreover, the history information includes
the source of the parts of a document that were transferred from
different documents. Our model provides a mechanism to keep
track of the parts of the text content of an XML element, where the
parts were transferred from different locations or were created
in different contexts. This enables us to have protection units
smaller than the XML element, which leads to a finer granularity
that can enhance both security and usability.
The objects in our model are defined by XPath patterns. For
that purpose, we have extended XPath to access history informa-
tion. Additionally, we have defined five operations which can be
invoked by human subjects to view and manipulate these objects.
The effects of the operations are recorded in histories.
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Afterwards, we presented a system architecture that enables
us to apply the model in a scenario where multiple users concur-
rently edit documents in an efficient way. The proposed system
architecture maintains the rules, the documents and the history,
so that this information is accessible for access decisions of the
PDP. We introduced the check-in and check-out approach, which
reduces the overhead of recalculating permissions for dependent
documents. We specified the workflow for editing a document by
explaining all necessary algorithms including the algorithm for
the calculation of permissions and the algorithm for the creation
of views.
We addressed the issue of controlling access to digital content
in Section 4.2. First, we analyzed existing DRM systems with
respect to customer acceptance and security. We found out, that
current DRM systems rely on protection measures on the ba-
sis of unreliable software-based solutions. In addition, they do
not sufficiently consider customers’ expectations. To overcome
these shortcomings, we proposed to use trusted computing tech-
nologies because of two reasons. First, they allow us to build
hardware-based (and thus more robust) DRM systems. Second,
trust computing is an emerging technology and will be available
in different platforms, in particular mobile devices [Sad08]. This
trend will spur the interoperability of systems based on trusted
computing technologies and allow consumers to transfer and use
their purchased content to other devices and/or users.
Remote attestation is one of the key technologies specified
by the TCG. It offers the possibility to attest the configuration
of the local platform to a remote platform with the help of in-
tegrity reporting protocols. We have shown that masquerading
attacks against integrity reporting protocols are possible. This
evolves because the AIK does not reveal whether the attesting
system is the one, which really provides the measured values.
This shortcoming may become relevant when remote attestation
is used to guarantee the trustworthiness of client systems, such
as DRM-clients. To address this issue, we have presented a robust
protocol which prevents masquerading attacks. For that purpose,
we added a key agreement scheme into an integrity reporting
protocol. The resulting protocol guarantees that the communica-
tion after the remote attestation is authentic, i.e. the challenger
communicates with the system that provided the measurement
values.
In Section 4.2.7, we presented a fair DRM system. The previ-
ously mentioned integrity reporting protocol is a building block
of the proposed DRM system. This system considers both, the
requirements of content providers and the requirements of con-
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sumers. It provides a high protection level. At the same time, it
allows users to transfer their purchased content to other devices
or users.
Finally, DRM itself is a strongly debated topic. In course of
time, companies may develop alternative business models that do
not require protection of copyright in its current form. However,
the integrity reporting presented in Section 4.2.5 is also useful as
a building block in other business processes.
future work
Although this thesis has shown a range of security mechanisms
for trust building and usage control in context of business pro-
cesses, it opens up some research opportunities and questions
that are still unanswered. In the following, we describes some of
these important areas.
Reputation Systems
The reputation system proposed in Section 3.3 is a central repu-
tation system with a trusted party. Since this party can observe
the complete market including all transaction and corresponding
ratings, it can apply mechanisms to detect attacks against the
reputation system. These mechanisms could base on clustering
of market participants on the basis of their bilateral ratings and
would be a reasonable complement to our reputation system
which aggregates ratings from a certain market participant’s
point of view.
As shown in Section 3.4.8.4, transitive rating aggregation is
robust against ballot stuffing and bad-mouthing. However, this
approach is not applicable in case of new peers entering the
market. In this case no trust paths can be found. Thus, transitive
rating aggregation is useless for this kind of peers. Instead, they
could use other rating aggregation mechanisms which consider
only the rating list of the peer in question. Such a mechanism
could analyze a rating list with respect to discrepancies which
could occur as a result of malicious behavior. For instance, in
case of ballot stuffing, a malicious peer receives numerous high
ratings from a small group of (other malicious) peers. Given this
fact, we could divide the ratees into two groups according to the
number of ratings. One group contains ratees who have given
several ratings whereas the other group consists of those ratees
who have given only few ratings. Then, we calculate the average
rating value for each group and compare the two results with
122
each other. We assume that a significant difference between the
two average values is a sign for ballot stuffing.
The reputation systems proposed in this thesis aim at trust
building towards human actors. However, since autonomous
computer systems, e.g., a service, may be involved in business
processes, it would be necessary to develop mechanisms to assess
the trustworthiness of technical systems. This kind of mechanism
could base on trusted parties or witnesses that observe transac-
tions, e.g., using a service, and make their observations available
for other interested parties.
Fair Auctions
Our protocol for sealed-bid auctions presented in Section 3.5.3
assumes a trusted third party (TTP). However, this assumption
causes an overhead for setting up a TTP. Thus, developing a
protocol for sealed-bid auctions which does not rely on TTPs
would be a more feasible solution.
A sealed-bid auction is only one possible form of pricing mech-
anisms. Other pricing mechanisms need other kinds of methods
for trust building. We explain this with the help of a concrete
pricing mechanisms, i.e., reverse pricing. It is a dynamic pricing
mechanism. The very basic idea of it is simple: a seller first spec-
ifies a secret threshold price for a certain product and offers it
to potential buyers. By naming a price a potential buyer indi-
cates his willingness to buy the product at his price. The deal
is conducted if the buyer’s price exceeds the seller’s threshold.
Otherwise the seller’s offer remains open. Since the threshold
price is secret, bidders have to rely on the seller’s actions and
decisions. In particular, a bidder has to trust that a not accepted
bid means that the bid was below the seller’s threshold price.
In other words, reverse pricing, if solely based on trust, usually
lacks transparency which may lead to unfair behavior. Thus, we
need a protocol which meets two requirements. First, the seller
should not be able to increase his initial threshold price while
keeping it confidential. Second, a bidder should be able to verify
whether his bid exceeds a seller’s threshold without learning the
threshold.
Access Control for XML-Documents
One possible enhancement of our model would be supporting
provisions and obligations [HBP05]. These concepts define con-
ditions, which must be fulfilled before access is granted or after
access has been granted respectively, e.g, a condition stating that
the user must sign an agreement before he can access certain
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data. We can extend our model by adding another field to our
access control rules which specify provisions and obligations.
Another open issue in this field is the efficiency analysis of
our access control model. In particular, the algorithms for rule
evaluation and view creation should be analyzed with respect to
runtime and memory usage.
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